Here are the long & short essay questions for my POL 321 (Politics of Latin American) final exam. Students got all exam questions last Monday to prepare. I will select the long essay & two short essays they will have to answer this Wednesday. The final is based on what we read since the second exam.

The long exam questions are based on the Castañeda/Morales book, Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left. The short essay questions are based on three of the several articles they read.

Long Essay
I will select one of the following questions for you to answer. Aim for about 4-5 substantial paragraphs.

1. Originally (in his book before Leftovers), Castañeda suggested that there were two lefts in Latin America: a “responsible” (or “social-democratic”) and a “populist” left. Describe their differences, citing one example of each in your discussion. Be sure you spend equal time explaining what unites both figures (why they're both “leftists”) as well as what divides them (why one is “social democrat” and the other a “populist”).

2. Some of the authors in Leftovers disagree with Castañeda, arguing that it is too simplistic to divide Latin America into a “good” and a “bad” left. Elaborate on this critique (one Castañeda himself now shares) by citing two chapters in the book. In your answer, be sure you do two things: 1) explain how a particular case doesn't fit Castañeda's original dichotomy and 2) outline the alternate dimensions or concepts that should be included in a typology of the left in Latin America.

Short Essay
I will select two of the following questions for you to answer. Aim for about 2-3 paragraphs per essay.

1. Roberts (“Latin America's Populist Revival”) attempts to define “populism” in ways that both complement and challenge Castañeda's discussion. How does Roberts define populism? And why does he criticize Castañeda?

2. Based on what you know after reading Latell (“Confronting Fidel's Legacy”), where does Cuba fit in Castañeda's model? [This is an “opinion” short essay. I am looking for a well-supported argument, not a “correct” answer.]

3. Barr (“Bolivia: Another Uncompleted Revolution”) discusses several factors that contributed to the election of Evo Morales. In what ways was Morales's rise “typical” to other cases we've studied this semester? What is the “uncompleted revolution” Barr writes about?

In addition to these essay questions, they'll have five vocabulary terms, as well as be able to correctly match 10 heads of state (I give them the names) w/ their corresponding country.

It’s been more than a month since my last update. Wow. Partly, a lot of my short, running commentary has now moved almost entirely to Twitter. But I’ve also just been keeping my head down working on a number of projects. I’ll try to remember to set some time aside for more posts, both personal & otherwise.

The weeks are quickly ticking by, and I’ve been focusing mostly on my teaching workload, though trying to transition myself to get some more research, writing, and editing time. Javi’s fever last night meant I lost most of today, though I think I managed to hold some solid ground (K8 let me work this morning; I took him in the afternoon, which is mostly nap time).

The rush to get ready for next semester is on. I thought I was ready (my syllabi were mostly finished). But then there was unfiled HR paperwork, finding me office space, getting a university web account, etc.—not to mention the hassles of moving & settling in to a new place. Plus, of course, a backlog of manuscript reviews & other tasks.

Our first few days in Santa Cruz are mostly devoted to catching up w/ my parents & relatives, so I’ve not had a chance to really scour the Bolivian news. There will be much more of that when we get to La Paz, obviously. But the two main stories that seem to dominate everyone’s attention are swine flu (N1H1, here called A1H1) & deteriorating Bolivia-Peru relations.

Two days ago @arpiel posted a link to an interesting (and provocative) piece of independent journalism about USAID’s links to Bolivia’s anti-Evo opposition.

This week’s Economist has a story suggesting that Colombia’s Uribe is “edging towards autocracy.” While I think the term “autocracy” is perhaps a bit exaggerated (just as it would be to call Venezuela’s Chávez an “autocrat”), I agree w/ the overall sentiment.

Yesterday I posted some (very) early predictions for Bolivia’s December 2009 elections. I decided to make up a table showing some possible vote distributions based on some possible scenarios.

I’m going to forgo a lot of the he/she speculation about a number of Bolivian topics swirling around the internets. But let me address those briefly, before turning to the upcoming December elections.

More details on the (alleged) terrorists/assassins captured/killed in Bolivia early this week: One of them, the Bolivian born Eduardo Rózsa, was what I’d call a “crazy.”

La Razón has reports of a capture of some foreign nationals who may have been involved in an assassination attempt on Evo Morales.

On Wednesday, Bolivia’s legislature passed the final version (en detalle) of the country’s new, “transitional” electoral law. There were a number of interesting compromises in the bill, which changed it not only from the original MAS proposal, but also from the version passed (en grande) a few days earlier in plenary session. Overall, the new law is an interesting compromise—and one that mostly benefits the opposition, not MAS.

