There are signs that calm & order may be returning to Bolivia after several tumultuous days. In the aftermath of more than a dozen dead, 30+ injured, and as many as 100 missing in Pando, the government is seeking to reestablish control. There are still some blockades throughout parts of the media luna, as well as worrying signs of sporadic confrontations. But the volume of such confrontations has greatly diminished. These are optimistic signs.
Evo’s government is prosecuting Pando’s prefect (Leopoldo Fernández) for his role in the conflict. Fernández has a long political trajectory with Banzer’s ADN: He was elected to the lower house in 1985; he later elected as a senator in 1989, 1997, and 2002; he was Tuto Quiroga’s government minister from 2001-2002. Two other local figures will be tried: Miguel Becerra (ex-mayor of Cobija) & Abrahán Cuéllar (senator for Unidad Nacional, but caucuses w/ MAS). Becerra also has a history w/ ADN: he was elected to the lower house in 1989 & 1997. Cuéllar has a shorter political trajectory as a suplente1 senator for the new party founded in 2004 by Samuel Doria Medina (formerly of MIR). Additionally, the head of the National Police in Pando was dismissed for failure to control the situation; he may also face charges.
This so far seems like good news. First, clearly the prefect had something to do w/ the violence. He may not have specifically ordered it, but he clearly encouraged—he also took few (if any) steps to halt it. The inclusion of a MAS supporter (Cuéllar has been a “dissident” senator for some time, often helping cast critical votes to back MAS) suggests two things: 1) the conflict was more about “regional” loyalties than “party” loyalties and/or 2) the government is truly seeking to find all those responsible—regardless of partisan loyalty.
Second, the disciplinary action against the chief of National Police in Pando (colonel Silvio Magarzo Segovia) may shore up future discipline among the military & police. Both security services were grossly negligent—as they have been in numerous other recent occasions—by removing themselves from harm’s way & allowing the civilian-on-civilian violence to continue. Over the past weeks, entire military & police unites simply shut themselves up in their barracks or left the area of conflict entirely. This may serve the military/police institutional interests of preserving their own hides (and reputations). But it does little to protect the interests of a political state (which is defined by its ability to monopolize the means of violence in its territory). Hopefully, this will make other officers act to preserve & maintain order, rather than sit it out.
Meanwhile, international leaders are backing Evo’s government. In part, of course, this is protocol: heads of state tend to back other heads of state against coups, putsches, or destabilizing protests (regional leaders, even Chávez, backed Goni in 2003). But some (like Brazil) are sending strong signals that they expect to negotiate w/ both the government & opposition leaders as a means to find a lasting solution. The only wrench in the works continues to be Chávez, who is still railing against the Bolivian armed forces & threatening to intervene—even after the Bolivian government asked him to stop. The heavy-handed rhetoric (reminiscent of the American blustering of yesteryear) will most likely backfire, w/ Bolivian military officers already clearly irritated.
The surprising key figure in the current negotiations is Mario Cossío, the prefect of Tarija. As representative of the opposition prefect’s organization, CONALDE (National Democratic Council), Cossío is heading up the opposition’s current round of negotiations w/ Evo’s government. Cossío represents a potential “third way” option. Rather than an ADN or PODEMOS figure, Cossío has a long trajectory w/in the MNR. He was elected a deputy from Tarija in 2002, and became President of the House of Deputies. In 2005, he ran as candidate for prefect of Tarija under an alliance between MNR & a civic organization (Camino al Cambio). He was the only prefect elected who was not an ally of either MAS or PODEMOS (in Tarija, Jaime Paz Zamora ran as the PODEMOS-backed candidate). During the first year of Evo’s government, the MNR (and UN) joined MAS in a loose coalition that gave Evo legislative majorities in both chambers (MAS has a majority in the lower house, but is two seats short of a majority in the Senate). Following Goni’s resignation in October 2003, the MNR has tried to reinvent itself as a “pragmatic national” party planted in the center—neither radically left nor reactionary—along the lines of its 1952 image. If Cossío is successful in his negotiations, he may give the MNR a much needed boost.
Either way, US-Bolivia relations will likely take a long time to normalize. There is currently no US ambassador in Bolivia (the embassy affairs are now run by the economic attaché); the consulate in Santa Cruz is (temporarily) closed; and the Peace Corps is on the way out as well (perhaps also Fulbright & other such programs?).
This may be good news on some fronts: Bolivia will gain greater maneuvering space, as it casts off US-imposed commitments (such as coca eradication efforts). But it may also mean short-term loses: the US is one of Bolivia’s largest donor countries (whether it is the largest depends on how the figures are added up); the US is also one of Bolivia’s largest export destinations (which may now be captured by more US-friendly Peru & Colombia, or even Ecuador).
The US has long ignored Latin America. After 9/11, attention has been focused elsewhere, and the region was almost thrown by the wayside. This has cost the US dearly. Not only is Venezuela a growing power in the region, it also looks to be linking up w/ Russia (the two countries are increasing their military cooperation, including upcoming joint naval exercises). Shortly after its invasion of Georgia, Russia made clear that it intends to reestablish itself as a major world power—one capable of checking the US. Basically, we are inching towards a new cold war (Russia restarted its cold war era long range nuclear bomber patrols several weeks ago). Now there is a report that Evo’s government is considering replacing US assistance in the drug war w/ Russian assistance.
There are many who will welcome the decline of US unipolarity & global hegemony. Certainly, it was arrogant to seek to be the lone superpower in an increasingly globalized world. But a new US-Russian geopolitical confrontation w/ Latin America as a battlefield is not good news—particularly if we remember the Latin American experience of the 1960s & 1970s. Bolivia needs to break free from the US orbit. But it does not need to be drawn into another geopolitical confrontation between world powers in which it will merely be pawn.
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1 Bolivia has a “suplente” system of parliamentary representation. This means that each sitting legislator (whether in the House of Deputies or Senate) also has a “substitute” legislator who can cast votes in the absence of the “titular” representative. Suplentes also enjoy all the perks of titular representatives (offices, staff, and parliamentary immunity).
