Some (very) preliminary 2009 Bolivian election predictions

Yes, I think Rosza was crazy. No, I’m not convinced he was part of broad conspiracy involving all Evo’s opponents. But clearly the government has mishandled some (though not all) of the investigation, giving it a (huge) international pr problem to deal w/. And since Rosza was reportedly also targeting key opposition figures, it would’ve been nice to see Evo & Costas together on a balcony denouncing violent paramilitary groups (whether Ponchos Rojos or UJC) & making a pact to jointly defend democracy, blah, blah, blah. It would’ve been nice. Instead we just got finger pointing & his/hers conspiracy theories.

Yes, I think some sort of investigatory process about the events of the October 2003 gas war is necessary. No, I don’t think the current political climate is amenable to a fair hearing. Why? Because I don’t think the deaths of 59 protestors & security personal during several weeks of clashes constitutes “genocide” (even if it meets the Bolivian legal definition, which calls the killing of six people an act of genocide). Also, because unless we’re also willing to see if other political actors (Quispe, Evo, Solares, etc.) share some responsibility for the escalating violence of those days, then any trial will be fundamentally flawed. Instead, I recommend a truth & reconciliation commission. Not perfect, of course (ask the Chileans or the South Africans), but it seems to work in ensuring long-term stability for the new regime (again, ask the Chileans or the South Africans).

No, I don’t think Bolivia will qualify for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. I think we all know why.

So. What about these pesky December 2009 elections? I promised MABB that I’d offer my own assessment of the upcoming elections, so here it is: Evo will likely win reelection, unless something truly unexpected happens. But he probably won’t have the same kind of legislative support he currently enjoys. Let me break that down quickly.

Because of the newly approved constitution, Evo can run for reelection. And because Bolivia adopted a two-round runoff system for presidential elections, Evo gets a huge boost. He doesn’t need to worry about his legislative coalition in case he doesn’t win a simple majority (the old constitution stipulated that in case no candidate won 50%+1 of the vote, the legislature would select from among the top two candidates). Moreover, he can also win w/ only 40% of the vote, so long as he defeats the second place candidate by at least 10 points.

This also makes him vulnerable, of course. If he wins less than 50% of the vote—and if some opposition candidate can get w/in 10 points of him—Evo could face a runoff election. In that unlikely event, a strong opposition candidate could upset Evo. But this is a very unlikely event.

The real weakness for Evo comes from the new electoral constraints in place for the legislative election. The newly approved “transitional” electoral law doesn’t help Evo/MAS as much as many observers think.

First, there’s the issue of the Senate. The original MAS proposal called for a unicameral legislature. That was abandoned. Instead, the Senate got bigger. Each department gets four seats, rather than three. And this time the seats are to be divided using proportional representation (very difficult w/ a district magnitude of 4, obviously). If we use the 2005 general election figures as proxy (please indulge me), here’s what the breakdown would be (using 2005 election data w/ the “natural divisors” method stipulated in the 2009 electoral law):

Chuquisaca: 3 MAS; 1 Podemos
La Paz: 3 MAS; 1 Podemos
Cochabamba: 3 MAS; 1 Podemos
Oruro: 3 MAS; 1 Podemos
Potosí: 3 MAS; 1 Podemos
Tarija: 2 Podemos; 2 MAS
Santa Cruz: 2 Podemos; 2 MAS
Beni: 2 Podemos; 1 MNR; 1 MAS
Pando: 3 Podemos; 1 UN

Currently, MAS holds 12 of 27 seats in the Senate (Podemos holds 13, UN & MNR each holds 1). The new Senate will have 36 seats. My estimates (based on 2005 election figures) would give MAS about 20 seats. That is much better than it did in 2005 (55% is better than 44%), which looks like a huge advantage for MAS. But don’t forget that w/ a district magnitude of 4 using the D’Hondt “natural divisors” method heavily rewards the largest parties. This helps MAS, if it remains the largest (or at least second largest) party in each department. But if it has slipped (as it clearly has) in places like the Media Luna, even by a little, that balance can alter tremendously. (Notice that a 2009 scenario gives MNR/UN smaller seat shares than they won under 2005 rules.)

The lower house Chamber of Deputies hasn’t changed much, despite the fanfare surrounding the new “reserved” indigenous seats. Four of those are in the Media Luna. These will no dout be won by indigenous representatives of CIDOB. Recently, that organization broke w/ MAS—though it could come back to the fold. Interestingly, there are no reserved indigenous seats in Chuquisaca or Potosí, two departments that would likely elect pro-MAS representatives. The rest will come from departments like La Paz, Oruro, and Cochabamba, were rural districts were expected to elect pro-MAS representatives.

Also, because the reserved indigenous seats are geographically bound, this poses an interesting problem for MAS. First, because these seats are not for Aymara or Quechua communities, but for smaller, more marginal groups (such as Afro-Bolivians in La Paz). These groups may have an incentive to select representatives who may challenge MAS on pet issues.

At the same time, because these seats are geographically based, they will mean carving up or otherwise altering existing district boundaries. And here I expect to see an interesting political conflict. It’s possible that in the end, cities (which have grown in population) may gain representation, reducing the number of rural districts to create the “reserved” indigenous districts. That may help MAS in El Alto/La Paz. But it will hurt MAS in the Media Luna. The end result is that MAS will likely win the same share of legislative seats as it currently holds.

But. Here’s the rub: The introduction of the two-round runoff may encourage more opposition parties to challenge Evo. Because the Senate and half the Chamber of Deputies are calculated based on the presidential vote, the introduction of a strong third candidate could hurt Evo—assuming it peels votes away from him and his primary opponent. The possibility of a runoff decided by voters, rather than legislators, may be enough of an incentive to push lower-tiered parties/candidates to try to place second, in hopes of later rallying the opposition to defeat Evo. Imagine what Doria Medina could’ve accomplished in a two-round runoff (at the very least, I think his UN might have won more votes as a credible option). Even if that gambit fails (which I think it would), it might peel away enough votes from MAS to lower their seat totals—particularly in the Senate.

The introduction of the two-round runoff has made Bolivia truly a presidential system (and no longer a “parliamentarized presidential” system). Throughout Latin America, that has historically produced presidents w/ low legislative support, which leads to crisis, gridlock, or “extra-constitutional” situations (e.g. Fujimori).

Let’s see what happens in the next few months.