Some details of the new electoral law (which still needs to be voted on en detalle; it was only passed en grande) have come out: The number of special/reserved indigenous seats is reduced to eight. Nearly 30% of the voter rolls will be revised between May-September (an opposition demand). Bolivians living abroad will be allowed to vote—and the CNE will provide funds for presidential campaigns to campaign in foreign countries for 10 days. Incumbents will not be required to resign three months prior to an election (this had been a bizarre Bolivian tradition).

I feel like I’ve been on the road for the past few weeks, which has limited my blogging time (though I’ve also shifted much of my online time to my Twitter posts). I’ve also wanted to postpone commenting on the Bolivian electoral law crisis (isn’t there always a “crisis” brewing these days?) until it was more or less resolved. It seems like it has been, for the time being: Bolivia’s parliament approved a last-minute transitional electoral law less than an hour ago (although it’s currently unclear if the law was passed “properly” and/or what the law contains).

Barrioflores already tweeted it, but El Deber published an Ipsos/AOM poll of likely presidential candidates for Bolivia’s December 2009 general election.

Over the weekend, a crowd of MAS supporters attacked the home of Bolivia’s former vice president & indigenous leader, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas. Cárdenas, then leader of MRTK, was vice president under Goni (1993-1997). At the time, MRTKL was the largest of the katarista parties—though it never won more than 2-3% of the national vote in any given election. Still, Cárdenas is often credited w/ putting Goni’s campaign “over the top,” as well as for initiating a new “multicultural” period of Bolivian politics.

I just got back from a short mini conference at American University on various issues involving multiculturalism in democracies.

For the past week, following voters’ approval of the new constitution (as well as the reduction of maximum land ownership from 10,000 to 5,000 hectares), members of Bolivia’s Landless Movement (MST, Movimiento Sin Tierra) began occupying lands throughout Bolivia, concentrated in Santa Cruz. Some of the occupied lands, however, were owned by the state hydrocarbons company (YPFB). The result has been increased tension as regional opposition leaders who criticize the government for giving MST “license” to seize lands, and MST leaders criticize Evo’s MAS government for not moving quickly enough to meet their demands. In the end, Evo has chosen to crack down on MST by ordering the arrest three of the group’s leaders, including Valerio Queso.

Queso may be vaguely familiar to many around the world. The man looks very much like Evo, and actually played the Bolivian president in a recent film biopic, Evo Pueblo.

If you’re looking to get your Bolivia news & updates fix, check out Red Bolivia. I’ve only glanced at it quickly, but so far it looks like it contains a great deal of information about Bolivia & global issues from a “Bolivian perspective.”

Voting is, of course, still ongoing in Bolivia’s constitutional referendum. If you’re interested in doing a simple side-by-side comparison of the current (2004) Constitución Política del Estado (CPE) & the document voters are being asked to vote on today, the National Electoral Court published both texts in a single volume.

The campaigns for Bolivia’s constitutional referendum on Sunday are winding down. Technically, all campaign activities are supposed to end today, as pre-election restrictions (e.g. no sale of alcohol at least 24 hours before polls open) start to come into play.

Just a quick note on some new political figures who are joining the “No” campaign in Bolivia’s upcoming constitutional referendum. Today’s La Razón reports that Carlos Mesa & Loyola Guzmán have joined the “No” campaign.

Bolivia’s constitutional referendum is Sunday, January 25. The referendum is, by now, only loosely based on the work of the Constituent Assembly elected in June 2006 or the actual draft text approved in December 2007 (in a meeting in Oruro, rather than Sucre, that excluded most members of the opposition). Throughout most of 2008, the country was in political turmoil. Late in October 2008, opposition & MAS legislators forged an agreement—which included a substantial rewrite of the draft constitution (CPE, for “Constitución Política del Estado”)—and set the stage for the upcoming referendum. Could 2009 offer a new beginning for Bolivia?

Forgive the temporary digest form, but a few interesting news bombshells today from Bolivia:

I’ve also updated my syllabi for next semester. I’ll be teaching Democracy and Democratization, Latin American Politics, and Comparative Politics.

I just wrapped up an article manuscript on Savina Cuéllar & the “new” regionalism in Bolivia. I focused on Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Chuquisaca (Sucre), which is interesting because lately these have become the most vocal opponents of MAS as the constitutional referendum inches closer (set for January 25, 2009).

