A surprising VP nomination in Bolivia

Let’s start at the bottom & work our way up.

A few days ago, Evo gave a stump speech asking Quispe (the radical indigenous Altiplano leader) to join his campaign. Quispe has become a strong critic of Evo’s government, primarily on the grounds that Evo has (according to Quispe) betrayed “authentic” indigenous demands. In that speech, Evo also publicly “forgave” Loayza (a MAS founder who broke w/ the party recently), and asked him to come back to the fold, and ask forgiveness.

At first, Quispe suggested that he’d consider an alliance—but on the condition that Evo drop his k’ara (white) advisors, particularly Álvaro García Linera (Evo’s vice president). AGL joined Quispe in the early 1990s, helping the indigenous leader (who was already a rising figure in the indigenous katarista movement) form the now famous Ayllus Rojos (as well as the short-lived EGTK guerrilla organization). After AGL left prison (where he became a sociologist) & joined the pundit/intelligentsia circuit, Quispe became a bitter enemy. So, much of this is personal vendetta. But there’s also been a growing criticism among old guard (and young radical) kataristas that Evo’s government is too moderate, and includes too many middle-class, white/mestizo top level appointees (e.g. Walker San Miguel, Alfredo Rada) and not enough “indigenous” cabinet ministers. Quispe today is quoting as saying that he will not “be used”—and insisting that Evo would have to give MIP (Quispe’s indigenous party) at least six ministries (so perhaps the door is still open?). For his part, Loayza argued he has “nothing to apologize for” & that Evo should instead apologize.

Neither figure will likely hurt Evo’s chances definitively. Loayza has a personal political machine, but it pales in comparison to that of MAS. He might chip away at Evo’s legitimacy among old guard MAS activists, but these won’t vote for most of the opposition candidates. Bottom line: most of Evo’s support today is both recent (since 2005) & personal (not “institutional”). This is evident in MIP’s decline between 2002 & 2005. In 2002, MIP swept the La Paz Altiplano to become the country’s 5th largest legislative block; in 2005 the party won less than 1% of the vote & failed to win a single seat. Could a revitalized MIP hurt Evo among Aymara rural voters? Perhaps. But the bulk of Evo’s support today seems to come from urban Aymara residents of El Alto (where his approval rates remain above 90%).

Jimena Costa: A few weeks ago, Costa invited a number of opposition candidates to her home for a salon/dinner discussion. The event created an instant media buzz. Costa is a well-known TV political analyst & it was clear she was angling for a spot on a presidential ticket—perhaps even top billing. For a few weeks, each known candidate (none are official until September 6, the filing deadline) spoke about the need to form a “united block” to face off against Evo. There was also much talk speculating that the “magic bullet” against Evo was a female middle-class candidate from La Paz. Costa seemed to fit the bill. (Of course, she was one of the first to float this idea during her commentary in the weeks before the opposition sit down).

Over time, the political differences—and egos—that divided the opposition candidates mired the discussion. Everyone wanted a unified front; and everyone wanted to be at the top of the ticket. W/o a party of her own, Costa did the only sensible thing: she bowed out. Although it also seems that, for all their interest, no one asked her to be their VP candidate. Or perhaps she held out for the top spot herself? Either way, Costa’s brief fling w/ presidential politics is (at least for now) over.

Joaquino: I’m personally surprised at Joaquino’s presidential campaign. Yes, he’s a multiple-term mayor of Potosí, a middle-sized city in Bolivia’s Andean heartland. But he’s also previously failed in big-ticket contests. In 2005, he failed to win the prefecture of Potosí, the only sitting or ex mayor who failed to do so (Manfred won in Cochabamba; José Luís Paredes won in La Paz). Now he’s running for president, but consistently fails to break out of the rear of the opposition pack in any polls. Still, Joaquino did pick a running mate yesterday: Charles Suarez, an Evangelical pastor from Santa Cruz. This could be interesting. The Evangelical vote has been a sleeper demographic for some time, but it could materialize to boost Joaquino’s campaign (and Evangelicals are in all social demographics, including a significant sector of the indigenous population). Still, talk about horrible timing. Because all anyone is going to talk about is …

Manfred picked Fernández as is running mate?! That came across my Twitter feed last night, and I had to take a double take. After sleeping on it, I’m still confused. But it just might make (some) sense. The skinny on Leopoldo is this: He’s basically the political boss of Pando. Elected to the legislature a record six times in a row since 1979. In 2005, he was the longest serving senator. He was elected prefect of Pando in a tight race over his MAS adversary (48-46); but he won the recall referendum (56-44). About a year ago, pro-MAS & pro-Leopoldo activists clashed, killing several; after the central government briefly militarized Pando, Leopoldo was arrested; he’s been in La Paz’s San Pedro prison ever since. The government claims Leopoldo was fomenting unrest; his supporters (particularly the association of opposition prefects, CONALDE) claim Leopoldo is a political prisoner.

Either way, the reality is that this election will likely hinge on Pando. I’m confident that Evo will win. He’s too far ahead in the polls, and the opposition is too fragmented. Unless one single opposition candidate can break the 30% barrier to come w/in 10 points of Evo (and only if Evo fails to reach 50%), would voters go to a runoff (and even then I suspect Evo would edge out pretty much anyone). But the key to the next administration is control of the Senate. That means Pando.

Already, the government has begun to move thousands of its supporters to Pando. Ostensibly, this is to give land to poor families from rural areas. The reality, of course, is much more complex. The new “colonizadores” (as such communities are called) are currently living in tent cities; no infrastructure (housing, roads, schools, hospitals, sanitation, water, electricity, etc.) was prepared for them before the move. But they’re all being registered to vote. In Pando. Because Pando is so small, a few thousand families here/there can tip the balance.

Here’s where the choice of Leopoldo may be an interesting gambit. Manfred won’t win the presidency. That’s an unlikely possibility. He’s polling well enough, and he still has control over much of the Cochabamba urban political machine. But he’s not well-liked enough across the country. Yes, he has the backing of the ex-prefect of La Paz. But both Paredes & Manfred lost their recall referendums. So not much help there. But. The choice of Leopoldo might be enough to rally votes in Pando to prevent a MAS victory there. And that might be just enough to keep MAS from winning control of the upper chamber (just as in 2005 a 53% win for Evo still left MAS two seats short of control of the senate). Another possibility, as someone suggested in an email to me, is that Manfred may turn Leopoldo into a cause célèbre & rally Evo’s opponents around him. So crazy, it just might work. Not to win, mind you, but as a move to block a complete MAS victory.

Still, it’s early. And things can change. The “real” starting gun doesn’t go off until September 6, the deadline for all party candidates (president, VP, and legislative) must be registered w/ the National Electoral Court. But this is shaping up to be a very interesting election.