I’m Miguel Centellas. As a political science professor, academic interests are a significant part of my personal life. I post on Bolivian politics, interesting books, pop culture, and daily life in a Baltimore.
This page contains an archive of all entries posted to Pronto* in October 2007. They are listed from newest to oldest. For a list of other monthly archives, see the right sidebar; you may also look through the archives or search by keywords.
MABB (the “other Miguel”) has an excellent summary of recent constituent assembly news. Today’s La Razón reports that delegates will decide the future of the assembly. One of the three options? Close the assembly. I’ve no idea what that would do to the process of writing a new constitution (though likely it would simply mean using the legislature to write a new constitution, as happened in 1995 & 2004).
The Argentine presidential elections are coming up tomorrow (Sunday, 28 October). It’s highly likely that Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the wife of current president Néstor Kirchner, will win the presidential race. The latest Angus Reid poll puts her at 47%—w/ her nearest rival (Elisa Carrió) pulling in barely 16%.
Last semester I designed a little “constitutional engineering” exercise for comparative politics. It’s probably better for a special topics course. Fortunately, I’m teaching just such a course this semester: Democracy & Democratization.
I’ve been swamped w/ work (particularly trying to make better progress on my book manuscript) the past few days. But Bolivia is still simmering. There was another clash between university students and police in Santa Cruz. Students from UAGRM (Universidad Autonóma Gabriel René Moreno), joined by a number of other civic groups, marched in opposition to the government’s plan to reduce the share of hydrocarbons tax revenue to municipalities, departments, and universities. The laws that regulate the tax structure (since 1994) stipulate that 20% must go directly to the country’s municipalities (on a per capita basis), and other 5% must go to the universities (all Bolivian public universities are autonomously self-governed since the 1940s). At least 10 were injured. The UAGRM students will be joined today and over the weekend by other mobilizations, including the UMSA (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés) university students from La Paz.
There were attacks against the Venezuelan consulate & a Cuban medical mission early this morning in Santa Cruz. From police reports in La Razón, the attacks involved small dynamite (probably the “M-80s” frequently used in Bolivian protests), and no one was injured. But this is the first attack on any embassy or consulate in recent memory (to my knowledge). It follows days after a government military assault on the city’s airport re-stoked anti-government tensions (see previous post).
----- PS. Just to be clear: I don’t endorse such attacks on any embassy, consulate, public building, or private residence or business. By anyone. At any time.
I get the INESAD (Institute for Advanced Development Studies) newsletters in my email on a regular basis. This most recent one on the government’s new Renta Dignidad (an expanded version of the BONOSOL pension) is interesting:
Here’s a report from Human Rights Foundation Bolivia on the Viru Viru assault. It’s in Spanish, but it tries to give as detailed an account of the event as possible, as well as noting that several television images clearly showed Venezuelan troops (plural) inside the airport (though there’s no proof they were directly involved in the operation). The highlights:
Things seem to have calmed down in Bolivia. The conflict’s certainly not “over”—but at least there’s a respite.
I am, however, increasingly bothered by the references to the presence of Venezuelan troops in Bolivian—and particularly that this isn’t covered in the international media. Are there Venezuelan troops in Bolivia? If so, how many? And what is their purpose? Recently, elite Bolivian troops have begun training in Venezuela in “intelligence” and “urban combat.” Is Venezuela opening its own School of the Americas? This is particularly troubling since Chávez recently threatened to turn Bolivian into another “Vietnam.”
I just got an email from my mom (in Santa Cruz, Bolivia) and am reading the papers. The government seized the Santa Cruz airport (w/ a nighttime air assault by elite forces). At least 10 were injured. According to my mom, Venezuelan troops were involved (though I haven’t seen this in the press reports). The Santa Cruz prefect has called on residents to resist the government’s takeover. This is going to get very ugly, very fast. Here’s more from the International Herald Tribune. There were clearly problems w/ Viru Viru (which prompted the government takeover). But I don’t think going in w/ unrestrained military force was the answer.
I’m extremely interested to see if Stephen Colbert does, in fact, end up on the South Carolina primary ballot—and what effect that has on the presidential race. A stunt? Perhaps. But then, so are the “candidacies” of the likes of Mike Gravel, Tomas Tancredo, Sam Brownback, Dennis Kucinich, and at least a few others in the over-crowded primary fields.
