Back when José Luís Exeni was named to head Bolivia’s National Electoral Court (CNE), skeptics worried about the court’s future impartiality. Exeni was a well-known public intellectual w/ “leftist” sympathies. He even had a blog (Fadocracia), which he discontinued upon assuming the post. I wasn’t worried then, and recent events have confirmed my optimism.
I’ve dealt w/ the CNE off & on for almost a decade, since my first research trip to Bolivia in 1998 (during grad school). Back then, Jorge Lazarte was CNE president. Later, when I was in Bolivia from 2003-2004 during my dissertation work, and again when I went back in 2006, Oscar Hassenteuffel was CNE president. During both their tenures, CNE provided me w/ much needed information for projects, even going so far as to let me have specifically disaggregated data not readily available to the public. Despite lack of resources, I saw the CNE improve its technical capacity, increase its publications, and become increasingly professionalized.
During 2003-2004, I also had the opportunity to interview Exeni as part of my research. He was knowledgeable & helpful. I’d also read a few of his monographs, many published through ILDIS. He reminded me more of Lazarte (a scholar) than Hassenteuffel (a technocrat). And I had the impression that he was part of the circle of young Bolivian intellectuals who tended to see democracy & democratic institutions as valuable, despite the many flaws in their practice in Bolivia.
Since taking charge, Exeni has continued the CNE’s tradition as an independent election body. The CNE is in charge of running all elections—and it’s been busy these few years. This means that the CNE can regulate campaign spending, candidate behavior, and serves as both watchdog & the ultimate authority in the country’s elections. In fact, in the 24 hours before & then throughout election day, the powers of head of state are temporarily handed over to the CNE president (so that it can command the military & police, which are tasked w/ keeping the peace on election day). In addition to all that, the CNE keeps election results, party & candidate registrations, and voter registrations. It also publishes regular reports, of various kinds, including analysis. Most interestingly, the CNE has recently become a publisher for academic works on electoral system reform & related topics. Plus, their website (http://www.cne.org.bo) is a great place to find data, which can be disaggregated to the individual table in a precinct. Whew!
In the past year, the CNE has also served as an important check on Evo’s government. It was the CNE that insisted that the August 2008 recall referendum should use the threshold of 50% (not the complicated formula that benefited the government). It was the CNE that denounced voter registration fraud leading up that election. As the country moved towards a possible January referendum on the new constitution, it was the CNE that finally pushed Evo to lift the state of siege in Pando (since elections can’t take place under those conditions). At a number of stages, the CNE has upheld the letter of the law—and Exeni has been able to ensure that Evo’s government complied.
Yesterday, the CNE suspended the government’s “Sí” campaign for violating impartiality laws. It’s no secret that Evo & MAS support a “Sí” (Yes) vote on the draft constitution up for voter approval in the January 2009 referendum. But, legally, the state isn’t supposed to campaign using public funds for a partisan issue. Exeni & the CNE have insisted that while parties (like MAS) can campaign in favor of the referendum, government officials (including the president) or institutions (like the various ministries) can’t use public funds to finance the campaign. That doesn’t mean Evo or his ministers can’t say publicly that they would like voters to approve the new constitution, but it does mean that the government can’t pay for media ads promoting a “Sí” vote. It’s an important distinction.
What this means is that the CNE under Exeni has become one of the most institutionalized instruments of the legal framework of Bolivia’s democracy. And that’s a good thing. It means that January’s referendum vote will (barring any unexpected developments) be truly free, fair, and competitive, and will be seen as legitimate by all sides.