If anyone’s in the DC area next Tuesday (December 9), I’ll be part of a panel on “Political Polarization in the Andes” at George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs. The panel will include Craig Kauffman (a Ph.D. candidate at GW), to speak about Ecuador, and possibly also John Walsh (from the Washington Office on Latin America), to speak about Venezuela.

My friend MABB beat me to it, but there’s polling data out on Bolivia’s upcoming constitutional referendum (see his post). Overall, it looks like Bolivian voters will approve the new constitution (the one modified on October 21, 2008, in a compromise between MAS & opposition legislators, not the draft approved in December 2007). But regional differences matter: polls in the cities of El Alto, Oruro, and Potosí show support for the constitution exceeding 50%; polls in the cities of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Sucre show opposition to the constitution exceeding 50%; results in the cities of Cochabamba, La Paz, and Trinidad (capital of Beni) are more mixed (see the report in La Prensa). And there are a lot of undecided voters out there. It’s going to be a voter turnout game.

In the past several weeks, Evo’s government has become more aggressive towards Washington: In short order, the US ambassador, USAID, and the DEA were expelled from the country. The Peace Corps left on its own, but it too was a target of anti-US rhetoric. In response, the White House decertified Bolivia’s anti-narcotics efforts & threatened to end Bolivia’s favorable trade relationship (which threatens thousands of Bolivian jobs). Clearly, US-Bolivian relations are at a low point.

Earlier this morning I wrapped up a brief interview w/ VOA that is scheduled to appear today at 5pm EST on its television broadcast show “El Mundo al Día.” They called me in to comment on Evo’s visit to the US, the new draft constitution, and US-Bolivia relations in general. The feed will only be on their website until 5pm EST tomorrow.

Basically, these were my comments: The new draft constitution (that includes regional autonomy) is a good compromise; any new constitution must be viewed as legitimate by all major parties; Evo is not Chávez; and an Obama administration does have potential for positive developments, but Bolivia rates low in priorities.

_____
Addendum: It looks like they didn’t use my comments, which is probably for the best (and as a former journalist & assistant copy editor, I know how these things work). But after spending 2+ hours in a car & a $100 parking ticket, it’s kind of a bummer.

Should a US elected official travel to a foreign country for a self-described “warm” & “friendly” meeting w/ the leader of a state (a military dictator, mind you) who had only a few years earlier orchestrated a September morning terrorist attack on US soil (Washington, DC) that killed American citizens? In the age of the “war on terror,” that’s an interesting question. Especially if the elected official was there to express his support for that leader, not to condemn him.

Bolivia’s president Evo Morales offered an interesting explanation for the recent congressional negotiations, which modified the new draft constitution: He announced that he & various social movement leaders had coordinated to draft a “strong” constitution deliberately to provoke the opposition, which would then be used to bargain the opposition into accepting a more modest proposal (see “Morales revela que propuso una CPE fuerte para transar”).

One of the most interesting things about this last round of negotiations shouldn’t go unnoticed: The march for a new constitution was explicitly also one for autonomies (plural). See photo below.

If you’re in the DC area next Tuesday (October 21), you may want to check out a screening of a documentary film about Bolivia: Humillados y Ofendidos, Sucre 24 de Mayo. It will be followed by a panel discussion. The event is hosted by the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, 7-9 pm, 957 E Street NW, Room 213.

The Bolivian political crisis is back to a respectable simmer. Even though the dialogue between government & opposition broke down several days ago, both sides agreed to throw the issue back into the legislature (where it should’ve been dealt w/ anyhow). MAS agreed to call back its protesters, allowing the legislature to deliberate in relative peace.

A number of observers have wondered what were the specific criticisms of the new draft constitution (CPE) put forward by the opposition. Yesterda’s El Deber published a brief outline of the opposition’s seven criticisms (and the relevant articles of the draft CPE). I’m simply giving rough paraphrased translations below:

Voters in Ecuador approved a new constitution (by almost two thirds), according to preliminary vote counts. This gives Correa an important victory.

Ecuador is holding a referendum on a new constitution today. The measure includes a number of “radical” social, economic, and political measures: a stronger role for the government over strategic industries (oil, telecoms), writing off some (but not all) international debts, an attack on large landholdings & land redistribution measures, allowing the president to have two consecutive terms (but not “indefinite” reelection), health care for senior citizens, and recognition of same-sex civil marriages.