El Alto is getting restless again. Irate parents destroyed & burned four blocks along calle Jorge Callasco in the 12 de Octubre neighborhood. The parents were angry that merchants were selling alcohol (and other vices) in the area, which is close to schools. Evo’s government is accusing the mayor of mishandling the situation. Meanwhile, the local police authorities (who by all accounts did nothing) admit that they can’t guarantee public safety in much of EL Alto. Additionally, the federation of parents of El Alto (FEDAPAF) has broken its dialogue w/ the minister of education. They’re demanding to speak w/ Evo regarding the 1,000 classrooms they were promised. Otherwise, they’ll begin a blockade of the city of El Alto.
Chávez is under criticism—even from MAS members—for some of his recent statements about Bolivia. During his visit to Cuba, Chávez stated that he would turn Bolivia into a “new Vietnam” if anything happened to Evo’s government, which was highly criticized as “interventionist” in many sectors (most notably, of course, the opposition). Some MAS members have joined in calls against Chávez’s statements, though government spokespeople were thankful for the Venezuelan president’s statements of “solidarity.”
Washington Monthly editor Paul Glastris was on last night’s Colbert Report discussing his magazine’s college rankings. The issue sparked by interest, because Dickinson’s president (Bill Durden) is a leading champion against the US News college ranking system, which has recently come under criticism.
I’m teaching a multidisciplinary introduction to Latin American studies course next semester. It took me a while to conceptualize the course, but here’s the syllabus. Below are some of the texts I’m assigning (also in my Amazon bookstore). Comments are always welcome.
Last month, I posted some reflections on 9/11 & the question of “the American idea” (though I didn’t use that exact expression). This month, The Atlantic celebrated 150 years w/ a series of contributions from writers, artists, poets, and other public intellectuals. They were asked to contribute something (either in writing or in art) on “The Future of the American idea.” It’s worth a look.
A few days ago, a multiparty council came to a consensus on a model that would give department, municipal, indigenous, and “regional” (sub-department but larger than one municipality) autonomy. That consensus has now been rejected by indigenous community leaders (particularly those from CIDOB), leaders of department pro-autonomy movements, and the municipal governments represented in FAM (the Federation of Municipal Associations). That’s pretty much everyone, except the MAS leadership. Which leaves me wondering: Who supported this consensus? And did they ask anyone about it first? And will this quagmire ever end?
Ben Whitford (of Backyard Briefing) has a column in yesterday’s Guardian Unlimited: “The trouble with starting over.” In it, Whitford puts current attempts to draft new constitutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador into historical context. Such as the fact that Latin America has collectively gone through more than 200 constitutions since independence. It’s enough to makes one skeptical of the possibility of lasting change w/ such a long history of “disposable democracy.”
Last semester, I conducted a voting simulation in several political science classes (thank you, colleagues) at Dickinson. This year, I hope to expand that to a much broader cross-section of the student body. In addition, I’m hoping to rope in a few other colleges & universities, if possible. I’ll be running the simulation at Dickinson from October 22 through November 2.
Today’s La Razón includes a supplement called “25 años de democracia.” It includes a number of essays on various topics related to Bolivia’s politics since democratization, including retrospectives written by Evo several ex-presidents: Rodríguez Veltzé, Mesa, Goni, Tuto, and Paz Zamora.
I just find this odd. There are two significant anniversaries coming up in Bolivia: the first is the 40th anniversary of the death of Che Guevara (who died in Bolivia), the second is the 25th anniversary of the end of military rule in Bolivia.
I like to read “pop” history books—either looking for readings for future classes or (more commonly) for ways to stretch my thinking about the things I like to teach. Here’s a few of the things I’ve recently been reading:
An article in today’s La Razón points out that Bolivia’s municipalities face a 23% drop in revenue transfers from the hydrocarbons tax. Bolivia’s central government collects this tax revenue. Under the 1994 Popular Participation law, the government then redistributes the revenue to municipal authorities. The government argues that because of the anticipated rise in tax revenues, municipal governments will still receive roughly the same amounts as last year. The government also argues that the money is being diverted to cover the expenses of the BONOSOL, the national pension plan created by first Sánchez de Lozada (Goni) administration. Municipal governments are complaining, of course, and several are preparing anti-government demonstrations.
If you’re a LASA (Latin American Studies Association) member, you’re invited to join the LAPIS (Political Institutions Section) discussion of the recent LASA Congress in Montréal.
It’s still a few days away, but worth noting. This October 10th, Bolivia celebrates 25 years of democratic government. It falls one year short of the longest period of civilian (though not “democratic” by modern standards) rule in Bolivian history: 1904-1930.
