I’m Miguel Centellas, a political science professor at Mount St. Mary’s University. Because of academic interests, I post frequently on Bolivian politics. I also occasionally discuss interesting books, pop culture, and daily life in Baltimore.
I never understood why many jumped to the conclusion that Evo Morales was an “indigenous” political leader in Bolivia. Yes, he’s primarily of indigenous origin. But does that make him an “indigenous” leader? Especially in Bolivia, which has a long tradition of indigenous political movements—the kataristas—who were mostly concentrated in the Andean Altiplano. During the 1980s, the most important of these was MRTKL (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Revolución); in the 1990s, it was MIP (Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti). These weren’t the only such movements. And it’s important to note that Evo was never a member of any of these. He belongs to a different trajectory.
In my dissertation, I identify three different social discourses that struggled together in the 1980s-1990s. The first is the “national-corporatist” model; one based on the developmentalist & statist model of the 1952 National Revolution & the ideology of the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario). This discourse emerged in the aftermath of the Chaco War, during the 1930s-1940s (it has much in common w/ the Mexican national project of the 1930s-1940s).
The second is the katarista model of indigenous (primarily Aymara) mobilization against a “neocolonial” state. This discourse emerged in the 1970s & actively challenged the image of a homogenous Bolivian national identity (the 1952 revolutionary model was an “integrationist” national identity based on Spanish language & mestizo identity). At some points, some leaders (such as Felipe Quispe) called for secession or the creation of a new “Qollasuyu” autonomous Aymara homeland. At other times, it took a more pluralist approach & sought inclusion into society, but w/ a greater emphasis on their “indigenousness.”
The third discourse is the “liberal-pluralist” discourse that emerged alongside democratization in the 1980s. This discourse adopted the idea that there was no single, homogenous “Bolivian” identity. Instead, it slowly reformed the state to better incorporate previously excluded groups (e.g. the muicipalization of Participación Popular created autonomous indigenous communities). This discourse dominated Bolivian politics throughout the 1990s; it gave birth to what Carlos Toranzo calls “lo pluri-multi” (a pluralist, multicultural view of the nation).
One of the arguments of my dissertation is that, ironically, this shift allowed previously marginalized groups to emerge to challenge the state. Another problem, of course, was an electoral reform (the shift to a mixed-member proportional electoral system) encouraged anti-systemic groups at the expense of moderate ones.
But the key point here is that Evo is not a member of the katarista discourse. And he’s not an “outsider” either. Evo was involved in electoral politics at the national level since the 1980s. But he participated in the various IU (Izquierda Unida) alliances, not any of the “indigenous” parties. One of the most interesting things about Evo’s political career is the antagonism w/ which indigenous leaders (e.g. Cárdenas, Quispe, Barrenechea). Even one of his earlier collaborators (the closest thing to an “indigenous” wing of the socialist left in the 1990s), Alejo Véliz, broke w/ Evo some time ago.
Instead, Evo was always a part of IU, which included the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), Frente de Salvación Nacional (FSN), the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), and other offshoots of Bolivian Marxist & Maoist socialism. In fact, Evo’s party—MAS (Movimiento as Socialismo)—was actually founded in 1985 by David Añez Pedraza. Only then it was known as MAS-U (Unzaguismo) after Unzaga de la Vega, the founder of Bolivia’s Falange (the fascist party). In 1999, Evo & Pedraza entered an alliance that allowed Evo to run as president under the “MAS” banner (Pedraza became the party’s president emeritus).
Evo is clearly a campesino (peasant) syndicalist leader. But he’s not really an “indigenous” one. He certainly didn’t use such discourse until the 2005 election (in large part, I suspect, to capture votes in the Altiplano that usually went to Quispe, a rival for leadership of the October 2003 social movements). Lately, in popular discourse, Evo has rediscovered his indigenousness (ironically, reports of his broken Aymara at his inauguration were well-known; Evo is clearly more comfortable speaking in Spanish than in either Aymara or Quechua).
But his recent conflicts w/ indigenous movements across Bolivia suggest that he is not a katarista. After all, the kataristas disliked the centralized state & actively sought for greater decentralization—they wanted more powers devolved to local, indigenous authorities. Instead, Evo & his MAS government have regularly argued against that kind of decentralization & instead for a stronger central state role in the economy & social sphere. The recent clashes at Mididi & the brewing conflict between indigenous leaders & MAS delegates over the ownership of natural resources is another such example.
The best way to categorize Evo is not as a “new” kind of “indigenous” leader, but rather as a throwback to the national-corporatism of the 1950s MNR government.
I think you're essentially right here, esp. with an eye to the history of Evo-MAS (with respect to Quispe, etc.).
But, you do have to take into account at least three things: 1) his push to have "community justice" institulionized, 2) his (failed, from what I hear) policy to required that local officials be fluent in the local, indigenous language, and 3) his (definitely failed) attempt to strengthen indigenous language instruction in the education system. Plus, doesn't the MAS approach to decentralization take indigenous polities-regions as possible political units?