Bolivian negotiations have broken down after the government refused to negotiate the language in the draft constitution (it had earlier agreed to open the draft up for revision). Now Evo announced that he’ll approve the draft constitution, peacefully or not (“De buenas o de malas”). The statement was made at a MAS gathering in Cochabamba; he also announced a march on La Paz to force the National Congress to pass a bill for a referendum on the draft constitution.

It was perhaps too predictable, but the Bush administration is rescinding Bolivia’s preferential trade access to the US. The move, based on the previous White House declaration that Bolivia failed to meet up to its drug war obligations, is clearly a further response to the recent expulsion of the US ambassador from Bolivia. For its part, Bolivian government has declared the move an “attack on democracy.”

Putin met w/ Chavez to announce that Russia will loan Venezuela $1 billion dollars to purchase arms (Venezuela has already spent $4bn on Russian arms recently).

It looks like things are calming down in Bolivia. The fear of pro-government & opposition forces clashing in Santa Cruz didn’t materialize after MAS supporters lifted their blockades & agreed to stand down. The issue is being thrown back into the legislature’s lap, which is where it belonged all along. And it’s good that the government is opening up the entire draft constitution for debate (though not in the legislature, but in round table discussions between Evo & the prefects).

From an email from my parents (who live in Santa Cruz):

Evo announced an alleged a coup plot between Goldberg (the US ambassador expelled a few days ago), Costas (the Santa Cruz prefect), and a number of high-ranking military officers. Meanwhile, reports from Pando suggest that five of the bodies were Venezuelan soldiers, who are being repatriated. Costas has also asked Evo to call of the MAS protests who are still marching towards the city of Santa Cruz; he’s also called for a suspension of labor & a public assembly in the main plaza for a cabildo (a “popular assembly”) to decide what to do. (FYI: The last Santa Cruz cabildo proclaimed Costas “governor” & demanded regional autonomy.) Also, as of now, the 24 de Septiembre celebrations are cancelled—the first time that has happened in more than 50 years. This doesn’t look good at all.

Despite signs of progress, Bolivia is again becoming tense. The last two weeks, the blame fell squarely on the opposition. This week, most of the blame falls on the government. MAS supporters are marching on Santa Cruz; they have been for days. All this while the government seeks a compromise w/ the opposition, but making no effort to prevent tens of thousands of (many of whom are armed) from descending from rural Cochabamba towards Santa Cruz in two columns (one from the west, one from the north). The marchers are calling for the resignation of Rubén Costas (the Santa Cruz prefect) & Branko Marinkovic (president of the Comité Cívico de Santa Cruz). Essentially, the government is using the marchers to push the opposition back to the negotiation table to accept a deal.

It was a farily predictable outcome (at least I thought so). But Evo is offering regional autonomy in exchange for support for the draft constitution. The draft constitution includes regional autonomy, of course. And, as I pointed out before, the distance between that model & some of the “autonomic statutes” wasn’t great.

Next semester I’m teaching two sections of Latin American politics. I like to regularly switch up my readings, assigning 2-3 “country study” texts (and spend 2-3 weeks on each) in addition to a more general textbook. So far I’m leaning heavily towards the following cases: Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela. I also want each case to offer a different “theme.” Here are the books I’m currently considering (thoughts & suggestions welcome):

MABB suggests Evo’s government made significant compromises in agreeing to the framework for dialogue. I’m inclined to agree. The document—published in La Razón (which I linked to yesterday)—opens up for discussion the following items: the new constitution, regional autonomy, the IDH (direct taxes on oil & gas revenues, which the media luna prefects demand be returned to them), and the naming of vacant posts (electoral court, constitutional tribunal, etc).

It’s been a tense roller coaster ride (which isn’t yet 100% over of course), but it looks like there’s a compromise in place between Evo’s government & the opposition prefects. Hopefully, this means that things will start getting back to “normal” again soon enough.

There are signs that calm & order may be returning to Bolivia after several tumultuous days. In the aftermath of more than a dozen dead, 30+ injured, and as many as 100 missing in Pando, the government is seeking to reestablish control. There are still some blockades throughout parts of the media luna, as well as worrying signs of sporadic confrontations. But the volume of such confrontations has greatly diminished. These are optimistic signs.

