There’s continued confrontations between pro-MAS & opposition groups throughout the “media luna”—particularly in Santa Cruz & Tarija. La Razón has a series of stories on the developments: virtually all public institutions in Santa Cruz are taken over by pro-autonomy groups; Tarija & Villamontes civic groups seized the gas field at Vuelta Grande; civic & campesino groups clashed in Tarija; MAS groups cut of San Julián & threaten to march on Santa Cruz; El Alto residents demand arms to defend the government; there was an explosion at the Tarija prefect’s garage; campesinos from Chuquisaca & Potosí threaten to cut of Sucre again; American Airlines is no longer flying to Bolivia & the airports at Cobija (Pando), Trinidad (Beni), Guayaramerín (Beni), and Tarija are taken over by pro-autonomy civic groups.
In the midst of all this, a number of questions come up. What is Brazil’s role in this? Brazil, which relies on Bolivian gas exports (which are not cut), has a vested interest in Bolivian political stability. According to CNN, Brazil’s foreign minister expressed willingness to deal directly w/ the pro-autonomy prefects to secure its gas contracts. Historically, Santa Cruz has gravitated (culturally, economically, and even sometimes politically) towards Brazil.
Another question has to do w/ the military. So far, the military has essentially sat this out, despite direct mob attacks on military installations (which left more than a few conscripts & junior officers injured). Instead, the confrontations have mostly involved civilian groups like the UJC (pro-autonomy) & pro-MAS groups. Will the military eventually help restore order or guarantee political dialogue? Can Evo count on the military to back his government? So far the military has made clear that it doesn’t want to use lethal force w/o express written orders from the president (they don’t want to be held responsible for the resulting casualties).
Finally, the diplomatic bombshell: Evo announced the expulsion of the US ambassador to Bolivia. So far, this is not “official” (it has to be done in writing). But the rationale is (IMO) sketchy. Evo argued essentially that because Philip Goldberg worked at the State Department’s Bosnia desk, that he was responsible for the independence of Bosnia & later Kosovo (is Evo a closet Milosevic sympathizer?), and therefore would play a similar role in Bolivia. If Goldberg is truly expelled as “persona non grata,” it will be the only time a Latin American state has done so (even Chávez has retained his US ambassador). It would also automatically mean that Bolivia’s ambassador to Washington would also have to leave.
Anyhow, the whole thing has turned into a real mess.
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Note: The obviously snarky/sarcastic comment about Evo being a “closet Milosevic sympathizer” isn’t serious. But the logic that a diplomat who was involved in the Balkan crisis of the 1990s must necessarily support secession/autonomy is stretched. Bolivia isn’t Yugoslavia; I hope Evo realizes that (otherwise, he’s painting himself in the role of Milosevic & the autonomistas as the poor Bosniaks & Kosovars—ironically, many autonomistas have made similar analogies).
Addendum: For some more on the Bolivia situation, visit the Gringo Tambo blog (“US ambassador asked to leave Bolivia”), where I posted the following: “The bottom line is that Evo has no interest in making friends w/ the US government, regardless of who the ambassador is. Why should he? He’s counting on Venezuelan and Iranian (and possibly Chinese and Russian) economic and political support. The days when poor countries “needed” the US (or Europe) are dwindling as oil wealth becomes the new currency of international politics. The age of “Pax Americana” may be coming to an end, but we (Western progressives) may not like the alternative.”