Anyhow, I think the bigger question is just what kind of political entity katarista-style indigenism is. Where does it come from? Whose interests does it serve?
To be an indigenista is not the same thing as being an indigenous leader. (Sorry, that's kinda cryptic, but I gotta run...)
Posted by
Ben
May 28, 2007 6:17 PM
For the long story on katarismo, I’d refer you to some of the writings of Xavier Albo (lots of articles on JSTOR or Project Muse or other databases). There’s one particularly one I liked called “And From Kataristas to MNRistas?” that’s frequently cited.
But, yes, it’s certainly not mutually necessary for someone to be “indigenous” and “katarista.” And there is some overlap. While Evo himself was never in the katarista camp, Alvaro García Linera (his vice president) was (he was in EGTK along w/ Quispe). But katarismo is a millenarian indigenous political ideology that rejects “external” ideas and prefers an “autochthonous” social, political, and economic model. On the surface, this sounds like Evo’s plan. But his emphasis on central state authority, state-led development (a throwback to the 1930s ISI [import substitution industrialization] model), and sectoral corporatist-syndicalism runs counter to the kind of ideological & mobilizational strategy the kataristas employ. Evo is clearly more shaped by Trotskyite & Sorel-style syndicalism.
As for Evo’s rather weak track record w/ pro “indigenous” policies (such as his language policies), these show his lack of creativity. The bilingual education for indigenous peoples—w/ an emphasis on indigenous-language education in the primary grades—was actually a policy of the first Goni (Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada) presidency as part of the 1993-1997 reforms. Similarly, the incorporation of indigenous justice systems & territorial units was actually a policy implemented in 1994 w/ Participación Popular (again, a Goni-era reform). Thus, Evo can herald these advances to the international media (which is, sadly, rather ignorant of the 1990s Bolivian reforms) to claim that he’s making progress on issues that were implemented by Bolivian politicians a decade ago.
Where Evo has really focused his attention—and actually made some progress—is on macroeconomic issues. But here he’s following a playbook laid out in the 1930s-1940s during the Busch & Villarroel regimes, though his leftist rhetoric resembles the short-lived Torres regime (1970-1971). Evo’s “indigenism” actually also closely resembles that of René Barrientos (1964-1969), who despite his anti-communist (it was under him that Che Guevara was captured & killed), followed the basic state-capitalism (or ISI) policies that grew out of the 1930s-1940s and were entrenched by the “1952 state” established after the MNR came to power in April 9, 1952.
In short, Evo is better understood as a throwback to mid-twentieth century populism & ISI, than any kind of “new” indigenous movement. It shouldn’t be surprising that some of his most vocal opponents are indigenous (whether katarista or not) leaders. Currently, MAS is facing a revolt of many of its constituent assembly delegates from indigenous groups (particular CIDOB & CONAMAK) who want the new constitution to enshrine the autonomy of indigenous communities—particularly w/ regard to control over natural resources in their territories—but it’s MAS leadership loyal to Evo who reject this, wanting to instead concentrate such power in the central state.
Wow, fascinating and educational interchange, Miguel. I'd be interested in your take on Evo's personal vision (if he has one) of where he'd like to take his country. Correa, here in Ecuador, and Chavez, of course, continually go on about their plans and visions (not always consistent, I should say).
To me, though, Evo is still somewhat mysterious in terms of his own personality/vision and his (apparently) subservient attitude toward Chavez is interesting too; it's like he's in awe of the guy, which gives me unpleasant vision of the Indian bowing to the criollo once again...
What's your take on the guy?
Posted by
Tambopaxi
May 30, 2007 10:08 PM
I’ll try to work up something along those lines, but it might take a few weeks. In a week, I go to Bolivia for three weeks (mostly to visit family). So it might be mid-July before I get back to doing more research-writing. But let me think of a (very) brief answer:
First, I don’t think of Chávez as a criollo; so that analogy doesn’t work so well. Both are clearly mestizos. But I see your argument (and share it): it’s odd that Bolivia should decide to shake the American yoke to exchange it for a Venezuelan one.
Second, Evo (like Chávez) also sometimes uses ambiguous & contradictory rhetoric. So it’s difficult to pin down. But he’s also recently started making a public list of “enemies” to his regime & going after them. So this is troubling. Yesterday, Congress issued warrants for the remaining four members of the Constitutional Tribunal after they refused a summons (for its part, the court argued that the summons was, itself, unconstitutional). Evo has also explicitly named Bolivian media as “enemies” of the regime. We’ll see whether press censorship is on the horizon or not.
But I share your concerns about Evo tying his regime too closely to Chávez. And not for ideological reasons. Instead, I think Bolivia should more closely align itself w/ Brazil & Peru. Venezuela is clearly trying to build “sphere of influence” in Latin America to counter the growing economic power of Brazil. It’s clear that Bolivia is a piece in the puzzle.
Evo should be careful that he’s not being used as a pawn for Venezuelan interests. When the dust settles, Brazil & Chile will still be regional political & economic juggernauts—Bolivia can ill afford to further alienate them.