Things are, it seems, returning to calm in Bolivia. Evo has made remarkable overtures for compromise—and so far it seems like the opposition prefects are willing to negotiate as well. A tentative agreement between Evo’s government & the opposition may be in place soon. There are still, of course, troubling signs. Both opposition & government supporters are an alert, preparing to face each other again. It may take time for the state security forces (police & military) to regain full control.

Just a quick update while visiting family in the DC area. An email from my mom states that the US embassy is now advising all Americans to leave the country; 100 have been evacuated already. My parents still haven't decided what they'll do. But things do seem to be calm in Santa Cruz; the center of this current crisis is Pando.

Chavez has again criticized the Bolivian military, and continues to speak of intervention in case Evo's government falls. The South American UNASUR countries will meet in Santiago, Chile, to discuss the situation. Brazil's Lula & Chile's Bachelet are leading calls for calm & calling all sides back to negotiate.

The Bolivian army is now mobilizing to Pando. They're tasked w/ restoring order & arresting the prefect. There are also reports that journalists are being prevented from covering the story as they're held by military personnel for their own safety. The death toll in Pando continues to rise (it's now at least 15 dead).

Also, various groups are mobilizing. One that should be noted are the Chiquitanos (an indigenous group from the Santa Cruz lowlands). But the Chiquitanos are backing the Comite Civico de Santa Cruz in "defense of the IDH" (the oil/gas rents collected by the government & returned to the departments, which has been recently cut). Regional alliances are quickly starting to dominate the agenda.

After deadly clashes between pro-MAS & opposition forces in the department, Evo has declared a state of siege in Pando. The order bars public meetings of any kind, the carrying of weapons, and imposes a curfew. Meanwhile military forces mobilized to restore order in the media luna departments. In addition, Bolivia’s military issued a statement condemning Chavez for suggesting that Venezuela might intervene militarily. In Santa Cruz, a women’s march in front of the Venezuelan consulate called for the removal of foreign presence (there have long been rumors of Venezuelan troops in Bolivia, including their involvement in the government raid on Viru Viru airport a year ago).

Bolivia’s crisis has spread, drawing high levels of concern from other Latin American states. In a repeat of September-October 2003, neighboring heads of state expressed support for Evo’s presidency. But note that Chavez has threatened to “intervene” in Bolivia. He’s also decided to follow suit & expelled the US ambassador to Caracas. But notice also that Brazil made clear that it “will not tolerate” a democratic break.

There’s continued confrontations between pro-MAS & opposition groups throughout the “media luna”—particularly in Santa Cruz & Tarija. La Razón has a series of stories on the developments: virtually all public institutions in Santa Cruz are taken over by pro-autonomy groups; Tarija & Villamontes civic groups seized the gas field at Vuelta Grande; civic & campesino groups clashed in Tarija; MAS groups cut of San Julián & threaten to march on Santa Cruz; El Alto residents demand arms to defend the government; there was an explosion at the Tarija prefect’s garage; campesinos from Chuquisaca & Potosí threaten to cut of Sucre again; American Airlines is no longer flying to Bolivia & the airports at Cobija (Pando), Trinidad (Beni), Guayaramerín (Beni), and Tarija are taken over by pro-autonomy civic groups.

There’s state of virtual civil war in Santa Cruz, and dangerously headed towards a more serious confrontation. It’s been brewing for a while. But things are spiraling out of control as UJC thugs attacked government (and pro-government) installations. Pro-government groups have announced reprisals to follow. There’s also reports of tensions between Evo & military leaders over why the military didn’t act quickly to restore order (the military demanded written authorization from the president, since such efforts would produce deaths).

Matt Shugart, Greg Weeks, and Boz have been commenting on the growing rift between Cristina & Cobos. Since casting a tie-breaking vote in the Senate against the Argentine president (Cristina Fernández de Kirchner), the vice president (Julio Cobos) has openly joined the opposition. Now, Cobos may rejoin the Radical Party (UCR) & is expected to run for president (against either Crisitina or her husband, Néstor Kirchner) in 2011. It raises a number of interesting questions about the institutional role of vps in presidential democracies.

MABB has a good post on the crisis of the state in Bolivia (increasingly Bolivia fails to meet Max Weber’s classic definition of a “state”). In addition, he reflects on the use of polarizing discourse as the new modus operandi of Bolivian politics.

In an interesting twist, MAS supporters issued a call for the resignation of José Luis Exeni (the president of the National Electoral Court), calling him a “traitor to the social movements” for his statement that the CNE couldn’t go forward w/ the elections Evo called for by executive decree because of legal obstacles. Last night, the CNE issued a statement making clear that elections must be convoked by parliament, not by executive decree. Earlier, Exeni (named to the post by Evo) was criticized by the opposition, who accused him of being too sympathetic to MAS.

