Official results aren't out yet. But here's what we know so far about yesterday's election in Bolivia: Evo Morales won (as expected), and by about the margin predicted in polls (I explain below). MAS also won majorities in both legislative chambers, but only managed a 2/3 supermajority (so far) in the upper chamber. The autonomy referendums were a smashing success, winning massively almost entirely across the board (reversing the 2005). But for all the celebration, there are some cautionary signs for MAS. Similarly, the opposition did poorly, but not nearly as poorly as many thought or predicted. I'll try to break it down below.

1. The pre-electoral polls were actually quite accurate

Hardly anyone doubted that Evo would win reelection. All the polls gave him decisive margins over his nearest rival, Manfred Reyes Villa. The last polls (about a week before the election) gave Evo 55% & Manfred only 18%. So it seems that Evo's 63% victory “exceeded” poll expectations. If so, Manfred's 28% also exceeded expectations. So, what explains this discrepancy? Two things: undecided voters (in polls) & using “valid” votes (rather than total votes) as the basis for percent calculations.

Well, many observers ignored the size of the undecideds in the pre-electoral polls. The last Ipsos pre-electoral poll had 15% of respondents undecided. If you include those who gave their preferences to other candidates in that poll (12% for split between Samuel Doria Medina & Rene Joaquino), you get a total “valid” polling figure of 85%. Using that as a base, the Ipsos poll suggested these figures: Evo 65%, Manfred 21%, SDM 12%, and Joaquino 2%. That suggests a few things: 1) Evo actually underperformed the poll (slightly, but w/in the margin of error); 2) Manfred actually overperformed the poll (by a more significant margin); and 3) voters continued to flee SDM & Joaquino, but most went to Manfred.

2. Manfred's results suggest polarization is entrenched

No one expected Manfred to win, or even to make it a close enough race to make it into a second round runoff. Still, he outperformed many pollster's expectations. In the end, he did as well as Jorge Quiroga (Tuto) did in 2005. This suggests that a sizeable, consolidated chunk of the electorate is unreconciled w/ the “process of change” championed by Evo/MAS.

Moreover, these voters are less likely to back a centrist candidate (like SDM) or an insitutionalized “traditional” party (these are now swept away). The standard bearer for the opposition is a conservative populist. This means that despite all the celebration of the “end of polarization,” we instead see an entrenchment of that polarization. The 28% of voters who backed Manfred aren't going to budge, and you can bet they'll do all they can to make Evo's second term as difficult as possible.

3. Don't be so quick to celebrate the MAS “supermajority”

Yes, MAS seems to have secured a (slim) 2/3 supermajority in the Senate. But it failed to do so in the lower house (though it has a large majority). This gives Evo a lot of leverage compared to the last few years (when the opposition controlled the Senate). But let's not assume that MAS is a homogenous party w/ lockstep discipline. It's not, and it doesn't.

Already in 2005-2009 MAS was plagued by a number of defections from its ranks. Currently, two MAS senators are “dissidents.” And a number of top-tier senate candidates were actively recruited by MAS from the middle class & intelligentsia to send signals to moderate voters. This worked, as a campaign strategy. But already Ana Maria Romero de Campero (Anamar) has proclaimed that she helped MAS increase its vote in La Paz. The middle class, liberal human rights activist is unlikely to share any passion for the kind of “totalitarian” project many of Evo's harshest critics fear. And it's likely that legislators like her will act as constraints on Evo's government. Moreover, as the MAS tent has grown to include social groups ranging from landless peasants to urban indigenous day laborers to urban professionals to middle class intellectuals it has stretched itself in various directions. This may prove a challenge in corralling votes for different policies.

4. The new “federalized” Bolivia changes the game significantly

Yesterday's vote also saw all of Bolivia's nine departments approve regional autonomy. The Media Luna departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando) already did so in 2005 (and again in the 2008 “wildcat” referendums). But now the Andean departments (La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosi, and Chuquisaca) did so as well. And by overwhelming numbers: 78% in La Paz, 79% in Potosi, 84% in Chuquisaca, 79% in Cochabamba, and 73% in Oruro. These are almost reverse, polar images of these departements' votes in 2005.

This time, of course, MAS actively campaigned in favor of autonomy. It's interesting to note that pro-autonomy votes exceeded the votes for autonomy in the Media Luna in 2005 (the highest then was Beni w/ 73%). This suggests that Bolivian voters have come to embrace the idea of regional autonomy. No doubt they have a different kind of autonomy in mind, perhaps. But more likely this has been a question of reframing the autonomy debate. Nevertheless, the country now has constitutionally recognized autonomous departments. And this transforms Bolivian politics.

In April 2010, voters across Bolivia will go to the polls to elect new municipal governments, as well as their first ever departmental governments (governors and regional legislators). This has important implications. It means the next four months (January to April) will force MAS (and the opposition) to act w/ electoral considerations in mind. This will impact how “departmental brigades” (as departmental caucuses are called) behave. And that impact will be strongest in the Senate. Evo now has to calculate whether moving quickly to secure policy goals helps or hurts his party's chances in local elections, which will be seen as a plebiscite on his administration.

Additionally, voters in Gran Chaco (comprising three municipalities in Tarija) voted for their own “regional” autonomy. It's still very unclear what that means (in practical terms), especially since voters there won't get to elect their own “regional” authorities until 2015. But it suggests that Bolivia's political system is about to get even more complicated. Municipalities are now also “autonomous” (according to the constitution), so this mid-level “regional” autonomy sits uncomfortably between departmental, municipal, and indigenous autonomy (all of which seem to be “co-equal,” constitutionally).

The bottom line is that all parties—especially parties in power—will face pressures from local politics like never before. This is part of a growing tendency since the mid-1990s (w/ municipal decentralization & electoral system reforms). But now there's a new, more complicated layer.

5. The “exterior” vote wasn't decisive, but could become so in the future

At first glance it doesn't seem like voters in Spain, the US, Brazil, or Argentina made a significant impact, one way or another. Like the rest of Bolivians, they backed Evo (the only voted for president). They also backed him by slightly larger numbers: 69% for Evo over 25% for Manfred. [Edit 12/08: It now seems like voters in the US went for Manfred over Evo 71-30, and that the total international vote was closer to the Bolivia tally. But these numbers all could change, as official counts come in.]

But these voters could be decisive in future elections. A total of 170,000 voters cast ballots outside Bolivia. That's three times the current population of Pando (60,000) & half the population of Oruro (385,000). If the number of Bolivians voting in the exterior increases (and it's likely to, both by rising migration & increasing the number of international polling places), they could really prove decisive if they break substantially from how voters in Bolivia cast their ballots.

6. Not everyone wants indigenous autonomy

Not much can be said about this, yet, based on early vote counts. But it seems that at least two of the municipalities that had a chance to vote for “indigenous autonomy” (which is somehow different from regular municipal autonomy) & opted to reject that symbolic move. Those were Charagua (in Santa Cruz) & Carahuara (in Oruro). No one yet seems to know what, if anything, that means. But it does suggest that indigenous voters are more complex (and therefore human) than they're often portrayed.

7. The old party system is dead, long live the new populists

None of the traditional parties even competed in the election. This suggests that populism (a form of non-institutionalized, personality-driven politics) is the new norm in Bolivia. Even MAS is currently dominated by a single figure (Evo) and seems unlikely to become an institutionalized party system able to present an internal transition.

This was the death knell of Bolivia's traditional parties, which were led by single caudillos for their entire history. Only the MNR managed a transition, but that was in 1988 after Victor Paz Estenssoro held a firm grip on the party since the 1940s. And then the transition was to Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (Goni), who led the party for two decades (until 2004).

If Evo is serious about running for reelection in 2015, that postpones an internal transition w/in MAS. That would only continue Bolivia's tradition of populist caudillos, which has not been a good track record. If MAS is serious about a lasting process of change, it needs to prepare a second generation of leaders who can take over after Evo. The real victory for Evo in 2015 would be not to win reelection by 70% (as he suggests he hopes to do), but to ensure that someone else from MAS succeeds him in a smooth transition. That would truly make his reforms “irreversible.”

8. It's the economy, stupid

Finally, Bolivia's economy has some troubling signs as the global recession continues to take its toll. Yes, the economy has grown (as many Evo supporters are often quick to point out). But that growth isn't all it's cracked up to be. First, because that growth has been primarily based on raw material exports, continuing a tradition that goes back centuries (and one highly susceptible to boom/bust cycles). Second, because that growth isn't that much better than in the early 1990s. From 1993 to 1998, economic growth was consistently between 4-5% per year (see chart). It was only in 1999 that the economy entered recession. But throughout that period, GDP growth was outstripped by inflation (see data). Last year, inflation hit 14%, far outstripping the 6.1% GDP growth rate. The 2009 growth rate is currently pegged at only 2.8%. If the economy begins to falter, that will put strains on Evo's government, which has already used bank reserves to doll out payments to children, mothers, and pensioners. These are all valuable, worthwhile programs. But they're expensive. And now they're viewed as entitlements, which means any incumbent government will be punished if it's unable to continue to deliver (or even expand) them.

Moreover, the longer the recession continues in the US & Europe—and the Dubai financial mess is a troubling sign of things to come—the less money will be available for both critically needed donor aid & foreign investment. For all his symbolic rhetoric, Evo is still actively courting foreign investors. If the economy makes them increasingly risk-averse, we may see a recession hit Bolivia. Of course, rising economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China) may pick up the slack. But that's always a gamble. It would be better to have a larger number of options, not fewer.

The bottom line, however, is that Bolivia is not really charting a new “socialist” course, per se. It's following the 1952 MNR playbook, pursuing a political strategy of multi-class alliance & an economic strategy of “state capitalism.” It's banking on a state-driven economic sector to grow, keeping the middle class happy while also securing better standards of living for the poor. It was the failure of the state capitalism model to deliver that led to an experiment w/ neoliberalism. Another failure of state capitalism could leave Bolivia primed, yet again, for another neoliberal episode.

Conclusions

Overall, this was a good day for Bolivia. By all accounts the election was free & fair. Evo has led MAS to yet another electoral victory, gaining greater legitimacy for his political project. However, neither the entrenched opposition nor the die-hard believers should read too much into this victory. Evo won (as he does before most elections) by moving closer to the center & appealing to key sectors of the middle class for support. This means that hislegislative majority is more heterogeneous than many suspect.

April will be the big test. By then, voters will be voting on more “bread & butter” issues, rather than on the symbolism of Evo & a continuation of a “process of change.” In April, voters are more likely to vote on local issues that may divide even avid MAS supporters (at the national level). And whether the economy stalls or continues to grow will also play a major role.