On 10 October 1982, the last military head of state (Guido Vildoso Calderón) ceded power to civilian authorities. Rather than convene new elections under tense conditions, they respected the 1980 election results. The legislators elected in that election convened, naming Siles Zuazo president of Bolivia. At the head of a broad, but fractured, leftist coalition (the UDP), Siles Zuazo struggled to consolidate civilian-led democratic authority while managing a collapsing economy. In 1985, amid growing social unrest, he stepped down a year early in favor of the newly-elected Víctor Paz Estenssoro (of the MNR), who began the country’s transition away from a state-led development model (firmly in place since 1952) towards neoliberalism.
A quarter century later, Bolivia has come full circle. A president leads a broad, but fractured leftist coalition in the midst of social tension & a sluggish economy (though not yet near the “collapsing” point). I sincerely hope we can beat the 1904-1930 record.
Angus Reid Global Monitor just released new polling figures for Evo Morales. His public approval rating rebounded slightly in September to 59 percent, according to the latest survey. It’s unclear whether the figures include a “bump” after his visit to the United Nations last week or not. If it does, the bump (which is w/in the margin of error) was very small.
Here’s his figures since January 2006. It seems like his numbers have stabilized in the high 50s/low 60s range. The figures, of course, don’t show regional differences (Evo has retained high 80s/90s figures in La Paz-El Alto and low 30s/40s approval ratings in Santa Cruz).
I haven’t been able to follow this as closely as I would like. But Ecuador held elections for a constituent assembly on Sunday. So far, it seems that Correa’s “party” won a majority (though official results aren’t yet in). It’ll be interesting to see how the situation unfolds there. He has promised not to follow the Venezuela-Bolivia model (though his rhetoric suggests otherwise).
This will be the fourth “outsider” in the Andes to win an election & soon after rewrite the constitution. This motley crew includes: Alberto Fujimori (an agronomist at a rural university), Hugo Chávez (an army colonel), Evo Morales (leader of the coca farmers’ union), and Rafael Correa (a PhD in economics from Illinois). Though Correa is perhaps less of an “outsider” than the others (he was a former cabinet minister), all (except Evo) were first elected w/o the backing of an institutionalized political party.
The conflict over the location of Bolivia’s capital is still preventing the Constituent Assembly (frozen since August) from moving forward. A dialogue attempt, ongoing since last month, seems to have decidedly “broken” in favor of the government, w/ the assembly divided in two.
The decision by PODEMOS & four other parties (MNR-A3, APB, AAI, and MIR) to abandon dialogue, and return to Sucre (the seat of the constituent assembly) seems to have split the Assembly into two camps. Those remaining to dialogue include MAS & nine other parties (AYRA, AS, ASP, CN, MBL, MNR, MCSFA, MOP, and Unidad Nacional). The Tarija-based MNR-FRI still hasn’t decided. There are also a number of individual delegates who may have broken w/ their party or bloc.
A few notes of interest. Obviously (as the news reports make clear), the MAS-led bloc comprises more than two-thirds of the Assembly. This was the magic number needed to approve any new constitution. It’s unclear, however, whether the parties still in dialogue would vote together for a draft constitution. But MAS spokespersons were thrilled, arguing that they can no move forward on substantive issues. In essence, PODEMOS has boycotted the meetings in La Paz, and MAS is willing to ignore them.
The other interesting notice is which parties stayed behind in La Paz. While MNR-A3 (the Santa Cruz MNR bloc)—and probably also MNR-FRI (the Tarija MNR bloc)—went back to Sucre w/ PODEMOS, the rest of the MNR contingent has instead stayed in La Paz. Despite the “crisis” of the party, I believe the MNR is still playing an important pivot point in the constituent assembly process (for better or worse). After all, Evo’s government retains support in the Senate only by securing the support of Unidad Nacional & the MNR. Perhaps this isn’t surprising, since Evo’s government is essentially recreating the “1952 state” built by the MNR itself. While there are different strands w/in the party, its core ideological values have historically been integrationist nationalism & state-led economic development. I am keenly interested to see what role the MNR continues to play in all this.
The final interesting point is the potential for a new MAS attempt to dominate the proceeding. If the delegates in La Paz constitute a two-thirds supermajority, it’s likely that MAS will use this opportunity to draft a constitution w/o PODEMOS or the opposition (after all, MAS has already begun circulating complete draft proposals in the public press). On the one hand, MAS might have the votes. But on the other hand, the lack of any opposition in the proceedings would make the process somewhat questionable (to some more than to others, of course). How this plays out in the next few days may prove decisive.