I was recently asked to write something about Bolivia’s foreign policy for e-IR, a new online international relations journal published by students at Oxford, University of Leicester, and the London School of Economics. The essay (“Bolivia’s New International Stage”) looks at the country’s international relations in the first two years of Evo’s government.

As expected, Savina Cuéllar won the race for Chuquisaca prefect by a comfortable margin over the MAS candidate (57.3 to 39.4 percent). Although these are unofficial “quick” counts, they’re not expected to change much. (Official results from the National Electoral Court, w/ only about half of the vote counted, so far gives Cuéllar almost 75 percent of the vote.)

Chuquisaca voters go to the polls today to elect a new prefect to replace interim prefect Ariel Iriarte. The previous prefect, David Sánchez (MAS) resigned over the government’s handling of the social unrest during the final days of the constituent assembly process in Sucre last December, which left three dead.

As expected, voters in Tarija approved an autonomy statute by wide margins. Though final counts aren’t yet in, preliminary counts show that the “Sí” vote reached about 80%. Voters in Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando have already approved autonomy statutes. It also currently looks as if voter turnout was higher than in the three other departments, despite attempts at preventing the vote by pro-MAS activists.

Back from vacation (and only now w/ cable/internet restored). Still catching up w/ news, email, work, etc. More later.

But some startling news from Tarija: An explosion at a Canal 4 installation in Yacuiba, Tarija. The department of Tarija is today wrapping up its own autonomy referendum election. At least one suspect (who has admitted to complicity) w/ ties to the presidential palace was rounded up: Lt. Georgef Peter Nava Zurita is identified as a member of the presidential guard. Another 19 civilians were arrested in connection. While Evo’s government denies any connection to Nava (though La Razón reporters who called for information pretending to be his cousin were given the opposite impression), opposition leaders are claiming this is a sign of Evo’s “state terrorism.”

Tomorrow will bring preliminary results of Tarija’s autonomy referendum. This now makes four such votes. Evo’s government has rejected all such referendums as illegal, and pro-MAS supporters have mobilized to prevent voting in each of the four regional referendum elections.

I’ve been meaning to post a note about my objections to the use of the term “race” when discussing Bolivian social politics (I prefer the term “ethnicity”). A brief report in today’s La Razón provides a great starting point: The Qhara Qhara “nation” was “reborn” yesterday.

Roberto Sándoval, campaign manager for an opposition candidate, has been freed (see news report). The ruling was made by a judge in an El Alto court, after state prosecutors were unable to present any evidence, indictments, or warrants against Sándoval. In effect, the judge ruled the arrest—made by agents of the Intelligence and Government ministries—illegal (see previous post).

The campaign manager (Roberto Sándoval) for an opposition candidate for the Chuquisaca prefecture (Sabina Cuéllar) was detained yesterday (see news report). He’s accused various crimes, including sedition & attempted “magnicide” (stemming from pro-government & opposition forces a few weeks ago in Sucre). If true, they’re serious crimes, of course. Yet the circumstances of his detention seemed questionable: A number of unidentified, masked men forced him into a vehicle. The government only acknowledged his arrest & announced its indictment 12 hours later, after his wife denounced his kidnapping.

It’s been a hectic two weeks. Since May 15, we’ve moved to Baltimore, held our son’s christening, attended two weddings (one in DC, one in Carlisle), and hosted a reunion of the Centellas brothers for Andy & Saloumeh’s MBA graduations in Delaware. We also attended two Orioles games, bought new furniture at IKEA, and have started to explore our new Mount Washington (or is it Roland Park?) neighborhood.

Bolivia’s politics shifted south this weekend. Evo suspended a planned trip to the Sucre (on the 199th anniversary of Bolivia’s “declaration of independence”¹) after university students & other local groups mobilized in opposition.

A reader tipped me off to a new public opinion poll in Los Tiempos conducted by the political science department at UMSA (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, the public university in La Paz). Unlike most polls, it includes a smaller eastern city (Montero) among its respondent sample in addition to the regular urban samples (La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz). The total sample was about 3,000 respondents.

I’m starting to put together my syllabi for next year. And so I’ve been reading some new books that I plan to use for my classes. Currently, I’m working my way through an incredibly interesting book on Nepal: Many Tongues, One People by Arjun Guneratne.

A quick clarification in light of today’s argument that Bolivia’s political opposition suggests that a recall referendum may be unconstitutional: I don’t care.

A surprising development in Bolivia: If Evo enacts a law approved by the Senate (as he said he would), there will be a recall referendum in Bolivia as early as August (90 days after the law is enacted). The recall referendum would put Evo & the country’s nine prefects up for an up or down popular vote of confidence.

