With 6 de agosto fast approaching, tensions are mounting in Bolivia. That date is the national holiday (Bolivia’s Fourth of July), often commemorated w/ military and/or civil parades. When I was a schoolboy, I represented my school (Christo Rey) at one such desfile in Santa Cruz. But these days, the date is becoming controversial. And in places like Santa Cruz, regional holidays are swiftly becoming more important (in Santa Cruz, it’s 24 de septiembre). But the government is also adding to the tensions.
One of the problems w/ “national” holidays is that they require a common, shared idea of what that nation is (in Benedict Anderson’s phrase, an “imagined community”). That’s no longer the case in Bolivia. One of the problems, of course, is that neither of the two extremes (the indigenista & media luna regionalists) is willing to see Bolivia as a multicultural—and mestizo—society. The various sectors of Bolivia’s fragmented society now uphold identity politics as more important to building & nurturing a political community. More & more, we see regional & sectarian flags at social protests. The once ubiquitous Bolivian tricolor, seen at every major demonstration, is now increasingly rare: in Santa Cruz it’s the green-white-green, in Tarija it’s the red & white, and Sucre it’s the burgundian cross, in the Altiplano it’s the wiphala. Even the recent cabildo in La Paz was a shock: an incredible number of the flags seen in pictures were the once-rarely-seen paceño plum & green flags (I was also surprised to see so many of them out in public during my last visit).
To make matters worse, Evo’s government is now insisting on a number of “indigenous-military” parades throughout the country. This would include Santa Cruz. An increasingly frequent display in the Altiplano, these parades involve units of the armed forces marching alongside indigenous militias (such as the Ponchos Rojos). These events have sparked controversy regarding the proper role of the military (and whether it is the only instrument of legitimate state coercion), fears of an ideologically indoctrinated military & paramilitary backed regime, and complaints that the indigenous militias often march w/ the wiphala, rather than the “national” flag.
Next week, the MAS government is sending hundreds of indigenous marchers from the Altiplano to join in such parades in Santa Cruz, a city that is increasingly in rebellion precisely because it doesn’t want to have an “Andean” identity imposed upon it. Sure, there is considerable racism there (though it’s not so much “ethnic” racism as “cultural” racism). But there are also historical legacies of previous governments (such as the 1964-1969 René Barrientos military dictatorship) specifically using rural indigenous paramilitaries to strong arm urban opponents—especially in Santa Cruz. Thus, this clearly looks to most observers as a repeat of previous experience: a government backed by a military-campesino alliance intimidating its urban-based opposition.
This probably won’t end well, if the government insists on such a parade. Santa Cruz civic leaders have already entered into “emergency” sessions to discuss the matter & plan a response. Leaders in Tarija are already preparing to declare “de facto” autonomy (as Santa Cruz did several weeks ago). Add to this the growing anti-La Paz sentiment in Sucre (where indigenous militia parades have been frequently seen).
One of the problems w/ “indigenous” parades of this sort is that there is no single “indigenous” community in Bolivia. To think so is to grossly misunderstand Bolivian social history. Most will recognize the important split between Aymara & Quechua communities (which have historical antagonisms). But these are further divided into smaller communities. One of the weaknesses of previous military-campesino pacts was that they benefited some communities over other, creating resentment. During the 1960s, a civil war between Cliza & Ucureña factions (both Quechua communities in the Cochabamba valley) proved difficult to contain. This was, of course, part of the strategy of military regimes: by keeping indigenous communities divided and dependent on state patronage, they could control more easily manipulate them. We’ve seen Evo rely extensively on two groups: the cocaleros (loyal to him since the 1980s) & the Ponchos Rojos (drawn primarily from Aymaran communities previously loyal to Felipe Quispe & partly organized by Alvaro García Linera when he was an EGTK member).
Is this just a repeat of previous political history? It’s interesting that many Bolivian intellectuals (both critics & supports) compare Evo to Barrientos & Juan José Torres (another military dictator). Many also compare Evo’s policies to the “military socialism” of David Toro (yet another military dictator). This is not to say that Evo is a dictator; he has allowed far too much open opposition to bear that label. But it says something about his policies: they aren’t “new” policies, just a return to the earlier populist nationalism of Bolivia’s pre-democratic history. Except that this regime (Evo’s) is substantially weaker than previous military-campesino governments (the support of either of the two sides of the equation could easily dissipate), even as the liberal-pluralist democratic regime of the 1980s-1990s eroded support for a common “national” identity. Evo is now trying to impose his vision of “national unity” on Santa Cruz (and other rebellious regions). But it’s a “national” vision many in the eastern periphery are not willing to accept.
For more, see this series of brief reports in La Razón. Here’s a report from El Deber, which mentions that at least 2,000 campesinos are expected to be brought in by the government for the parade (only 3,000 military personnel will participate). The press release from Evo’s spokesman is presented in El Diario.
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PS. For some reason, several Bolivian newspaper websites aren’t loading (Sucre’s Correo del Sur has an “under construction” banner). Is the internet just acting up? Or should I be worried? I’m sure it’s nothing; but I like to read the news from Sucre once in a while.
