According to a La Razón report (“La Asamblea propone un Congreso 100% uninominal”), Bolivia’s Constituent Assembly is considering radical changes to the composition of the legislature in the new constitution. The first is to move from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The second is to transform all legislators into “uninominal” representatives elected in single-member districts (SMDs).
I certainly have no problem w/ a unicameral legislature—at least objectively. Of course, one of the functions of a bicameral legislature is to provide two different kinds of representation. But these make more sense in federal systems—and Bolivia’s not a federal system (at least not yet).
The issue of all uninominal representatives is a thorny one. On the one hand, it’s a break from the fused-ballot electoral system that has linked the fates of presidential candidates & party seat distributions in general elections. But a case could be made either way.
The real problem, as I see it, is first-past-the-post plurality winners in SMDs. Like many countries, Bolivia has historically had a multiparty system. I don’t think plurality elections for SMD representatives is very practicable, under such circumstances. Sure, there’s the chance that a process of “institutional learning” will take place. And, yes, plurality electoral systems can encourage “centripetal” behavior that moves parties closer towards a moderate center. But it can also encourage intense fragmentation or gross misrepresentation of minorities (whether these be ethnic, economic, ideological, or something else).
Since 1997, Bolivia’s have elected half their House of Deputies using plurality formulas in SMDs as part of a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system; the other half of the lower house was elected using proportional representation in “compensatory” fashion (so the final seat distribution reflected the list-PR vote distribution). But in many of the 70 diputados uninominales won by slim margins (some as low as 20%). The result of a legislature made up entirely of plurality SMD deputies is one in which many parties, movements, or social sectors are shut out of representation.
Again, this demonstrates a move by Bolivian political elites in the wrong direction. As w/ the idea of a presidential runoff, they’re too heavily emphasizing vertical accountability & majoritarianism. In the case of the legislature, I think a better option would be to seek solutions that reduce polarization, promote centripetal bargaining, and allow for broader representativeness. And my solution’s not proportional representation.
If we’re moving to radical changes, why not propose the alternative vote (AV) or some other preferential voting system? AV is still a plurality electoral system, but it encourages multiparty coordination & bargaining. Since voters (in AV) are allowed to rank order their preferences, voters—and not political elites—can make decisions about cross-party alliances. Basically, in AV electoral systems, voters rank order their candidates from most to least preferred; if no candidate wins a majority of the vote, the candidate w/ the fewest first preference votes is dropped & his/her voters second preference votes are shifted to their respective candidates; this continues until a candidate wins an absolute majority. For all its novelty, AV electoral systems are actually rather simple—and they provide much useful information about the complexity of voters’ preferences.
