After approving Departmental Law Nº 05, Santa Cruz plans to go forward w/ regional elections (currently scheduled for January 2009). The central government, of course, isn’t happy w/ the move. But it’s not yet clear what steps it’ll take to prevent the wholesale creation of an autonomous government structure in Santa Cruz.
The statute gives an overview of the political structure that would govern an autonomous Santa Cruz:
Articles 9º, 16º, and 18º state that candidates can be put forward by “any political party, citizens’ group, indigenous community, or recognized alliance” (this language is similar to that found in the current & proposed new constitution). Article 18º is the longest & most detailed, and it specifies that electoral lists must have gender parity. All offices are set at 5-year terms.
The statute also creates a 28-seat legislative body. Under Article 11º each of the department’s 15 provinces receives one seat, w/ an additional 8 seats awarded on the basis of population. Andres Ibañez, the province where the city of Santa Cruz is located, receives 5 additional seats. Other provinces receiving an additional seat each are: Obispo Santistevan, Cordillera, and Ñuflo de Chavez. For those provinces that have more than one seat, Article 13º empowers the Departmental Electoral Court (CDE) to divide the territory into the necessary number of electoral districts. In each district, candidates win by simple majority. Article 14º reserves an additional 5 seats for each of the department’s major indigenous communities: Chiquitano, Guaraní, Guarayo, Ayoreo, and Mojeño. These can be elected on the basis of indigenous custom (Article 10º).
The new statute also sets up the elections of “sub-governors” (previously “sub-prefects”) for each of the 15 provinces (Articles 15º & 16º), as well as for the corregidores (local magistrates). The exact number or jurisdiction of corregidores isn’t specified in the statute & remains unclear.
The remainder of the statute mostly outlines the electoral process & is almost identical to existing national laws. This & other statutes, as well as other information about the “Autonomous Government of Santa Cruz” is available from its website (www.santacruz.gov.bo).
Sidestepping the argument about whether regional autonomy is “legal” or ideologically desirable, the statute as it stands seems (to me) reasonable—w/ some important caveats:
The overall construction of a unicameral legislative assembly w/ a mix of regional, popular, and minority representation is good. The city of Santa Cruz, w/ nearly two thirds of the department’s total population, receives only 6 of 28 seats (less than a quarter). Meanwhile, the small indigenous communities receive 5 of 28 (nearly a fifth), in addition to any representation they might also win in their provinces. This gives rural provinces (where MAS support is highest) significant clout & (should) mollify those who thought a regional government would over-represent urban interests. But perhaps it would be more appropriate for the city to receive a larger share of representation (say, 40%?).
However, the use of a simple plurality formula to seat candidates could produce some highly disproportional outcomes. Additionally, much will depend on how the CDE draws district boundaries in those provinces w/ more than one seat. This could be solved by using some form of PR formula (treating the department as an at-large district for the 23 non-indigenous seats), though this would give the city the lion’s share of electoral weight (a permanent super-majority). But perhaps some form of preferential voting sytem.
Another solution would be to use the electoral districts defined by the national government (Santa Cruz has 13 uninominal districts: 7 in the city, the rest in the rural provinces). Each province could be given 3 (or more) seats & then use some sort of formula that awards seats to party lists on the basis of their ranking in the vote (as in the national Senate or the 2006 constituent assembly election).
Additionally, the method used to elect sub-governors & corregidores isn’t specified. One could assume that sub-governors would also be elected by simple plurality (as are prefects). But that should be made clear. The lack of detail about corregidores is also problematic.
Finally, despite the inclusion of gender parity as a principle, it’s unclear how it will work in reality. The gender parity clauses in Article 18º mention electoral lists. But these are single-seat contests. So parties could nominate women for seats in provinces/districts where they can’t possible win, in order to meet the gender quota. If the legislature were elected using a PR formula, then a gender clause would be much more effective (though this would create other problems).
It’ll certainly be interesting to see what the results of such an election would be—if it happens.