Human Rights Foundation (HRF) has posted its preliminary report on the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum.

While all attention is currently on Santa Cruz, it’s important to look ahead to June 22. That’s when Tarija will hold its autonomy referendum (making it the 4th department to hold such a vote). Santa Cruz leaders will wait until then to negotiate collectively w/ the central government.

The Santa Cruz departmental electoral court (CDE) website has updated official counts, as they’re processed. They’re using the same software/process (SIRENA) as the national electoral court (CNE)—which is the software/process used by each of the regional electoral courts during national elections.

The official count will be made public by Friday. But this morning’s reports show that “Sí” (pro autonomy) won by 86% to 14% in yesterday’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum. It seems unlikely that these figures will change significantly. Some brief analysis:

The official results aren’t in yet. But El Deber (and other media) reports that the “Sí” vote won in the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum—by a wide margin (exit polling has it 85.3% to 14.7% in the city, 89.6% to 10.4% in the rural areas).

Today’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum is under way. There won’t be much news until later, of course. But the morning news highlighted problems in Yapacaní & San Julian.

Tomorrow, Santa Cruz goes to the polls in its autonomy referendum. The central government is still adamantly opposed, of course. On the eve of the election, it’s also clear that there is little that can be done to stop it. But what will happen?

Boz beat me to the latest poll numbers out of Bolivia: Evo retains 54% public approval (down from 56% in March) across Bolivia, according to the latest poll.

I’m trying to keep up w/ the escalating tension between the central government & Santa Cruz as the May 4 autonomy referendum approaches. As of the end of this week, the legal maneuvers have started to heat up: The central government has cut off the prefecture’s finances, and is preparing legal actions against the prefect & other regional leaders. In turn, the opposition (which controls the Senate, but not the House of Deputies) is initiating legal proceedings against the head of the national electoral court (the renegade regional electoral organism is moving forward with organizing the vote). All the while, the last remaining member of the Constitutional Tribunal (whose members were purged, or quit, w/ no replacements named) has initiated proceedings against the vice president for overstepping his constitutional powers. And this doesn’t begin to address the problems of social movements & counter-movements. In short, it’s a mess.

The question is, perhaps, exaggerated. Clearly, Evo—still the head of Bolivia’s cocalero federation—is an important leader w/in Bolivia’s anti-neoliberal social movements.

I’m a little late getting this news out. But. April 19 is “Día de las Voces Bolivianas” (Bolivian Voices Day).

There have been calls in the past for Evo to step down, but now they’ve become more commonplace.

We’re now a little more than three weeks away from the May 4th autonomy referendum in Santa Cruz. A broad social movement¹ calling for regional autonomy has been active in force since January 2004, coming on the heels of the October 2003 “gas war” (which pitted a very different constellation of social movements against Goni’s government).

Things in Bolivia have become increasingly tense in the last few weeks. We’re now about five weeks away from the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum (set for Sunday, May 4th).

The spring speaker series I put together at Dickinson is winding down, w/ two final speakers who will focus on the Andes.

No shooting (at least not yet), but there’s a police mutiny in Bolivia.

The problems stemming from Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador a few days ago (when Colombian armed forces killed a leading FARC rebel leader) continue. Much of the problem stems from two counts:

Both Open Veins (“Colonialism at the UN”) & The Gringo Tambo (“UN international narcotics board calls on Bolivia to outlaw coca leaf”) have already commented on the recent UN report on coca. GT quotes some of the language in the UN document; Open Veins gives historical background on the matter.

There’s an excellent article in this month’s Le Monde Diplomatique on the current situation in Bolivia: “Bolivia: Morales is Checked” by Hervé Do Alto and Franck Poupeau (trans. George Miller).

In a brief 30-minute session last night, Bolivia’s legislature approved two constitutional referendums & annulled the proposed Santa Cruz & Beni autonomy referendum. The vote took place as pro-MAS protestors lay siege to the parliament building for several days, and as at least two female opposition candidates were beaten as they tried to enter the legislative session. Opposition legislators were refused the floor, the votes took place following no discussion, and the brief session took place with dozens of pro-MAS protesters crowded into the gallery.

For the past several weeks, Carlos Hugo Molina (of Ágora) has been noting internal contradictions (i.e. places were the text itself states different things in different sections) or other problems in the new Bolivian draft constitution approved last December. When I get time, I hope to put them together into an English-language summary. In the meantime, here are the links to the posts: two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten.

Boz, who frequently posts poll numbers from across Latin America, has some interesting poll numbers for Peru.

About five years ago, when I was doing fieldwork in Bolivia, there were only a handful Bolivian bloggers. That number has since expanded to include hundreds, and is rapidly expanding today.

