I’m Miguel Centellas, a political science professor at Mount St. Mary’s University. I post regularly on Bolivian politics. But I also occasionally discuss interesting books, pop culture, and daily life in Baltimore.
Neither the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum nor the recall referendum are, strictly speaking, “constitutional.” The 2004 constitution allows for referendums (which can be initiated by the president, congress, or the public). This seems to imply that various kinds of referendums are possible. But the constitution doesn’t specifically prescribe how such referendums should be run.
This why I’ve (in previous posts & comments) distinguished between democratic institutionality & legality. I think both the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum (and the upcoming ones in Beni, Pando, and Tarija) was “institutionally democratic.” I also think a recall referendum could be, as well. The key is how it is managed. As far as anyone can tell, the Santa Cruz electoral court made a (mostly successful) concerted effort to get electoral materials distributed across the country, to register voters, to count the ballots properly—in short, to run a transparent, free, and fair electoral process. I see no reason why a national recall referendum couldn’t prove otherwise.
Of course, such a recall may not solve any problems. Evo will probably win (though I have some doubts), strengthening his claim to a mandate. But so will most of the prefects. So we’d end up at the same impasse.
So what do I mean by the distinction between “legality” vs. “democratic institutionality”? Well, not all laws are institutionally democratic. For an extreme example: There are elections in North Korea (legal practice enforced by the state), but they are hardly “democratic institutions.” Liberalism has long made the distinction between what is “lawful” & what is “right.” The US Declaration of Independence was hardly “legal” in the eyes of the Court of Saint James. Whether it was “democratic” is up for debate of course (did women get a vote? did slaves?), but it might serve as a historical example of a move many would consider “democratic” though “unlawful.”
I prefer to rely on objective criteria for democratic institutionality, such as Robert Dahl’s criteria (though these have been amended over the years):
Effective Participation. Citizens must have adequate and equal opportunities to form their preference and place questions on the public agenda and express reasons for one outcome over the other.
Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage. Each citizen must be assured his or her judgements will be counted as equal in weights to the judgements of others.
Enlightened Understanding. Citizens must enjoy ample and equal opportunities for discovering and affirming what choice would best serve their interests.
Control of the Agenda. Demos or people must have the opportunity to decide what political matters actually are and what should be brought up for deliberation.
Inclusiveness. Equality must extend to all citizens within the state. Everyone has legitimate stake within the political process.
What is remarkable is that, since 2003, Bolivia has been transitioning to a system of strict legal democracy (“partidocracia”) to something more participatory. The results is, understandably, chaotic. And some groups insist that only they have the right to represent “the people” (always a dangerous claim). And particularly in the context of efforts to “re-found” the nation (i.e. writing a new constitution), efforts should be made to stick to abstract first principles, rather than flowery (yet ineffective) legalese.
Miguel, I'm not sure at all how you figure most of the prefects will be re-elected. To stay in office each party has to receive as a minimum an inverse percentage of what they got in 2005. I understand that it's now a straight up/down vote instead of an electoral race among a dozen candidates, but still, looking at what the prefects will have to pull (vice Morales) come August, for me it seems like a no-lose scenario for Morales. Even if he loses a MAS prefect or two, he gets to hand-pick the successor, and if an opposition prefect loses, all the better for him. Maybe I’m missing something.
Paredes (La Paz) needs 62.01%
Virreira (Potosí) needs 59.31% (MAS)
Aguilar (Oruro) needs 59.05% (MAS)
???? (Chuquisaca) needs 57.69% (MAS)
Suarez (Beni) needs 55.36%
Cossio (Tarija) needs 54.35%
Reyes Villa (Cochabamba) needs 52.36%
Costas (Santa Cruz) needs 52.12%
Fernandez (Pando) needs 51.97%
Morales only needs 46.30%
Posted by
norman
May 10, 2008 10:19 PM
Norman: I'm not sure. I can't imagine Costas or Cossio getting more than 50% rejection. Paredes in La Paz? Maybe. But the media luna prefects are, I believe, safe.
