Yesterday I posted some (very) early predictions for Bolivia’s December 2009 elections. I decided to make up a table showing some possible vote distributions based on some possible scenarios.
The first table shows what the seat distribution would be like if the vote shares were identical to the 2005 vote shares. Based on the strength of MAS in the Andean highland departments, its seat share would expand significantly, giving it a solid majority (55.6%) of the Senate.
But because I (and others) doubt that MAS will do as well as it did in 2005, I thought I’d run two other alternate scenarios. The first (Table 2) assumes that MAS lost 5% of the vote in each department, and that those votes transferred to the chief challenger (in 2005 that was Podemos). The second (Table 3) also assumes that MAS lost 5% of the vote in each department, but this time votes transferred to the second challenger (in 2005 that was UN). Under both scenarios MAS would “win” the election at large (or come very close) in the first round because of the sheer volume of votes in La Paz & Cochabamba (where MAS would still receive about 60% of the vote). But the seat shares change dramatically.
Under the first scenario—which assumes that the opposition overcomes its coordination problems and one single party (or presidential candidate) gains all the benefits of a slight decline in MAS support—the highly disproportional system (D’Hondt using consecutive divisors w/ a district magnitude of 4) benefits the primary opposition. In this scenario, Podemos would walk away w/ a majority (52.8%) in the Senate.
Under the second scenario—which assumes that the opposition doesn’t overcome its coordination problems but one other party (or presidential candidate) receives most of the benefit of a slight decline in MAS support—the electoral system would produce a deadlocked Senate (just like the 2005 election did). In this scenario, Podemos would actually be worse off than it was in 2005 (when it won one more seat than MAS, but not quite enough to have a majority in the chamber). But MAS would be in a pinch, coming up one seat short of an even 50% (and needing two to fully control the chamber). This would give disproportionate strength to the smaller parties (in 2005, MNR and UN). If they joined the primary opposition, they’d control the Senate. If they joined the government, MAS would hold a majority—but would have to negotiate away policy preferences, administrative posts, etc. to semi-loyal coalition partners.
The key point is that under the new rules, MAS can only do well if it retains all of its electoral strength from 2005. If it loses only a small percentage, or if those loses are particularly concentrated, it could see the new electoral rules come back to haunt them. Notice that under both scenarios a decline in only 5% of the vote locks MAS out of Senate seats in Pando & Beni (much like in 2005). Depending on how votes disperse throughout the Media Luna, MAS could see itself shut out in 3-4 departments, making achieving a majority almost impossible.
This leaves two fundamental questions heading into the 2009 election: How much support does MAS lose, and where? Is the opposition able to overcome its coordination problems?
Finally, please note that these are actually conservative estimates. The real nightmare scenario (for MAS) is that even if it retains all its vote support the opposition overcomes all its coordination problems, producing a two-party contest. If we added the vote shares for Podemos, UN, and MNR, the breakdowns would be even more highly skewed (and give the opposition a two thirds supermajority!—even w/ MAS receiving 54% of the national vote!!).