First, let me be clear: the two cases are not similar in some critical & fundamental ways. But what is interesting is the political international repercussions that a secession implies.

In an interesting (though not entirely surprising) political turn, Evo has been reigned in by his own supporters (the organizaciones de base). Only days before, Evo had publicly struck out against the Santa Cruz autonomy movement (which is steamrolling forward), claiming that his supporters were willing to use force if necessary, then calling on the military & “social bases” to mobilize.

There’s been some discussion about a recent ABC News report that a Fulbright scholar in Bolivia was asked to “spy” on Venezuelans & Cubans in Bolivia (to be precise: to report if he had seen any, who, and where) during his mandatory security briefing.¹ I’ll refer to the discussion at Gringo Tambo (a group blog of primarily ex-Fulbrighters who study Bolivia).

In many ways, Santa Cruz has long been a “rebel” department in Bolivia. Throughout the two centuries of the republic’s existence (Bolivia will celebrate its bicentennial in 2026), Santa Cruz has frequently opposed the central government. But the current conflict between the central government of Evo Morales & the oppositional prefect of Ruben Costas (supported by various regional “civic” organizations) is a new development.

Three new developments highlight the importance of regions (departments) Bolivian politics.

Today’s La Razón has a special on six “grupos de choque” that play important roles in current Bolivian politics.

Yesterday evening, Óscar Ortiz (PODEMOS) was elected the new Senate President. The position also makes him third in line of succession; he would become interim president if Evo & Alvaro García Linera were both absent from the country (they both frequently travel).

There’s an interesting conflict brewing w/in Bolivia’s National Electoral Court (CNE). The newly appointed CNE president (José Luis Exeni) is asking the Santa Cruz regional electoral court to stop verifying the signatures for a referendum initiative. The initiative would establish a department-wide referendum on the “autonomic” statute (read text of the Santa Cruz autonomic statute).

I’ve long noticed splits between the MAS rank-and-file & Evo Morales. While Evo has, at times, been conciliatory, the rank-and-file is much more radical. Last week, Evo met w/ the country’s prefects & suggested that their autonomy statutes could be “reconciled” w/ the new draft constitution. Yesterday, MAS constituent assembly delegates made it clear to Evo that they would not modify the draft constitution.

A few weeks ago, a pro-government majority (the opposition was absent) of the Constituent Assembly (CA) approved a new draft constitution (after a last-minute change of venue). It was barely debated, and voted upon in only a few hours. This followed weeks of unrest, including four deaths in Sucre. Not surprisingly, the opposition recoiled. In response, several lowland departments announced their own “autonomy statutes” & prepared to take them to department-wide referendums.

After a tense month (which followed several other tense months), Bolivia’s political situation shows signs of hope. Both the government & the opposition prefects (regional governors) have been meeting, w/ aims of coming to a solution that could integrate the new constitution w/ demands for regional autonomy. One standout is Pepelucho (José Luis Paredes), the opposition La Paz prefect, who’s begun challenging the government for its alleged neglect of the La Paz regional government.

A number of Bolivian poll numbers in La Razón today:

Today’s La Razón has an interesting article on the Bolivian government’s proposed new budget. The figures include about Bs.10.1 million (about US$1.2 million) for “social movements” (which primarily seems to mean organized unions & sindicatos). The figure, of course, is merely a fraction of the budget (about 0.1% of total projected spending)—so it’s probably not as big a deal as the news report suggests. But it’s still a little troubling.

As expected, Bolivia has entered a holiday truce (a cuarto intermedio). No doubt things will heat up again after the New Year. But for now things are simmering down. Let’s hope it stays that way.

For some time now, Peru’s government has been demanding that Bolivia extradite Walter Chávez, a Peruvian citizen wanted for his alleged connection to MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, an urban Maoist terrorist organization). Walter Chávez is a fairly well known journalist w/ leftist sympathies who served as advisor to Evo Morales’s presidential campaigns in 2002 & 2005. The Bolivian government has declined to extradite him to Peru & has offered political asylum. The (relatively minor) issue has been on the back burner for some time now. Walter Chávez, of course, denies the allegations; he stepped down as a presidential advisor in February 2007.

A recent poll by Equipos Mori shows the pro-autonomy position gaining ground from July 2006 to today. The poll suggests that “Yes” would win in a new referendum on autonomy in 6 of 9 departments (in a 50/42 split).

This could be unrelated to the political news, of course, but ERBOL (and other sources) report a bomb explosion just past noon in Santa Cruz. The explosion (reportly large enough to destroy a car) went off in the 6th floor of the Palacio de Justicia. No injuries are reported.

