The question is, perhaps, exaggerated. Clearly, Evo—still the head of Bolivia’s cocalero federation—is an important leader w/in Bolivia’s anti-neoliberal social movements.
But I ask because Evo’s presidency has been at times marked by his willingness to sidestep “institutional” means of authority (the courts, the legislature, etc.) to rely instead on non-institutional means: principally, by mobilizing the “social bases.” This is a traditional “populist” strategy. And the opposition, of course, has relied on similar tactics as well. The end result is that politics is increasingly de-institutionalized, spilling into the streets, where political conflicts are resolved by agitated masses (often, involving violence).
A few days ago, Evo called on the cocaleros & other movements to march on Santa Cruz to prevent the department’s pro-autonomy leaders from holding a referendum on the issue of autonomy. The National Electoral Court (headed by a new Evo appointee) won’t recognize the regional electoral court’s authority to hold an election (Bolivia has never had elections except on a “national” calendar, when the CNE oversees nationwide elections). In response, the regional court doesn’t recognize the national court’s authority to prevent it from going forward. The legalities are murky, because of the 2004 Constitution (which does allow for citizen-initiated referendums, but doesn’t stipulate clearly under what conditions). Unable to resolve the issue institutionally (which is the fault of both the government & the opposition), Evo called on his supporters to prevent the election from going forward.
But Evo’s call to prevent local authorities (in Santa Cruz, the elected prefect is leading the charge for autonomy) from acting, Evo didn’t use the state’s legal apparatus, but social movements. Imagine if in 1957 President Eisenhower had mobilized social movements, rather than the 101st Airborne, to Little Rock to enforce the Supreme Court’s school desegregation order. No doubt, in the absence of state forces, violence would’ve been the most likely result. In sharp contrast, Evo has not asked the police or armed forces to intervene in the election; rather, he mobilized loosely organized civilian groups. Of course, the Santa Cruz pro-autonomist movement includes its own “civic brigades,” making confrontations not only likely, but almost a certainty.
Yesterday, both Evo & García Linera (the vice president) called on the cocaleros & other movements to refrain from marching to Santa Cruz. Yet the movement’s leaders countered w/ claims that they are “independent” of the president—and that they’ll continue w/ their plans to march on Santa Cruz. So. Does Evo have “control” of these movements? Is he able to mobilized them at his request (they’ve refused to be mobilized in the past) or reign them in when he wishes (this isn’t the first time they’ve refused to stand down, either)?
The implications are various. On the one hand, it means (as I’ve argued before) that Evo isn’t a dominant or hegemonic political actor. He’s checked not only by the opposition, but also by his own base. On the other hand, it suggests that Evo could lose control of the situation—particularly if his base loses patience w/ the pace of reforms (he’s moving too slowly for many of them) & if he’s unable to keep his base & the opposition from engaging in violence (as happened already in Cochabamba & Sucre). If such conflicts continue to escalate—and if Evo is unable to mediate them—his government may increasingly become irrelevant for politics on the ground. And then what?
