On Wednesday, Bolivia’s legislature passed the final version (en detalle) of the country’s new, “transitional” electoral law. There were a number of interesting compromises in the bill, which changed it not only from the original MAS proposal, but also from the version passed (en grande) a few days earlier in plenary session. Overall, the new law is an interesting compromise—and one that mostly benefits the opposition, not MAS.
The law outlines rules for two upcoming elections:
December 9, 2009
On this date, voters will cast ballots for president & vice president, the new “Plurinational Legislative Assembly,” an autonomy referendum in Andean departments, and a regional autonomy referendum in the Chaco municipalities of Tarija.
This will be the first presidential (and vice presidential) election to use a two-round runoff system. Additionally, a presidential candidate can win w/o a simple majority in the first round if he/she wins at least 40% of the vote and places at least 10 points ahead of the second runner-up. Also, this will be the first time that presidential reelection is permitted (limited to two consecutive terms), making Evo eligible to run again.
In addition, the new legislature is somewhat modified. Despite the name change, the legislature will remain essentially the same, and it will continue to be a bicameral body (the original MAS proposal called for a unicameral legislature). Additionally, the Senate has been enlarged, giving each department four seats (up from the previous three seats). This will most likely benefit the opposition in two ways: 1) it will make winning additional seats in the Andean departments easier; 2) it will over-represent the eastern lowland departments (for example, Tarija has only about 5% of the national population but 11% of the Senate seats). Currently, the opposition has a slim (one seat) lead in seats in the Senate, which gives it control of the chamber. That likely won’t change w/ this system.
The lower house has a few minor changes as well. The new law reserves 7 “indigenous” seats (down from the 14 in the original MAS proposal, and 8 in the law passed a few days ago). Additionally, Chuquisaca & Potosí won’t receive any indigenous seats, despite the fact that they have significant indigenous (mostly Quechua) populations according to the 2001 census (66% in Chuquisaca, 84% in Potosí). Each of the remaining departments will have one reserved seat for indigenous candidates, which will be subtracted from the department’s “plurinominal” (list candidate) total. Otherwise, Bolivia retains its mixed-member proportional electoral system, which now will tilt further towards majoritarianism.
The two autonomy referendums are interesting. First, because no such referendum will take place in the “Media Luna” departments (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pano, Tarija). This means that the government is accepting the 2006 (and/or 2008) autonomy referendums. It will then extend the same option to the remaining departments. But the “regional” referendum for Tarija’s Chaco municipalities is also interesting. This is a new mid-level regional autonomy provision stipulated in the new constitution, making Tarija’s Chaco a test case. It’s also a compromise, because the original MAS proposal would have allowed Santa Cruz & Chuquisaca’s Chaco municipalities to also have autonomy referendums & allow them to join together to form an autonomous region that crossed department borders. But the provision also opens the door to other regions that have long sought some level of autonomy from their department, such as Potosí’s Tupiza region.
April 4, 2010
On this date, Bolivia’s will go to the polls again. This time they will elect “governors” (the law now recognizes them by that title) in the Media Luna and any other departments that approve of autonomy in December 2009. Departments that reject autonomy will still get to elect their prefects. (I’m unclear what the legal/constitutional consequences of the difference between a “governor” and a “prefect.”)
Voters in the Media Luna will also elect their departmental assembly, using the formulas in the autonomy statutes approved in 2008 (this is a major concession by MAS that retroactively legitimizes the wildcat referendums). The sizes of the assemblies are: Santa Cruz 28, Beni 28, Pando 16, and Tarija 30. In addition, the other departments will elect their department councils: Chuquisaca 21, La Paz 45, Cochabamba 34, Oruro 33, and Potosí 32.
Finally, on this date voters will also elect municipal mayors & councils. The last municipal elections were in December 2004, and are long overdue (they are supposed to be held every five years).
What does this mean?
Nothing is ever certain, of course. Evo claims that he will win reelection (he probably will) & that MAS will win 70% of the seats (rather unlikely). But the changes do not tilt the game sufficiently in his favor. The reduction of indigenous seats has pushed the lowland indigenous confederation (CIDOB) away from its alliance w/ MAS. If that break sticks, it’s possible that 3-4 of the indigenous seats could be held by opposition indigenous candidates. On the other hand, it’s unclear if the addition of 3-4 “safe” indigenous seats will compensate for potential losses from declining middle class support in the cities (particularly La Paz & Cochabamba), which can tip the balance, depending on the specific vote-to-seat formula used to hand out the plurinominal list seats.
In the end, I suspect that MAS will win a majority of the lower house (though there could be an upset), but the opposition will manage to hold on to the Senate. Additionally, the prefects/governors will have incentives to run against the central state & could become thorns in Evo’s side. The final result is likely to be a continuation of the kind of bipolarization we’ve seen since 2005, w/ the opposition winning significant bastions of power w/ new constitutional protections.
Once again, Evo negotiated away much of the MAS platform in exchange for a guarantee that he can run for reelection—which he’s likely to win. But the tensions w/in his own coalition (which is now more CONALCAM than MAS) plus the tactical victories of the opposition will make his next term even more difficult. Especially if the global economy continues to slump.
