The news from Bolivia is not so good. It’s sad that June is now just recognized as the start of “bloqueo season” in the country (K8 & I will be traveling just then; will we be able to reach La Paz?). But things are getting dicey again.
Evo Morales’s government issued warrants for the arrest of members of the Constitutional Tribunal. The members refused to answer an earlier summons, claiming that the summons didn’t fulfill constitutional requirements. Evo has now publicly stated that he—through the constituent assembly—plans to strip the constitutional court. Judicial branch employees marched in Sucre in protest.
And w/ fresh attacks on Bolivia’s press, the echoes of RCTV (and now Globovisión) are fresh in many minds. Certainly, Evo has not pursued the same kinds of anti-press tactics that Chávez has in Venezuela. And, frankly, I don’t think Evo has the political capital, even if he wanted to. But the country’s political polarization continues to increase, dangerously.
Meanwhile, four departments (those of the eastern-lowland media luna) have, once again, declared themselves in a “state of emergency” over simmering conflicts between regional prefects & the central government. (A mass mobilization inspired by Evo & aiming to force the Cochabamba prefect from office resulted in three dead this January.)
Interestingly, Evo’s MAS is facing internal divisions. The indigenous organizations that joined the MAS umbrella political front oppose plans by Evo & his supporters to write a constitution that centralizes power—especially territorial land-based resources—in the central state. These organizations—principally CIDOB (the confederation of indigenous peoples of the Amazonic lowlands) & CONAMAQ (the national alliance of Ayllus & Markas of the Qullasuyu, a primarily Aymara organization) demand regional autonomy & local (indigenous, communitarian) control over such resources. Meanwhile, Evo’s government is also battling indigenous communities in Madidi, which have so far left several injured.
These kinds of conflicts, between campesinos (peasants), colonizadores (recent arrivals to territories), and pueblos indígenas (indigenous communities) are becoming a daily hassle for MAS. But the conflict is nothing new. Since the 1980s, the Chapare was split by conflicts between cocaleros (colonizadores; recent arrivals to those lands) & previous residents (most of them indigenous-mestizo). In the end, of course, the cocaleros won, consolidating their position in the Chapare coca fields. The conflict is now spreading. Internal migration patterns (which began in the 1950s during the country’s MNR-led modernization efforts & accelerated in the 1980s after the economy’s collapse) have made this inevitable: large numbers of Bolivians (primarily from Andean communities, such as Oruro) have migrated into previously sparsely populated, but fertile, areas. Evo Morales is a product of that displacement (as am I, btw).
What is most interesting about Bolivia—and sets it apart from the Venezuelan case—is that Evo is not in full control over his own political “movement.” At its core, MAS is led by cocaleros & others who have worked together since the 1980s as members of the anti-neoliberal left. But it’s most recent success comes from its alliance w/ numerous groups, including: several indigenous organizations, the La Paz middle class (especially Del Granado’s MSM party), the El Alto “street,” and other sectoral organizations. But these MAS allies are latecomers (from post-2003).
Especially problematic for Evo will be the indigenous organizations & El Alto. So far, the residents of El Alto (who are better described as “cholo” than as “indigenous”)1 have remained at Evo’s side. This group supports him (according to polls) by as much as 90%. But the El Alto street can be just as fickle as it is powerful. It’s high support for Carlos Mesa quickly evaporated, and Mesa fell as soon as El Alto went to the streets against him.
And the El Alto street often takes its cues from the surrounding Altiplano—and its indigenous organizations. This is especially problematic for Evo, who’s government is applauded internationally as an “indigenous” government. If the indigenous forcefully mobilize against him, he will lose much-needed international prestige & support. Plus, if the Altiplano communities rise up against him (and it’s leader, Felipe Quispe, has historically been a strong critic of Evo), it can blockade the La Paz-El Alto metropolitan area. Once that happens (as in October 2003), it won’t take long for residents of El Alto to turn on the government.
In the past few months, Evo has been publicly drawing up a long list of enemies: the church, the middle class, the business elites, the cruceño elite, the media, the United States, international investors, Chile, Brazil (it’s a very rocky relationship now), and now FIFA. But as the list of “enemies” grows, one begins to wonder who’s left to support this “mass” movement. And the two groups Evo can’t afford to alienate (other than the military, which in Latin America is, sadly, a no-brainer) are the indigenous communities & the El Alto street. But he seems to be moving to alienate them, too.
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1 It’s important to note that I don’t use “cholo” in a derogatory sense, but rather simply in its descriptive sense (as also used by anthropologists). In that sense, “cholo” means something like “urbanized” indigenous (and mestizos who self-identify w/ their “indigenousness”).
