Bolivia: the return of “pacted democracy”

In reality, the practice was little different than the kind of coalition bargaining that takes places in any European parliamentary system. One commentator called Bolivia a “parlimentarized presidential” system. Each election ended in a stalemate, w/ no candidate winning 50%+1 of the vote. Rather than a runoff election (which was adopted in the 2009 constitution), the first task on the agenda of the newly-elected legislature was to appoint a president from among the top contenders. Inter-party negotiations began shortly after the election results were known, and continued until a selection was made. Often, this happened long before the first legislative session, as parties hammered out deals to split the spoils of government (a ministry here, a prefecture here, a committee appointment there, etc.). Under this system ever Bolivian president between 1985 until 2002 counted w/ a solid legislative majority.

The practice of alliances grew institutionalized, that by the 1990s parties began negotiations well in advance of elections. These years saw a number of pre-electoral alliances: MNR-MBL, MIR-FRI, ADN-PDC, ADN-NFR, etc. Some of these became difficult to understand ideologically. Perhaps the most perplexing was the “Patriotic Accord” (AP) alliance between ADN (the center-right party of former military dictator Hugo Banzer) & MIR (the center-left party of Jaime Paz Zamora, who was persecuted during Banzer’s dictatorship). The AP alliance was born out of the 1989 election, when a frustrated Banzer (who was denied the presidency in 1985 & looked to lose it again in 1989) threw the weight of his party behind Paz Zamora. Because the two main parties had themselves been pre-electoral alliances, the AP alliance actually encompassed two other minor, but significant parties: PDC (the centrist Christian democrats) & FRI (a social-democratic party).

The AP alliance marked both the zenith & low point of “pacted democracy” in Bolivia. From the start, it was clear that the only thing holding the alliance together was the desire of Paz Zamora & Banzer to power. In exchange for “crossing a river of blood” (the phrase used to describe the alliance, since so many MIR members had been killed during the dictatorships—including Paz Zamora’s own brother), MIR agreed to continue the alliance through the next election. In 1993 ADN & MIR campaigned together, as AP, w/ Banzer as the presidential candidate. AP marks the high point because it was the most elaborate, comprehensive power-sharing agreement; it marks the low point because there was little motive uniting the members other than the naked desire for power.

Before the AP alliance, the first coalition government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (MNR-ADN) had been merely a legislative coalition (ADN agreed to support the MNR from the legislature, but didn’t negotiate for specific ministries). After the AP alliance, all future coalitions would be explicitly “portfolio” coalitions (i.e. the parties would explicitly divide up cabinet & other executive posts in elaborate power-sharing agreements). 1993 brought Goni to power behind an MNR-MRTKL-MBL-UCS alliance. 1997 brought Banzer to power behind ADN-NFR-PDC-MIR-UCS-CONDEPA. 2002 brought Goni back behind MNR-MBL-MIR-ADN-UCS-NFR. Each time the coalitions included more parties & were increasingly difficult to negotiate and/or maintain.

This system had two saving graces: The first was its flexibility. Because coalitions were primarily about sharing power, rather than ideological convergence, political conflict was reduced to pragmatic accommodations. This was facilitated, of course, by an elite convergence on a neoliberal political discourse.

The second saving grace of “pacted democracy” was that it was compartmentalized. The introduction of municipal elections in 1994 (the first elections were in 1995) saw more than 300 electoral contests across the national territory. A similar system existed at the municipal level: If no party won 50%+1 the newly-elected municipal council would choose from among its members (there were no mayoral candidates, only party lists for seats to the municipal council). The remarkable thing was that across the country, different party coalitions emerged. That is, parties that opposed each other at the national level might find themselves—at the local level—negotiating coalition pacts. This reinforced the pragmatic nature of coalition-building. But it also recognized & guaranteed a significant degree of political autonomy to municipal governments.

Today it looks like MAS is reviving that tradition—including all its weaknesses & disadvantages, but w/ few of its saving graces. Battered in the April 2010 regional & municipal elections, Evo’s party has decided on a full-court press to gain control of departmental assemblies & municipal councils across the country. Some of these alliances are, frankly, odd. In the end, the move suggests that MAS is willing to go great lengths to maintain a firm grip on power—even if it means setting up w/ strange bedfellows.