This is going to be the biggest electoral year in Bolivia’s history, it seems. So far 2008 has seen four departments hold their own autonomy referendums, a special by-election for prefect in Chuquisaca, and a nationwide recall referendum. Now it looks like we’ll see yet another round of elections: two referendums on the proposed constitution, by-elections for the prefects of La Paz & Cochabamba, and the country’s first ever elections for subprefects (provincial governors) & departmental councils. The elections are scheduled for December 7.

I don’t have time now to summarize the new phase of Bolivia’s political crisis (which included violence directed at the national police). But I think Costas overplayed his hand. He had a chance to use the results of the recall referendum as a springboard for a workable political compromise—which may still be on the table—but he opted instead to go for broke.

An anonymous comment to the previous post asks if the presidential powers are increased in the proposed constitution (CPE), relative to the existing CPE (the 2004 Constitution).

I thought it’d be interesting to look at the draft of the proposed Bolivian constitution approved a few months to see how it treats departmental autonomy.

After approving Departmental Law Nº 05, Santa Cruz plans to go forward w/ regional elections (currently scheduled for January 2009). The central government, of course, isn’t happy w/ the move. But it’s not yet clear what steps it’ll take to prevent the wholesale creation of an autonomous government structure in Santa Cruz.

Still no final numbers on Bolivia’s recall referendum, but results are already much clearer. W/ a near-final vote count, Oruro’s prefect is safe w/ just over 50% of the vote. That means that only 2 of 8 prefects up for recall lost their seats: Manfred Reyes Villa in Cochabamba & José Luis (“Pepelucho”) Paredes in La Paz. At least now Reyes Villa is also acknowledging his defeat.

The votes in Bolivia’s recall referendum are still being counted, but the results are well established by now (Evo won, as did most of the prefects). One of the losers was the La Paz prefect, José Luis Paredes. Formerly of MIR, he recently founded his own party (Plan Progreso) & was allied w/ PODEMOS. He conceded his defeat (something Cochabamba’s Manfred Reyes Villa hasn’t done).

MABB already posted the exit polls. But it looks like Evo will keep his seat (no surprise), and so will all of the pro-autonomy prefects (as will the Potosí prefect).

Bolivia’s recall referendum started today, though it’s not yet clear what counting formula will be used in the end (not the best scenario, of course). MABB has a good roundup of this.

There’s been growing attention to the issue of regional divisions in Bolivia in the last few years. Of course, these didn’t start w/ Evo’s election (they have much, much longer histories). But they’ve certainly accelerated since early 2004, when a movement demanding regional political autonomy gained momentum. Nowhere is this truer than in Santa Cruz.

The Economist has a good analysis of Fernando Lugo, Paraguay’s incoming president. As w/ a number of other recently elected “leftists” in the region, the questions revolve around whether he’ll be a social democrat (like Lula or Bachelet) or a populist (like Correa or Chávez). So far, it looks like he’s more likely to move towards the social democrat position.

We’re coming up on the final 48 hours before Sunday’s recall referendum in Bolivia. Not much is likely to happen between now & then, based on legal restrictions placed before any vote (e.g. no alcohol can be sold, motorized transportation is restricted to authorized vehicles). As of this morning, the CNE is virtually running the country (in the sense that it has temporary command authority over the country's security forces).

I mentioned earlier some recent protests unsettling Evo’s government (mostly because they’re coming from the left, not the right). The protests have both escalated, and spread.

I didn’t actually attend the Boston ASA conference (K8 was giving a paper, so I was “Mr. Mom” & watched Javi). But K8 picked us up some interesting new books (all from Duke University Press).

With 10 days before the recall referendum, Evo might be heading into a tight spot. A strike by the COB (the Bolivian workers’ federation) has gained steam, and yesterday miners shut down much of the government in La Paz. The COB objects to Evo’s new pension plan, which doesn’t go as far as they would like (they insist that Evo’s government adopt the COB proposal w/o modifications).

MABB has a pretty good rundown of the current US presidential candidates’ positions on Latin America. Basically, it’s unclear what (if any) position McCain has beyond free trade. Obama, on the other hand, has a lengthy position paper on the subject.

