After approving Departmental Law Nº 05, Santa Cruz plans to go forward w/ regional elections (currently scheduled for January 2009). The central government, of course, isn’t happy w/ the move. But it’s not yet clear what steps it’ll take to prevent the wholesale creation of an autonomous government structure in Santa Cruz.
The statute gives an overview of the political structure that would govern an autonomous Santa Cruz:
Articles 9º, 16º, and 18º state that candidates can be put forward by “any political party, citizens’ group, indigenous community, or recognized alliance” (this language is similar to that found in the current & proposed new constitution). Article 18º is the longest & most detailed, and it specifies that electoral lists must have gender parity. All offices are set at 5-year terms.
The statute also creates a 28-seat legislative body. Under Article 11º each of the department’s 15 provinces receives one seat, w/ an additional 8 seats awarded on the basis of population. Andres Ibañez, the province where the city of Santa Cruz is located, receives 5 additional seats. Other provinces receiving an additional seat each are: Obispo Santistevan, Cordillera, and Ñuflo de Chavez. For those provinces that have more than one seat, Article 13º empowers the Departmental Electoral Court (CDE) to divide the territory into the necessary number of electoral districts. In each district, candidates win by simple majority. Article 14º reserves an additional 5 seats for each of the department’s major indigenous communities: Chiquitano, Guaraní, Guarayo, Ayoreo, and Mojeño. These can be elected on the basis of indigenous custom (Article 10º).
The new statute also sets up the elections of “sub-governors” (previously “sub-prefects”) for each of the 15 provinces (Articles 15º & 16º), as well as for the corregidores (local magistrates). The exact number or jurisdiction of corregidores isn’t specified in the statute & remains unclear.
The remainder of the statute mostly outlines the electoral process & is almost identical to existing national laws. This & other statutes, as well as other information about the “Autonomous Government of Santa Cruz” is available from its website (www.santacruz.gov.bo).
Sidestepping the argument about whether regional autonomy is “legal” or ideologically desirable, the statute as it stands seems (to me) reasonable—w/ some important caveats:
The overall construction of a unicameral legislative assembly w/ a mix of regional, popular, and minority representation is good. The city of Santa Cruz, w/ nearly two thirds of the department’s total population, receives only 6 of 28 seats (less than a quarter). Meanwhile, the small indigenous communities receive 5 of 28 (nearly a fifth), in addition to any representation they might also win in their provinces. This gives rural provinces (where MAS support is highest) significant clout & (should) mollify those who thought a regional government would over-represent urban interests. But perhaps it would be more appropriate for the city to receive a larger share of representation (say, 40%?).
However, the use of a simple plurality formula to seat candidates could produce some highly disproportional outcomes. Additionally, much will depend on how the CDE draws district boundaries in those provinces w/ more than one seat. This could be solved by using some form of PR formula (treating the department as an at-large district for the 23 non-indigenous seats), though this would give the city the lion’s share of electoral weight (a permanent super-majority). But perhaps some form of preferential voting sytem.
Another solution would be to use the electoral districts defined by the national government (Santa Cruz has 13 uninominal districts: 7 in the city, the rest in the rural provinces). Each province could be given 3 (or more) seats & then use some sort of formula that awards seats to party lists on the basis of their ranking in the vote (as in the national Senate or the 2006 constituent assembly election).
Additionally, the method used to elect sub-governors & corregidores isn’t specified. One could assume that sub-governors would also be elected by simple plurality (as are prefects). But that should be made clear. The lack of detail about corregidores is also problematic.
Finally, despite the inclusion of gender parity as a principle, it’s unclear how it will work in reality. The gender parity clauses in Article 18º mention electoral lists. But these are single-seat contests. So parties could nominate women for seats in provinces/districts where they can’t possible win, in order to meet the gender quota. If the legislature were elected using a PR formula, then a gender clause would be much more effective (though this would create other problems).
It’ll certainly be interesting to see what the results of such an election would be—if it happens.
I'm pleasantly surprised by the inclusive nature of the seating. And agree with you about PR as an alternative system.
Evo really needs to address autonomous movements now or he will have no control over how they are shaped. It is imperative that he secures the natural resource rights, though it would be difficult for autonomous movements to lay claim to them still.