That's my point though. Unless I misunderstand, Costas needs 52% approval to keep his office. It only takes 48% rejection to remove him. It only takes 39% to tell Paredes to take a hike. Cossio can be ousted if only 46% vote against him. Unless I'm reading it wrong, this works heavily in favor of Morales.
This is what I got from El Deber: Requiere una votación superior al porcentaje obtenido en la última elección de 2005 por la autoridad y un número de votos superior al total obtenido en el mismo sufragio.
Posted by
Norman
May 11, 2008 5:51 AM
Norman: A "win" in a recall referendum is a "no" vote. So for a recall to win (for an incumbent to lose his seat), the "no" vote must be higher than the number of votes for the candidate in the previous election. But it must also achieve 50%+1 to win. The clause in question only means that if the turnout in the election is minimal, even a victory for the "no" wouldn't be legitimate.
Say in the recall Evo is recalled by 54% of the vote (more % than the number of votes he won in 2005), but the turnout was so low that this 54% constituted fewer actual votes than in 2005—in that case Evo would keep his seat. So, yes, the clause makes it harder to unseat anyone who won a seat w/ more than 50% of the vote. But the reverse isn't true. From my understanding, if Costas wins 50%+1 of the "yes" vote, regardless of the number of total votes, he's safe. Yet if the "no" votes are 50%+1 but lower than the number of votes he won in 2005, he's safe.
I think the recalling of certain career politicians such as "pepe lucho" Paredes, Manfred, Cossio, and most certainly and most emphatically Fernandez and Suarez old remnants of ADN power from the Banzer days... might be very interesting to large groups of people who sit on the fence.
The election of prefects in 2005 as y'all know was a fluke- pushed through only by interim President Hormando Vaca Diez (infamous MIR Senator who the well known popular uprising prevented from reaching presidency later on)
- and many Bolivians were not ready to consider what we really want in regional leadership.
I hope, and think to some degree, the next elections after any of the Prefectos are recalled will be much different, and certain regional leaders will rise from the ranks to put down regional elites instead of actual constituent interests.
Not that I'm thinking on these lines, but for example, what kind of spin does Juan del Granado running for Prefecto/Gobernador de La Paz put on things?
A strong regional but nationalist representation from any of the Departments outside of Santa Cruz and Tarija could make the best example of the right way to implement autonomy, and catch them suckers (the Civicos) by surprise.
Posted by
hippie
May 12, 2008 2:27 AM
Hippie: I think there are some interesting points there, but also some misunderstandings. The election of prefects (the first ever of its kind) was a compromise made to appease the Santa Cruz (and other) regionalists who had been pushing for autonomy. Note that this pro-autonomy push was made *before* Evo came to power, during the elite Carlos Mesa presidency. Vaca Diez was interim president only because the president was out of the country (the Bolivian succession laws are cumbersome & flawed), but his unpopularity had little to do w/ the popularity of allowing departments to elect their governors (rather than have them be appointees of the central government).
I think you're right to distinguish between "regional but nationalist" autonomy movements, and more secessionist ones. But if the nationalism in question is centralist & predicated on a homogenous body politic, a "regional but nationalist" movement becomes difficult. I would also suggest that most pro-autonomy are also pro-Bolivia (in a nationalist sense). So, yes, they're not mutually exclusive.
fair enough. I had assumed Norman's interpretation but haven't waded through the legalese yet. however if you are correct Miguel then this will possibly only affect La Paz Prefect Paredes.
I agree the rules on Presidential succession are cumbersome, and for all intents and purposes Mesa's weak government passed the law allowing Prefectural election. however, it begs the question:
why didn't he do it himself? he was not out of the country for more than a few days or at most a week, why allow the interim (hugely disliked career politician/power broker) President to sign such a momentuous document?
Mesa should have, and did know, enough Bolivian history to know that this would somehow, some day, bite him in the ass.
Peace!
Posted by
Hippie
May 12, 2008 1:18 PM
Hippie: Well, Mesa spent much of the time resigning from the presidency, then rescinding his own resignation. I have an article coming out in a few months in The Latin Americanist comparing/contrasting Mesa & Evo (both of whom I describe as similarly "delegative" presidents, for various reasons).