A recent poll suggests that Evo would survive a recall referendum in Bolivia, w/ 49% in favor of keeping him in office, 18% opposed, and 33% undecided.

I’ve just uploaded the paper I’ll be presenting at the APSA meeting at the end of August: “Bolivia’s Party System after October 2003: Where Did all the Politicians Go?”

A year ago, friend & fellow Bolivian blogger Eddie Evila (of Barrio Flores) launched a project to help encourage more blogs from Bolivia—specifically in less affluent areas (his project started in El Alto).

There’s a running debate on the constitutionality of Bolivia’s recall referendums scheduled (tentatively) for August 10 over at MABB. I’ve weighed in w/ some thoughts on the legal backing of some recent related constitutional matters. But I’ve included the lengthier comment here:

You’ve gotta at least admire Quispe’s chutzpah. After allegations surfaced recently about ties between FARC, Venezuela, and Quispe’s EGTK guerrilla group, the famous Mallku (“prince”) of the Aymara katarista movement came forward w/ a press statement openly stating that he has FARC sympathies—though pointing out that he also has programmatic differences w/ the Colombian guerrillas.

Fallout from the capture of a FARC leader’s laptop in Ecuador a few months ago is starting to have some (predictable) fallout in Bolivia. Today’s La Razón has a series of articles on relationships between FARC & Bolivian groups.

It’s been an interesting past several days in Bolivia, though I’m still not sure how either of the two controversies will end. The first revolves around a series of accusations from the opposition regarding potential vote fraud in the upcoming (August 10) recall referendum. The second involves the case of Georges Nava, the army officer arrested in connection to an explosion at a Tarija television station on the eve of that department’s autonomy referendum. (Ironically, Nava was listed as working for the army’s anti-terrorism unit.)

A number of discussions about Bolivian politics (or any political discussion, really) often hinge on such vague concepts as “social justice” (there are numerous others, of course). I think a number of people have a very specific idea in mind of what they mean by this, but haven’t stopped to articulate it. Unfortunately, this often leads to assumptions that those who disagree w/ us must, by definition oppose “social justice.”

In a new wrinkle to the upcoming recall referendum, Bolivia’s senate passed modifications to the referendum law. The new law would only require a simple majority (50%+1) for both Evo & the prefects to keep their seats; currently the number varies on the basis of the December 2005 votes (from 46.26% for Evo to 62.012% for Pepe Lucho [José Luis Paredes], the La Paz prefect).

With the upcoming recall referendum in Bolivia, there’s growing speculation about whether the embattled Evo Morales will hang on to his presidential seat. The following graph might help:

The recall referendum campaign has started in earnest in Bolivia. On August 10, Bolivian voters in 8 of 9 departments (not Chuquisaca, which only recently elected a prefect) will vote on whether their prefects should keep their posts. They’ll also vote (in all departments) on whether the president, Evo Morales, should keep his.

I was recently asked to write something about Bolivia’s foreign policy for e-IR, a new online international relations journal published by students at Oxford, University of Leicester, and the London School of Economics. The essay (“Bolivia’s New International Stage”) looks at the country’s international relations in the first two years of Evo’s government.

As expected, voters in Tarija approved an autonomy statute by wide margins. Though final counts aren’t yet in, preliminary counts show that the “Sí” vote reached about 80%. Voters in Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando have already approved autonomy statutes. It also currently looks as if voter turnout was higher than in the three other departments, despite attempts at preventing the vote by pro-MAS activists.

Roberto Sándoval, campaign manager for an opposition candidate, has been freed (see news report). The ruling was made by a judge in an El Alto court, after state prosecutors were unable to present any evidence, indictments, or warrants against Sándoval. In effect, the judge ruled the arrest—made by agents of the Intelligence and Government ministries—illegal (see previous post).

The campaign manager (Roberto Sándoval) for an opposition candidate for the Chuquisaca prefecture (Sabina Cuéllar) was detained yesterday (see news report). He’s accused various crimes, including sedition & attempted “magnicide” (stemming from pro-government & opposition forces a few weeks ago in Sucre). If true, they’re serious crimes, of course. Yet the circumstances of his detention seemed questionable: A number of unidentified, masked men forced him into a vehicle. The government only acknowledged his arrest & announced its indictment 12 hours later, after his wife denounced his kidnapping.

Bolivia’s politics shifted south this weekend. Evo suspended a planned trip to the Sucre (on the 199th anniversary of Bolivia’s “declaration of independence”¹) after university students & other local groups mobilized in opposition.

