Yesterday’s La Razón had an interesting note about a new electoral coalition set to enter December’s presidential/legislative election in Bolivia. This one challenges Evo from his indigenous-left flank.
It’s unclear how credible/effective this electoral threat will be (I’m going to wait for the next round of polls). But this does have the potential to sap into some of Evo’s core constituency: rural indigenous campesinos & radical organized labor. The announcement indicated that a slew of established left-indigenous leaders had joined together in a left opposition coalition: Alejo Véliz, Román Loayza, and Felipe Quispe. Additionally, the following names were also mentioned as having expressed “interest” in joining the coalition: Roberto de la Cruz, Jaime Solares, and David Vargas. Who are these people?
Alejo Véliz is a lifelong member of Bolivia’s Communist Party. He was a key member of various leftist alliances (FPU & IU) during the 1980s & 1990s. He founded the ASP, the rural social movement organization that would eventually evolve into today’s MAS. In 1997, when Evo won his seat in the legislature (as a uninominal representative from a Chapare district), he did so under the IU banner. Véliz was that party’s presidential candidate. He split w/ Evo over personal/ideological/tactical differences—including arguments that Evo had encouraged split-ticket voting, so that wins for Evo & other cocalero legislators didn’t translate into higher vote shares (and therefore seats) for other IU candidates (including Véliz, who had hoped to win a plurinominal seat). Part of the problem was an earlier split: By 1997, IU was reduced to an alliance of two parties, the Communists (Véliz) & MAS-U (a leftist splinter of the Bolivian Falange led by David Pedraza; the U stands for Unzaguista, as in Unzaga de la Vega). Evo had already moved closer towards Pedraza, and away from the more doctrinaire Marxist Communists.
In 2002, Véliz joined Manfred’s NFR, which aimed to be a vague, populist, catch-all “change” party (and came a hair’s breath from placing 2nd in the presidential contest). There was speculation that Véliz would again join Manfred. That turned out not to be the case. Véliz has a bit of an image problem, since he has flirted w/ “traditional” parties. Still, he brings name recognition & some organizational structure (and experience) behind him.
Felipe Quispe is more well-known. He’s the firebrand, radical indigenesita leader known as “El Mallku.” Before MAS captured the world’s attention as an “indigenous” party, Quispe (w/ Alvaro García Linera’s help) had transformed the moribund katarista indigenous movement, radicalized it, and made it a powerful presence in Bolivian politics. In 2005, those voters seemed to abandon Quispe & MIP to help Evo & MAS cruise to a crushing victory. But there’s signs of restlessness in the rural Altiplano. And Quispe (unlike Véliz) can certainly not be painted as a sellout. And he’s shown (in 2000 & 2003) that his Aymara communities can bring a government to its knees, if it can organize—and maintain—road blockades of the Altiplano (laying a virtual siege on La Paz).
Román Loayza is another figure like Véliz. He had a reputation as a sort of “whip” for MAS, and along w/ Evo, Loayza founded IPSP, the electoral arm of ASP (it’s IPSP that became MAS). He left Evo over rather personal conflicts (he wanted a ministry or other similar position). But he also echoes some complaints from many old guard MAS activists: too many top appointments in the government went to “new” MAS faces (some who conveniently joined the party on the eve of the 2005 election) as MAS heavily recruited middle-class intelletuals & professionals to its ranks. The strategy helped MAS broaden its electoral base, but it rankled many old ASP-IPSP activists. Loayza could capitalize on those sentiments.
Jaime Solares is the former head of Bolivia’s labor federation (COB). Along w/ Quispe, Solares should be given the most credit for the October 2003 gas war (Evo was barely a presence in that conflict). It was Solares who mobilized the COB in daily protests (starting in early September), demanding the nationalization of Bolivia’s oil & gas sector, and denouncing the export of gas through Chile. After Quispe’s parallel protests gained steam, putting pressure on the government, the COB-led protests grew—and its demands became the signature cry of the October 2003 social uprising. The COB is now under new leadership loyal to MAS. But the name of Solares can hardly be forgotten, particularly by miners (who’ve been in frequent conflicts w/ Evo’s government) or those who want a more radical kind of government & see Evo as “watering down” the October agenda.
Roberto de la Cruz is another name from the October 2003 gas war, and perhaps the key. At the time, he led the El Alto regional labor federation (COR-El Alto), and was a key figure in that city’s explosion against Goni’s government in early October. It was Quispe, Solares, and De la Cruz who stood on the rocks of Plaza de Heroes & declared victory the day after Goni resigned, and it was they who received Mesa & negotiated a “truce.” Since then, De la Cruz has been a frequent critic (and sometimes ally) of Evo/MAS, but has retained his own political organization (M-17, October 17th Movement), w/ which he has won a seat on El Alto’s municipal council. Of all the figures above, De la Cruz has a solid electoral base where it most counts: El Alto.
David Vargas is another blast from the not-so-distant past. Vargas was a non-participant in the October 2003 uprising, but he was the figure of the February 2003 popular uprising. A police major, Vargas led the La Paz riot police in a mutiny, and even assaulted the presidential palace. Their protest (over wages) coincided w/ public rage over proposed tax increased, and became a brief prelude to October’s uprising. Vargas also retained his independence, and even won a seat to the Constituent Assembly w/ his own electoral vehicles, ASP (a different ASP, Social Patriotic Alliance).
Alone, neither of these characters would pose much of a threat to Evo. Together? That’s the big question. It’s unlikely that Evo can win by a larger margin than he did in 2005. I’d put the ceiling at no more than 55%. That’s still a lot, of course. But can this new “left-indigenous” front chip away at Evo’s voter base enough to bridge the gap between Evo & a (center-right or right) opposition candidate?
Again, the issue is not the presidency. Evo is going to win the presidency. The issue is the legislature. Can this new alliance chip away at MAS voters enough to make it difficult for MAS to secure the supermajority (in the House of Deputies) or majority (in the Senate) that it needs to push through its agenda? There’s three months to go. I’m curious to see what this does to Evo’s poll numbers, which have remained stagnant at around 40-45%.
Here's an interesting article that describes an interview on TV with Loayza and Quispe - it was on last night.
http://www.topix.com/forum/world/bolivia/T6CNJHMIIH34LRPJO
They said they felt used and betrayed by Evo and that Evo had used them "like toilet paper".