In a way, the "federalization" of the country is a natural progression of the Participación Popular reforms of 1994. It's too late now to turn the tide. The question is no longer whether Bolivia will decentralize, but how. I agree that it's imperative for Evo to negotiate some sort of compromise w/ the autonomy movements.
I am not sure you can say that the autonomy movement is natural progression of the PPL in 1994. Those reforms decentralized some activities to the municipal level, the SC autonomy statute centralizes to the Regional level. So it is actually a centralizing movement in that regard and contrary to the PPL. would also be cautious about making statements about the inevitability of media luna autonomy. Cerain aspects, such as the all important control over gas and oil revenue, cannot happen without coordination with the central government. Do you really think transnational corporations and going to cut deals and invest heavily in a rogue Department? Do you really think that Brazil, Argentina, etc. are going to cut deals directly with Costas? Otherwise, as the media luna continues to push its agenda without dialogue they look extremist, alienate the majority population and antagonize or challenge a more repressive response from the central government.
@Shanqueros: Long before this current autonomy fight, regional devolution/decentralization/autonomy was raised. It was raised in the 1990s (and rejected by Goni in favor of municipalization). It was raised in countless think tank meetings throughout the early 2000s (both before & after October 2003).
I can see how one can identify the autonomy movement as "centralizing" in the sense that it creates a superior government structure above the municipal governments. But it's clearly "decentralizing" in the sense that this new structure is intermediary between the municipal & central government. In other words, the central government is being decentralized (even if regional power is being centralized, to some extent).
Finally, when I or others (there's a recent book edited by ILDIS called La descentralización que se viene) argue that autonomy is probably "inevitable" we don't necessarily mean the autonomy as defined by the Santa Cruz prefect. Rather, the central government will (eventually) have to recognize regional governments (or some kind) & devolve some powers to them. Evo already clearly recognizes that, since he is still allowing prefects to be elected (something not even enshrined in the current constitution). Clearly what kind of autonomy will be given to which regions is up for debate & will be a key part of any negotiation w/ the central government.
I would also add that the current autonomy statute is more decentralizing than the status quo. Currently, Santa Cruz voters have only elected a prefect (and let's be clear that he has a lot of unchecked power!). The statute would check a prefect w/ a regional legislature (most likely dominated by MAS, since it will over-represent rural areas) & sub-prefects (who are currently simply named by the prefect).
Let's look at some hypothetical data, using the 2005 presidential (or "plurinominal") vote as a proxy for how the Santa Cruz legislature might look.
Andres Ibañez receives 6 seats, which could correspond roughly to the 7 "uninominal" electoral districts in the city of Santa Cruz (#s 51-55 & 70). In actuality, some municipalities in Andres Ibañez are part of other "provincial" (i.e. "rural") districts (#s 59 & 60).
MAS won in districts 70 & 55. PODEMOS won in districts 50-54. Some of the contests, however, were close. And UN & MNR did surprisingly well in several districts (averaging about a quarter of the vote). That suggests that MAS could win 2 of the seats in Andres Ibañez.
We can also look at province-level data. There, the results actually didn't favor Evo Morales in 2005. MAS only won in four departments (Ichilo, Obispo Santistevan, Ñuflo de Chavez, and Manuel Maria Caballero). But two of these are provinces that would elect two members. That means MAS could look to pick up 4-6 seats in those provinces. In four others, MAS was competitive. And throughout the Santa Cruz countryside, UN & MNR combined for about a third of the vote.
Without making any significant gains, it's possible that MAS could pick up 6-8 seats. That's already almost a third of the legislature. Additionally, there are includes 5 seats set aside for indigenous communities; combined that's almost half the seats.
So perhaps MAS wouldn't "dominate" the regional legislature. But it would certainly be competitive. And it could ostensibly elect "sub-governors" to a third of the department's provinces.
PS. All this was based on disaggregated electoral data provided to me by the CNE on my last research trip to Bolivia.
The legislative body sounds interesting. I've often wondered if the USA would be better off with a unicameral Congress. Maybe the current House of Representatives with a single "Senator" added for each state - at large, longer term, more committee privileges, but with the same vote on the floor.
Nebraska has a unicameral legislature, which seems to work fine. Also, the 2006 constituent assembly elections produced a unicameral body. But federal systems typically rely on bicameral legislatures if they want to balance popular & regional representation.