Reading Bolivia's election coca leaves, 4 months out

| 4 Comments

There’s starting to be a considerable amount of speculation regarding Bolivia’s upcoming (December 2009) presidential election. So far, Evo has a clear lead in all the polls, far outdistancing his potential1 rivals, leading many to assume Evo has an easy path to reelection. But he hasn’t reached the 50% mark in those polls, leading some to suggest that Evo’s in trouble. The reality is much more complicated.

A July 2008 poll asking Bolivians voters whether they would vote to keep Evo in the upcoming (August 2008) recall referendum gave Evo a 49-38 win. That is substantially off the final results (67-33). If we’re generous, and ignore the poll respondents who said they would vote blank (5%) and those who were unsure (7%) and treat only those who responded, the results would give Evo only 56%. Clearly, the poll understated support for Evo. In large part, that’s because the polls only sampled voters in La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. Since Evo has higher support in the countryside (about 40% of the national population), poll numbers are typically skewed downwards. But how much they’re skewed downwards is an interesting question.

Polls themselves provide some interesting comparisons. Two recent polls gave Evo a clear edge against potential rivals in the upcoming (December 2009) presidential contest. In April, only 41% of respondents said they planned to vote for Evo; that number grew to 44% in June. None of the potential hopefuls surpassed 8% (Victor Hugo Cardenas, in June). Both polls had significant “undecideds” (34% in April, 25% in June). Two interesting things here: First, though the number of undecided voters dropped 9% Evo gained only 3%, suggesting that (so far) undecideds are breaking for other candidates (mainly due to the introduction of two other potential candidates: Manfred Reyes Villa & Samuel Doria Medina).

None of this spells trouble for Evo (at least not yet), since we know his support in the countryside almost certainly makes his latest 44% figure lower than reality. Plus, Evo doesn’t need to win a majority of the vote to become president. He can do so in two other ways: He can win the presidency if he wins at least 40% of the vote and beats his nearest opponent by at least 10 points. He can also win the presidency so long as he comes in first or second, if he can then win the subsequent second round runoff.

But here’s where things get tricky (in terms of poll-watching): In April 2009 Evo scored 53% approval (w/ 43% disapproval). This is interesting because that number is 12 points higher than the poll of who would vote for Evo in the presidential election in the same month. What does this mean? I think it means that a substantial chunk of Bolivians who approve of Evo may not end up voting for his reelection.

Over the next several weeks, we’ll likely see opposition voters “converge” on a single candidate. That happened in 2005. Early in the campaign, Doria Medina was a poll favorite in three-way ties between him, Evo, and Tuto. In the last month of the campaign, voters abandoned Doria Medina (who ended up w/ less than 8%). Most of those voters flocked to Evo, who pulled ahead to win in an unprecedented landslide. Bolivian elections are notoriously unpredictable, and what really matters is the momentum that carries over into the final week.

Already opposition figures are busy working to build alliances to gather under a single banner to challenge Evo. This is tricky, however, because the ideological differences between Evo’s opponents could bring those negotiations to a standstill. But already we’ve seen Manfred gather around him a number of key ex-MAS dirigentes (Alejo Veliz, Adriana Gil) and non-MAS local figures (such as Jose Luis “Pepelucho” Paredes, elected prefect of La Paz in a narrow 2005 victory, but voted out in the 2008 recall referendum; and Marcial Fabricano, a long-time leader of Bolivia’s lowland indingeous peoples). Another w/ potential to put together a “unified” front is Victor Hugo Cardenas, Bolivia’s first indigenous vice president (1993-1997) and a long-time indigenous leader; he also recently became a media darling after pro-MAS protesters seized his house.

But things are even more complicated by the fact that only 14 political organizations (11 parties, one alliance, and 3 “citizen’s organizations”) are legally habilitated for December’s general election (see image). These are: MNR, MAS, UCS, MSM (currently allied w/ MAS, but possibly going it alone in December), MUSPA (created by ex-MAS strongman Roman Loayza), BSD, AS (led by Potosi’s popular mayor, Rene Joaquino), PPB (led by Peplucho), PULSO (led by Veliz), FPV, Concertación (an alliance of PODEMOS & PDC), Gente (w/o a presidential candidate), and Consenso Popular (which will postulate Santa Cruz senator, Oscar Ortiz). What this means is that there are at least 13 non-MAS parties that could present presidential candidates in December. Two of the most likely challengers (Manfred & Cardenas) don’t have parties; they’ll have to make a deal w/ one or more legally recognized parties to be able to run.

All this makes for a very interesting—and unprecedented—election cycle. No one yet knows how many candidates will emerge to seriously challenge Evo. In 2005, eight parties ran candidates, but only four (MAS, PODEMOS, MNR, and UN) took nearly 97% of the vote (MAS & PODEMOS alone took more than 82%). As of today, I’m quite certain Evo will win the first round, but not reach 50%. Whether he wins by more than 10 points over his nearest rival will largely depend on whether opposition candidates converge or splinter—and on how voters respond to any electoral alliances. Evo would be safer is his approval rates were higher than 60% (which they have been in the past); but they haven’t been that high in many months.

-----
1 I say “potential” because the actual list of candidates won’t be official for several more weeks. Additionally, several polls have included candidates that may not even run (several have already made clear they wouldn’t).

4 Comments

Miguel,,,
I guess we'll see what happens, but my money is on Evo--especially given how well he has done with the Bolivian economy and with elder, infant, educational social programs for all Bolivians--all without going into debt, or bowing before foreign interests. While I think he'll likely win in the first round, I hope I am wrong.
You believe the splintered groups dividing the popular vote will prevent Evo from winning in the first round, and I hope you are prescient--because in a run off election, Evo will win by an even greater margin than he has previously--I'm thinking in the 70% range.
Viva Bolivia and viva Evo Morales!
Regards,,,Jhon

I think you misunderstood me. I don't think a splintered vote would prevent Evo from winning. A splintered vote helps him; only if an opposition candidate wins 30% or more would Evo have to go to a 2nd round. But depending on how low Evo does in 1st round, he is actually more vulnerable in 2nd round than in 1st. IMO.

What makes you think that the opposition will actually band together? They have been talking about forming a coalition for months already, but the major players (prefects, Ortiz, Tuto, Cardenas, Samuel, Reyes Villa) are far from being in the same bed. Some alliances are taking place, but I do not see any indicators of a "grand alliance" to actually shake Evo. If anything, today's article from La Razon confirms this.

I don't believe the opposition will necessarily band together. I only know that it has no chance of winning at least 30% unless it does. I'm sorry my post wasn't clearer on that.

About

  • I’m Miguel Centellas, Croft Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Mississippi. I post semi-regularly about Bolivian politics, as well as interesting books, pop culture, and daily life in my new home of Oxford, Mississippi.
  • Here is my curriculum vitae.
  • You can also find me on Twitter & Facebook. I also have a Tumblr blog about teaching.
  • Send questions & comments by email.

Noticias de Bolivia