After losing three of the new governorships (Santa Cruz, Beni, and Tarija), MAS has maneuvered to control the departmental assemblies. It was successful in Beni & Tarija, but not in Santa Cruz. This partly due to the controversial interpretation of the electoral law, which (re)defined the parallel electoral system as mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) rather than mixed-member proportional (MMP, the system used at the national level). The move meant that MAS won a larger number of seats than it otherwise would have. But that still wasn’t enough to win control over the assemblies outright. So Evo’s party began to sign agreements w/ opposition parties.

MAS managed control over 8 departmental assemblies—winning the presidency of those assemblies. This includes two departments where an opposition candidate won the governorship. Because the transition law stipulates that any public figure w/ a pending case against him/her is automatically removed from office, MAS could name the new interim governors in Beni & Tarija (if the accusations against Suárez & Cossío go forward). To do so, however, MAS had to make the following alliances: In Beni, MAS crossed the aisle to join hands w/ the MNR (Goni’s party). In Tarija, MAS crossed the aisle to join hands w/ PAN (Poder Autonómico Nacional, founded by former PODEMOS members). The Tarija move is the most surprising. Because in the move to isolate Cossío (the reelected governor of Tarija) MAS has forged an alliance w/ politicians who only recently worked w/ Tuto Quiroga (Banzer’s former vice-president & president of Bolivia from 2001-2002).

Now MAS seeks to control municipal councils, w/ similar alliances. In the city of Oruro, where MSM won the mayorship & 5 of 11 council seats, MAS (which won 4 seats) has gained control of the municipal council w/ alliances w/ Unidad Nacional (UN, the party of business magnate Samuel Doria Medina) & a local party, MCSFA (Movimiento Ciudadano San Felipe de Austria). In Sucre, the former rector of the university (and a key figure in the capitalía movement that derailed the Constituent Assembly) won the mayorship & 4 of 11 council seats. MAS (which won 4 seats) has now signed agreements w/ Primero Sucre (2 seats) & Nueva Alianza Ciudadan (1 seat, held by a former PODEMOS senator). In the city of La Paz, where MSM won the mayorship & 5 of 11 council seats, MAS signed a deal w/ UN to seize control of the municipal council. The same thing happened in El Alto, where MAS did win the mayorship, but faced the possibility of an alliance between UN & MSM. The interesting twist has been the city of Cochabamba, where MAS won the mayorship, but opposition parties banded together to seize control over the council. Opposition parties have secure control in the following cities: Potosí, Tarija, Trinidad, and Santa Cruz.

These new alliances show an interesting pattern emerging from MAS. Failing to win decisive electoral victories in several departmental & municipal elections, it has decided to employ the strategy of the 1980s & 1990s: seek to build governing coalitions w/ any parties available. While this demonstrates a pragmatic streak w/in Evo’s government (it is less “ideological” than many critics suspect), it does evidence a significant majoritarian tendency—specifically, the search for political control at any cost.

In the short run, this may give MAS significant leverage as it pursues its policies. But at what cost? The constant expansion of MAS to include any & all persons w/ any political weight who are willing to work w/ Evo is dangerous because it lends itself to opportunism. Surely MAS could’ve found a more convincing “candidate for change” for the mayorship of Santa Cruz than Roberto Fernández, the scion of the right-populist UCS (whose brother also ran for mayor, under the family banner), convicted of tax evasion only recently, and founder of Alianza Siglo XXI (the civic organization that organized PODEMOS). An ideological convergence between Evo & Roberto? Hardly.

It’s exactly these kinds of alliances—or juntuchas, to use the Bolivian term—that eroded public confidence in the traditional party system. How long before they erode public confidence in MAS? Already there are signs of discontent in many rural municipalities, like Jesús de Machaca, where local indigenous leaders chaffed at the incursion of MAS candidates (too frequently appointed w/ little public support & appointed a dedazo by Evo or the party leadership).

At the very least, the 1990s version of “pacted democracy” allowed for divergences between the central state & local governments. This new model suggests that—despite the professed belief in pluralism as a political value—MAS prefers a hierarchically ordered central state. Rather than working w/ departmental & municipal governments, MAS seeks to dominate them. Not a good sign for a party that (at least recently) embraced the concept of political autonomies.

In the meantime, it’s also clear that any political figure who is ambitious enough will jump into the MAS bandwagon for a share of government spoils. If so, how is this different from the 1989-1993 Patriotic Accord alliance? In the race to gain control over the levers of state, has MAS become a “traditional” party?