I feel like I’ve been on the road for the past few weeks, which has limited my blogging time (though I’ve also shifted much of my online time to my Twitter posts). I’ve also wanted to postpone commenting on the Bolivian electoral law crisis (isn’t there always a “crisis” brewing these days?) until it was more or less resolved. It seems like it has been, for the time being: Bolivia’s parliament approved a last-minute transitional electoral law less than an hour ago (although it’s currently unclear if the law was passed “properly” and/or what the law contains).
The issue was a pressing one because a new electoral law needed to be passed by April 9 to facilitate new general elections in December 2009. The critical disagreement was over the number of special/reserved “indigenous” legislative seats. Because the constitution stipulates that the size of the lower house (the House of Deputies) is set 130, that left very little wiggle room. Those seats are awarded on a by department basis, varying (roughly) on the basis of population. Additionally, about half of each department’s seats are awarded on a proportional representation (PR) basis (specifically, using a mixed-member proportional electoral system). So that’s the institutional constraint on any new apportionment.
The MAS proposal would have kept the number of single member district (SMD) seats in each department the same, then create additional “indigenous” districts, subtracting from the total of PR seats available to departments. The total number of special indigenous seats was supposed to be 14. The opposition argued that this would give rural/indigenous areas over-representation in the legislature. Some argued that a number of rural areas were already de facto “indigenous” districts, and should be simply renamed.
An additional wrinkle was over who would administer these “indigenous” districts. SMD and PR seats would be administered by the National Electoral Court. But the MAS proposal stipulated that “indigenous” districts would be handed over to the larger indigenous umbrella organizations like CONAMAQ (in the highlands) & CIDOB (in the lowlands); only candidates accredited by these organizations would be sanctioned to run, and the method of selecting representatives would be left to the indigenous organizations themselves. This raises a number of potential problems, since CONAMAQ & CIDOB are allied w/ MAS (although those ties are often strained). The opposition thus suggested that this was a means to stack the deck to ensure that MAS would win a supermajority in the next elections.
MAS offered a compromise of 8, then 11, special indigenous districts. This was turned down by the opposition, shifting to arguments about the voter rolls, which it claims have been manipulated. However, the potential of reducing the number of indigenous districts to less than 14 caused leaders of CONAMAQ & CIDOB to announce that MAS had betrayed them, even accusing MAS of continuing the Bolivian state’s anti-Indian discrimination. Clearly, both sides amped up the rhetoric.
Where the voter rolls manipulated? Perhaps. That’s been a claim made before, during, and after every election since the 1980s (always w/ some level of truth). On the other hand, the CNE under José Luís Exeni has been a model of professionalism (btw, he has often stood up to Evo/MAS, demonstrating the electoral court’s integrity & independence). The MAS counter that “flawed” voter rolls didn’t seem to bother the opposition when it launched its semi-official wildcat referendums in May-June 2008 was a legitimate riposte.
It’s understandable why indigenous communities want “special” districts in which only indigenous candidates/parties can compete. This has been the practice in countries like Colombia. But in those cases, the indigenous population is very small, and there Colombia only awards one special indigenous seat (and one Afro-Colombian seat) from a lower house of 166. In contrast, reserving 14 seats in Bolivia out of 130 is a larger share. Of course, Bolivia has a much larger indigenous population. But that population has already shown itself capable of electing indigenous representatives: in 2002 MIP won 6 seats & MAS won 27 (though not all of MAS deputies were self-identified as “indigenous”); in 2005 MAS won 72 seats (again, not all held by self-identified “indigenous” candidates). Typically, the goal of special seats is to correct for a group’s gross underrepresentation; but this hasn’t been the case for Bolivia’s indigenous population since 2002.
Clearly, this is about politics. And both sides (the government & the opposition) are maneuvering to craft an electoral law that betters their chances in the upcoming elections. That’s also standard practice in Bolivia since the 1980s. Unfortunately, this has increasingly meant that both sides mobilize supporters into the streets to force the issue. But disaster seems to be averted, again. Bolivia’s leaders are getting very good at taking the country to the brink, then pulling back at the last second.
