I’m Miguel Centellas, a political science professor at Mount St. Mary’s University. Because of academic interests, I post frequently on Bolivian politics. I also occasionally discuss interesting books, pop culture, and daily life in Baltimore.
There’s been growing attention to the issue of regional divisions in Bolivia in the last few years. Of course, these didn’t start w/ Evo’s election (they have much, much longer histories). But they’ve certainly accelerated since early 2004, when a movement demanding regional political autonomy gained momentum. Nowhere is this truer than in Santa Cruz.
The recent (controversial) autonomy referendum in Santa Cruz was a watershed. And while most international attention has shifted elsewhere, post-referendum Santa Cruz has marched forward. What is resulting is a de facto federalism (or at least some form of “federacy”).
For some time now, the Santa Cruz prefecture has called itself “Gobierno Departamental Autónomo” (see their website), rather than merely a “prefectura.” The name implies that the prefecture bureaucracy is a government (not an administrative unit) & that it is autonomous. Constitutionally, of course, none of this is true. Article 1 of the 2004/05 Bolivian constitution proclaims the country a unitary republic. Article 108 (found in Title II, which deals w/ the executive branch) makes clear that prefects are appointed by the president. In 2005 Bolivians voted (for the first time) for prefects—and Evo has respected those decisions (though, let’s be clear, he’s under no legal obligation to do so). So the situation has become murky, particularly since all but two prefects are from opposition parties.
It’s important to keep in mind that Santa Cruz voters in May didn’t simply vote for “autonomy” (they had already done so by supermajority in 2006). Rather, they voted to approve an “autonomy statute” approved earlier by regional leaders. Since the May vote, the prefecture has gone forward under the assumption that the vote was legally binding—and the central government hasn’t made a move to prevent this.
Yesterday, the Santa Cruz departmental council approved regional election statutes. Every department has a regional council, made up of representatives from their respective municipalities. But these are advisory bodies, not legislatures. The Santa Cruz council has taken de facto legislative powers—and, again, the central government hasn’t made a move to prevent this.
What the 23-member council approved is nothing short of a radical break from Bolivia’s constitutional tradition. The council didn’t approve local election bylaws (those are the domain of regional electoral courts). What it passed was a departmental electoral code that outlines how a regional legislative assembly, sub-governors (in Santa Cruz the prefect is now called “governor”), and corregidores (local magistrates). Additionally, it establishes parameters for drawing legislative district boundaries.
It’s unclear when Santa Cruz would hold regional elections for such posts. But when it does, Bolivia will have moved sharply towards federacy. This is truly a remarkable development—and one that seems unlikely to be reversed (regardless of the outcome of Sunday’s referendum).
So what do you think will result out of all of this? A west that's more centralized and an east with greater state powers? Or will these changes eventually be applied nationwide?
Posted by
D.Arias
August 9, 2008 7:24 PM
There's no reason why a one-size-fits-all solution is needed. There are a number of interesting federacies out there:
Great Britain has an arrangement where Scotland & Wales (and sometimes N. Ireland) have their own parliaments. But England doesn't (voters rejected "home rule" measures in a referendum). So there is *NO* state-level government for England at all, but there is for Scotland & Wales (also N. Ireland, except when the violence escalates & London declares direct rule over the territory).
In Spain, Catalan & Basque territories have long pushed for greater autonomy. Over time, their autonomy has increased tremendously, outpacing that of over regions. But Spain is slowly moving towards a more even "federal" structure (where all subunits have the same relationship to the central govt, something that federacies don't have).
Another very unique case is Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is divided into three major units: the Bosnian Federation, the Serbian Republic, and the Brcko District (which technically is part of both the Bosnian Federation & Serbian Republic). The Bosnian Federation is divided internally very differently from the Serbian Republic. And in presidential contests, voters in Bosnian Federation can only vote for the Croat & Muslim presidential candidates (BH has a three person executive; one seat for each of the major ethnic groups), the Serbian Republic voters can only vote for the Serbian candidate, and voters in Brcko District can vote for all three. Each of the two big units has its own flag, internal laws, and internal security forces (until 2005 each even had its own army).
Another example closer to home is interesting: Canada. Quebec has a special relationship w/ Canada that other provinces don't.
So it's not necessary that Santa Cruz autonomy must be copied to Oruro. And it's not necessary that each department look the same, administratively. I should also note that Tarija, in particular, many civic leaders have strong ties to the Catalan autonomy movement & have studied that model closely.
Miguel, are you saying that the prefectural gubernatorial elections were extra-constitutional?
I am getting a little worried about this whole idea that Bolivia is democratic and institutionalized enough to be a case in a cross-national data analysis of political careers and party organization.
I really look forward to hearing why I should not be so worried!! See you soon!
Matt (MSS): I also am worried (and more than for implications for the cross-national data analysis)!
Now let me explain the "extra-constitutionality" of prefectural elections. I don't mean it in the sense of a military government (which would also be extra-constitutional. I mean that the (current) Bolivian constitution doesn't explicitly state that prefects *must* be elected (the new draft does state this).
But the constitution also doesn't forbid prefects from being elected. Rather, the president is empowered to name prefects. So far, Evo Morales has respected the December 2005 prefecture elections (there were worries during the campaign that he wouldn't). After the pro-MAS Chuquisaca prefect resigned, Evo at first named a new prefect, before giving in to pressure and allow new elections (the post is now filled by an opposition figure).
This actually suggests that Evo is more democratic than Chavez. Evo is under no legal obligation to retain opposition prefects, but he's respecting the (very new) informal institution of prefectural elections.
I look forward to picking your brain some more about Bolivia at our project meeting in San Diego.
Well, I should have said "para-constitutional," but perhaps it is the same thing. (A military coup would be several steps farther removed from the constitution, no matter the self-justification that might be used!)
If the constitution says that the president appoints prefects, then it is certainly para- (or extra-) constitutional.
How were the elections managed? Did the national electoral council handle them, or only prefectural authorities?
Matt (MSS): I agree that prefect elections are currently para-constitutional in the technical sense. But, again, they're not really anti-constitutional either. The US president is expected to appoint a cabinet, but there's nothing from preventing him/her from using an electoral system (or even a raffle) and then respecting the winner.
Bolivia has a tradition of informal institutions. Parliamentarized presidentialism evolved into a semi-consociational system in which parties negotiated coalition cabinets. None of that was strictly speaking constitutional, either.
As for how the elections were managed: They were managed by the National Electoral Court (CNE), w/ the regional courts overseeing their respective regions. Recently, regional electoral courts have gotten more attention (because of the recent region-specific referendums), but every national election since the 1980s has been overseen in the same way.