A quick clarification in light of today’s argument that Bolivia’s political opposition suggests that a recall referendum may be unconstitutional: I don’t care.

A surprising development in Bolivia: If Evo enacts a law approved by the Senate (as he said he would), there will be a recall referendum in Bolivia as early as August (90 days after the law is enacted). The recall referendum would put Evo & the country’s nine prefects up for an up or down popular vote of confidence.

Human Rights Foundation (HRF) has posted its preliminary report on the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum.

While all attention is currently on Santa Cruz, it’s important to look ahead to June 22. That’s when Tarija will hold its autonomy referendum (making it the 4th department to hold such a vote). Santa Cruz leaders will wait until then to negotiate collectively w/ the central government.

The Santa Cruz departmental electoral court (CDE) website has updated official counts, as they’re processed. They’re using the same software/process (SIRENA) as the national electoral court (CNE)—which is the software/process used by each of the regional electoral courts during national elections.

The official count will be made public by Friday. But this morning’s reports show that “Sí” (pro autonomy) won by 86% to 14% in yesterday’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum. It seems unlikely that these figures will change significantly. Some brief analysis:

The official results aren’t in yet. But El Deber (and other media) reports that the “Sí” vote won in the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum—by a wide margin (exit polling has it 85.3% to 14.7% in the city, 89.6% to 10.4% in the rural areas).

Tomorrow, Santa Cruz goes to the polls in its autonomy referendum. The central government is still adamantly opposed, of course. On the eve of the election, it’s also clear that there is little that can be done to stop it. But what will happen?

Boz beat me to the latest poll numbers out of Bolivia: Evo retains 54% public approval (down from 56% in March) across Bolivia, according to the latest poll.

The question is, perhaps, exaggerated. Clearly, Evo—still the head of Bolivia’s cocalero federation—is an important leader w/in Bolivia’s anti-neoliberal social movements.

There have been calls in the past for Evo to step down, but now they’ve become more commonplace.

We’re now a little more than three weeks away from the May 4th autonomy referendum in Santa Cruz. A broad social movement¹ calling for regional autonomy has been active in force since January 2004, coming on the heels of the October 2003 “gas war” (which pitted a very different constellation of social movements against Goni’s government).

Things in Bolivia have become increasingly tense in the last few weeks. We’re now about five weeks away from the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum (set for Sunday, May 4th).

The spring speaker series I put together at Dickinson is winding down, w/ two final speakers who will focus on the Andes.

The problems stemming from Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador a few days ago (when Colombian armed forces killed a leading FARC rebel leader) continue. Much of the problem stems from two counts:

Boz has an interesting thread on “who wins?” in a possible Venezuela-Colombia war. There is no reason (yet) to believe a war is imminent, of course. But the possibility of inter-state warfare in Latin America shouldn’t bee too hastily dismissed.

Latin American politics sometimes takes on broad, regional patterns. About two years ago, many began proclaiming or denouncing (depending on ideological bias) the “new left” in Latin America. Whether that trend is leftist or “populist” or something else, or whether that trend is continuing, or even whether it’s one trend (as opposed to divergent trends) is still a matter of discussion, of course.

In a brief 30-minute session last night, Bolivia’s legislature approved two constitutional referendums & annulled the proposed Santa Cruz & Beni autonomy referendum. The vote took place as pro-MAS protestors lay siege to the parliament building for several days, and as at least two female opposition candidates were beaten as they tried to enter the legislative session. Opposition legislators were refused the floor, the votes took place following no discussion, and the brief session took place with dozens of pro-MAS protesters crowded into the gallery.

If you’re in the Dickinson area, you may want to check out the next installment of our Latin American Studies spring speaker series. Anthropologist Steve Striffler (University of Arkansas) will speak on “Colombia, Coal, and Transnational Labor Solidarity.” The focus is on the effects of coal mining on indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.

Boz, who frequently posts poll numbers from across Latin America, has some interesting poll numbers for Peru.

If you’re in the Dickinson area next week, you may be interested in the next installments of our Latin American Studies speaker series.

First, let me be clear: the two cases are not similar in some critical & fundamental ways. But what is interesting is the political international repercussions that a secession implies.

Fidel Castro has (finally) stepped down, officially. I’m not sure what that actually means for US policy towards Cuba, Cuba’s policy towards the US, or international relations more generally. After all, unlike Generalissimo Franco, Castro isn’t dead. