Today’s La Razón has a nice breakdown of options this election. In some ways, this will be the most complicated Bolivian election to date Yet—for most voters—it will be little different from their 2005 vote.
All voters will be able to select a presidential candidate. After that, the options start to get a little trickier. The vast majority of voters (all urban voters & most rural voters) will then also have an option to select a “uninominal” legislative representative to the lower house (Bolivia uses a mixed-member electoral system similar to Germany’s). Votes for president determine the composition of the legislature’s upper house (the Senate), as well as slightly less than half (70 of 130 seats) the lower house (the House of Deputies).
Here’s where it starts to get tricky. Of the remaining 60 lower house seats, 7 are reserved as special indigenous seats. That’s one in each of the following departments: La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando. Interestingly, there are no indigenous seats reserved for Chuquisaca or Potosí. In those seven departments, voters will have various options. Some live in 183 specially designated “mixed” precincts (all in rural areas) where voters will have to declare before voting whether they will vote for indigenous or “uninominal” representative (they’ll then be given the corresponding ballot). Voters in another 150 precincts will only be allowed to vote for indigenous representatives (as well as for president).
This is where things can get interesting. Most voters casting ballots for “indigenous” representatives are likely to support the MAS-backed option. But this means that such districts could allow for opposition “uninominal” candidates to win in those districts. This might matter, since uninominal candidates need only a simple plurality to win. I’m going to keep my eye on those uninominal districts (which will encompass a mix of “mixed” & non-indigenous precincts).
Additionally, a number of voters will see other options on their menu. Voters throughout the departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Cochabamba, and Chuquisaca will have the ability to vote (yet again) for regional autonomy (they did so in 2005). Voters in Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando won’t have that option, since they voted for autonomy in 2005. This time—w/ MAS doing an about face & throwing its weight behind autonomy—voters in the five Andean departments are expected to approve autonomy by hefty margins (60-70% or more).
A few select voters will have yet another option. Voters in Tarija’s Gran Chaco province (made up three municipalities: Yacuiba, Villamontes, and Caraparí) will vote on their own regional autonomy. While voters in 12 other municipalities in Chuquisaca (Huacaya, Tarabuco, Villa de Mojocoya), La Paz (Charazani, Jesús de Machaca), Oruro (Chipaya, San Pedro de Totora, Pampas Aullagas, Salinas de Garci Mendoza, Curahuara de Carangas), Potosí (Chayanta), and Santa Cruz (Charagua) will decide whether they want to switch from the status of “municipality” to a constitutionally recognized autonomous indigenous territory.
The second vote (for indigenous recognition) is mostly symbolic. Already in 1994, the Popular Participation Law (LPP) gave municipalities the right to define themselves as indigenous communities. And the new 2009 constitution recognizes municipal autonomy across the country.
The first vote has more unclear consequences. The 2009 constitution allows for “regional” autonomy at an intermediate level between department & municipality. But this could also be the transition into a new department. If so, would bordering chaqueño municipalities in Chuquisaca & Santa Cruz want to join? This could be a real issue, because while most of Bolivia’s natural gas is found in Tarija, most of that is actually located in Gran Chaco (w/ significant deposits in other chaqueño municipalities in Santa Cruz & Chuquisaca. MAS victories there could serve as a flanking maneuver around opposition-dominated department governments in Tarija, Chuquisaca, and Santa Cruz.
Finally, the last complication is the role of overseas voters. Under Evo, Bolivia’s government has made a concerted push to facilitate voting by Bolivian citizens living overseas. Voting precincts will open in Spain (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia), the US (the Washington, DC area), Argentina (Jujuy, Mendoza, Buenos Aires), and Brazil (São Paulo). These voters will only be able to vote for president. Overseas voters have not been polled, and there’s enough of them to make an impact if their preferences differ significantly from those of Bolivians at home.
It’s still pretty obvious that Evo will win. It’s also almost certain that he won’t be forced into a second round runoff. The only question is how the legislature will look. Currently, MAS has a majority in the House of Deputies, but the opposition controls the Senate. MAS will certainly keep control over the lower house. The question is whether it’s votes—across the departments—will be enough for it to wrest control of the Senate away from the opposition. Evo’s rise in the polls over the past few weeks suggest that this is very real possibility. If so, it’ll be largely due to a failure of the opposition to coordinate behind a single candidate. Manfred has been successful at firing up the die-hard anti-Evo opponents (and even winning over some, but not most, moderates). But a more moderate candidate like Samuel Doria Media or Víctor Hugo Cárdenas might have done much better. Of course, it’s all speculation now.
