Tomorrow, Santa Cruz goes to the polls in its autonomy referendum. The central government is still adamantly opposed, of course. On the eve of the election, it’s also clear that there is little that can be done to stop it. But what will happen?

The report from the OAS (Organization of American States) that Evo hoped would condemn the referendum only expressed its support for Bolivia’s national integrity & democratic institutions; it didn’t explicitly condemn the autonomy referendum (it didn’t even mention the referendum in the resolution’s text).

The armed forces declared its support for Evo’s government & their opposition to the Santa Cruz referendum (which it called “illegal”). Nevertheless, the military explicitly cautioned against using force except if the situation “escalated.” All the while, rumors of coups are starting to circulate (yet again). At the same time, the national police force in Santa Cruz now reaches 4,200 (w/ future reinforcements on standby in Oruro and La Paz). Their orders are to help keep the peace, not to protect the election process.

Santa Cruz was one of the first (and still one of only a few) to have its own municipal police force (guardia municipal). 950 members of the guardia (I don’t know what the total number is) are distributing the ballots & ballot boxes throughout the department. Along with “civic brigades” (such as the UJC & Nación Camba youth groups & other volunteers), the guardia will play the role of police during the election process (typically, the national police has a presence during election day to help ensure the process).

In a show of regional solidarity, election monitors are arriving from Beni, Pando, and Tarija (including members of their respective departmental electoral courts). Additionally, Tarija & Beni had earlier sent some of their own civic brigades to reinforce Santa Cruz (in expectation that Santa Cruz would reciprocate when it came time for their own autonomy referendums). Human Rights Watch is sending monitors, too.

What would count as a victory?

For MAS, which has stated it will seek to burn ballot boxes & otherwise disrupt the autonomy referendum, a victory involves either a large enough boycott (or other disruption) that call into question the validity of the vote or significant levels of violence or both. There is little doubt that Santa Cruz will vote for autonomy (in 2006, in a similar nation-wide referendum the department voted 71% for autonomy). So MAS will seek to discredit the vote, by any means.

For the autonomy movement, a victory will require an election process that is as smooth, peaceful, and transparent as possible. There will be a temptation to “defend” the process against MAS agitators (most of whom are coming from far away Cochabamba, La Paz, and Oruro). To do so would only backfire. Any violence would most likely cast a dark cloud over the referendum process—unless the violence was clearly one-sided & almost all the blame could be cast on MAS agitators.

Hence, a pr war will likely ensue to control the images on television, as well as to frame the event. Santa Cruz private television will support the regional movement; state-owned television will show violence & criticize of the event.

A bit of history (& theory)

It’s important to note that Santa Cruz has a long history as a “rebellious” region of the country. W/o romanticizing, throughout Bolivia’s history, Santa Cruz has periodically risen up against the central government.

After independence, Santa Cruz & Moxos (Beni) were forced into the new Bolivian state by Sucre in 1826. A “federalist” declaration of 1876 was put down. Santa Cruz elites also joined w/ La Paz liberals in the 1899 Federalist War. Once victorious, the La Paz liberals merely moved the capital from Sucre to La Paz, maintaining a centralized government. There were two chief ironies of the war’s conclusion: first, indigenous forces (under Zárate Willka) that had supported the liberals were massacred; second, the Santa Cruz federalists were also put down.

There were regionalist flare-ups in the 1930s. Santa Cruz also played a key role in the “national revolution” process. In the 1949 uprising (a “dress rehearsal” for the 1952 Revolution), Santa Cruz served as the MNR’s provisional capital & held out for nearly two months against the military. And both during the first Siles Zuazo government (1956-1960) & the Barrientos dictatorship, Santa Cruz was occupied by campesino militias. Many considered the Banzer regime an essentially “Santa Cruz” regime (Banzer was from Santa Cruz, but more importantly his coup was launched there).

This is the history that Santa Cruz regional leaders point to (and cite in the autonomy statute’s preamble). It’s a constructed history, of course, as all histories are socially constructed narratives (ask Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, or Eric Hobsbawm). And it’s important to note that Santa Cruz has, in the past two decades, seen a revival of “regional” cultural history. It’s evident in the new momuments across the city erected to regional (not national) heroes, in the folkloric festivals, and in a resurgence of camba dialect in public sphere (you know you’re watching Telepaís because the anchors “speak camba”). Cultural production is important in the forging of a political community.

But this is also part of a broader process of globalization. Nearly two decades ago Benjamin Barber warned that the world’s nation-states were being pulled apart by the forces of “McWorld” (global integration) & “Jihad” (regional, ethnic, or religious fragmentation). Bolivia is a prime example. Bolivia’s entrance into the neoliberal economy put strain on a centralized state—particularly one that still relies on the myths of the 1952 National Revolution (and it’s homogenous mestizo nationalism). On the one hand, Bolivia is pushed to integrate into global organizations (Mercosur, ALBA, FTA) that supercede the central state’s traditional functions. On the other hand, regional/ethnic communities (whether Aymara indigenous movements or Santa Cruz regionalists) challenge the central state’s legitimacy.

The challenge for Bolivia—as it is for all multiethnic states—is to find a way to balance state authority w/ recognition of its plural community. But that plural community can’t be identified as merely “ethnic” in a simplified way. The “losers” of Bolivian centralism haven’t only been the country’s indigenous people. Regions like Santa Cruz or Tarija see a need for historical vindications, too. And whether we may agree or disagree on the objective quality of those calls vindication, the groups making them believe them to be true.

Also ... MABB is currently back in Bolivia, posting up a storm. Be sure to check him out, too. (Especially for info on the May 1st decrees.)