I don’t have time to post much today, but (since K8 reminded me): today is “Santa Cruz Day.” Today’s also the Oriente Petrolero vs. Blooming cross-town “clasico” match. Here’s hoping Oriente wins!

I briefly mentioned the recent Belgian crisis in class today, while discussing the different historical paths towards democracy in 19th & 20th century Europe. The potential (though unlikely) disintegration of Belgium (as a state) is a stark reminder that states are not permanent, anywhere in the world. Something Bolivians should pay careful attention to. Because a “velvet divorce” is one thing, a bloody one is another thing altogether.

Looks like Fujimori is finally going to be extradited back to Peru to face charges related to the abuse of power during his 1992-2000 semi-authoritarian regime. He had been living in Japan for several years; he was recently aprehended, while in Chile.

I covered Fujimori as one of my four cases (the others were Perón, Várgas, and Chávez) of populist Latin American leaders in my “Heroes & Villains: Populism in Latin America” course last semester. These are the materials we used:

More at my Pronto* Peru bookstore.

A recent study by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI) shows that most American college students can’t pass a test on political institutions & history. I know standardized tests aren’t de rigueur. But they do seem to say something. Like how a fifth of Americans can’t locate the US on a world map. So I took the ISI civics quiz. Some of the questions were trickier than I thought, but I’m happy to report that I passed (though only w/ a 93.3%). Care to try your luck?

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PS. It turns out the above claim about American’s geographic ignorance isn't true. Here’s a 2006 National Geographic report.

Today’s La Razón reports another potential modification to Bolivia’s presidential electoral system: lowering the minimum threshold for the presidential winner (from 50%+1 to 40%+1). There’s nothing inherently un-democratic about this move—since all thresholds are arbitrary conventions. Still, the opposition (the article cites a PODEMOS spokesperson) clearly sees this as an attempt to ensure Evo’s reelection (MAS is also seeking indefinite reelection of incumbent presidents) in light of his declining popular support in opinion polls.

The 40%+1 rule would only kick in if no candidate wins an absolute majority (50%+1) of the valid popular vote and the second runner up is behind by at least 10% of the vote. Thus, this rule is essentially little different than the set of provisions used in Nicaragua. In the even that the first place winner doesn’t win 50%+1 and the second runner up is behind by less than 10% the president would be elected by a second round runoff election.

My objection to this system is that this solution may not work well in a highly fragmented party system. Currently, Bolivian politics appears polarized between MAS & PODEMOS, but that’s only superficial. There are a number of smaller parties (both w/in & w/out the MAS & PODEMOS “big tents”) that suggest that a more “parliametnarized” style of politics may be more beneficial. Regardless of the runoff or a 40%+1 provisional threshold, Bolivia desperately needs an electoral system that encourages moderated multi-party politics & coalition building.

I recently ordered two books from Escaparate, an online Bolivian book distributor. They just arrived in the mail. I’m pretty impressed; it took a little more than two weeks. And the shipping wasn’t too pricy ($11.40 for two small books shipped overseas). Since Bolivian books are often quite cheap, it balances itself out. If you’re looking for Bolivian books (in any discipline), check them out.

Bolivia is dancing on a razor’s edge. But it’s been doing that for months, now. So are we merely witnessing the “institutionalization of instability”? In the past few days: Chuquisaca’s ex-prefect has resumed his post, the government & opposition are back to dialoguing, and things are slowly cooling down in some areas (they’re heating up in others).

I’m on the CEDIB (Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia) email list. They just sent out a notice on a new book (by Nelson Antequera Durán), co-published w/ Plural Editores & the European Commission:

Territorios Urbanos. Diversidad cultural, dinámica socio económica y procesos de crecimiento urbano en la zona sur de Cochabamba
[Urban Territories: Cultural Diversity, Socioeconomic Dynamics, and Urban Growth Processes in Cochabamba’s Zona Sur]

If you’re in Cochabamba on 20 September, stop by for a free discussion of the book in the CEDIB auditorium (Calle Calama #255) at 7pm. Discussants will include a member of the Cochabamba municipal council & faculty from UMSS (Universidad Mayor de San Simón).

Inflation has been creeping up in Bolivia for some time now. Today, La Razón ran a series of articles on economic indicators for the first semester of 2007. Things don’t look good. The economy is facing sluggish growth, w/ marked declines in agriculture (-2.26), hydrocarbons (-2.40%), and mining (-7.57%)—the only significant bright spot is commerce & construction (+4.38%). Meanwhile, there’s been no investment in mining since 1997. Despite rising prices, it looks like the mining industry has fallen an estimated 127% compared to last year. Additionally, hydrocarbon production won’t increase until next year. Government spokespeople, however, say everything’s fine.

I’ve added three books to the “Pronto* Recommends” section of my Amazon bookstore. They’re some paperbacks by Samuel P. Huntington, Amartya Sen, and Mark Juergensmeyer on the issue of states, nations, and “civilizations” (from this previous post).

My friend Clare Sammells, an anthropologist (University of Chicago) who studies tourism in Bolivia’s Lake Titicaca region, sites recent figures that show US tourists spend about $112 million per year in Bolivia (I severely underestimated US tourism expenditures). She also is certain that the strict visa requirements for US visitors to Bolivia will have disproportional affect on tourism to the Andean regions of Bolivia.

That said, it’s starting to look like many “exceptions” will be made in enforcing the visa requirements. It’s looking more & more like a political stunt. And if it’s put in place, it’s starting to look like haphazard enforcement will transform this less into policy than into rationale for corruption among border enforcement personnel.