Today will be an interesting day in Bolivia. In La Paz, the government & its supporters are celebrating the new constitution (CPE), w/ a march through the city. Meanwhile, many in Santa Cruz will celebrate the region’s self-declared autonomy. So will Beni, Pando, and Tarija. And Chuquisaca is moving in that direction, too. All five departments have either finished “autonomic statutes” or are working on them. Santa Cruz is preparing to hold its own referendum election.

Problems continue w/ Bolivia’s new constitution. According to a La Razón report, a small committee is modifying the text outside of committee & after it was approved by the assembly. This is the latest in a series of “irregularities” in the procedure by which the constitution was approved. It doesn’t help, of course, that an “official” version of the final document hasn’t yet been made publicly available. There’s a version on the assembly’s website, but it’s dated November 24 and labeled a “draft” (proyecto de ley).

Today’s La Razón has another special supplement on the new constitution. It offers some more detail on some of the text’s provisions. Meanwhile, Carlos Hugo Molina reminds us that there is no official document yet. Even w/o an opposition present (whether through boycott or intimidation), assembly delegates couldn’t agree on 8 articles (out of 408), which are still on the table. Thus, it’s still unclear what the final draft will look like.

As expected, the new Bolivian constitution has been approved (w/ some minor changes) yesterday evening. La Razón has a special supplement on the new constitution. Meanwhile, civic leaders in Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Cochabamba are calling for autonomy by December 15 (though “autonomy” is not the same as “independence”). Of course, the new constitution includes 30 articles detailing departmental autonomy (including formation of regional assemblies), so this may be unnecessary.

The draft Bolivian constitution will likely be ratified by the end of today. The document is being read quickly & voted w/ little debate. Less than 24 hours after the assembly voted to meet in Oruro, newspapers report that 147 of the articles were ratified. The document is 100 pages long, has 408 articles in total. As of a few weeks ago & about 15 months after its installation, not a single article had been agreed upon by the body, which nearly fell apart. The rushed vote is conducted, as in Sucre, w/ thousands of cocaleros and pro-MAS miners guarding the meeting site. The opposition PODEMOS is no longer participating in the process & five regional civic committees have already rejected the new document.

This has been a hectic week, and things are starting to move incredibly quickly, following the rushed passage of a draft constitution, making it difficult to keep up. But here are some quick updates on the Bolivian situation.

Following the last two weeks’ events, Evo proposes a recall referendum for himself & the country’s nine prefects. In the announcement, he asked voters to decide whether they are “in favor of change” or “continuing the neoliberal model.” No date is scheduled yet. But this is an interesting turn of events.

But there is a recall law already on the table (submitted on January 19, 2007). It stipulates that presidents, prefects, or mayors elected by an absolute majority (50%+1) can be recalled only if they are opposed by one additional percentage point in the recall referendum. This means that a vote to recall Evo must win 54.7% of the national vote. But for those who won w/ simply pluralities, a simple majority will do to remove them from office. No prefect won election w/ an absolute majority.

Ironically, few (if any) prefects have lost significant support over the past months. The one key exception is the David Sánchez (MAS), the Chuquisaca prefect. But if he’s voted out of office, a new election would likely appoint an opposition figure. This would leave MAS w/ only two prefectures: Oruro & Potosí. It’s possible, of course, that MAS could wrest the La Paz prefecture away from Pepelucho (José Luis Paredes, PODEMOS).

The greatest danger of this kind of plebiscitary democracy, of course, is that it leaves little incentive for compromise or dialogue. If the government & its opponents go into campaign mode on a single, polarizing question, political divisions are only going to worsen. And what if the vote to reject Evo is close nationally but lopsided regionally? Imagine if Evo is approved by 52% (his current standing in the polls) but rejected by two thirds (or more) of media luna voters. What then?

Angus Reid’s Global Monitor just released the latest poll for Bolivia. Evo is down 10 points from last month (from 62 to 52 percent approval). I don’t know how this breaks down across the country (the pollsters interviewed residents of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, the four major cities). But the figures are consistent w/ what one would expect after the tumultuous past weeks.

By now most people have commented on the defeat of Chávez’s constitutional reform proposal in yesterday’s referendum vote. The fact that Chávez came out quickly to accept the defeat is a positive signal. It means that Venezuela is not as “authoritarian” as some of its harshest critics would suggest. Hopefully, this will push Chávez to reconsider some of his ambitions (i.e. his desire for indefinite reelections)—especially since he made the constitutional referendum a personal issue (a vote for or against himself).

I’ve spoken to my parents (who live in Santa Cruz) and they’re fine. Otherwise, the situation in Bolivia is now very tense. They’re usually a pattern to these kinds of things, and they’re largely seasonal. The fact that political tensions are escalating even as the Christmas season approaches is a very bad sign (usually politics takes a “break” for Christmas and Easter festivities).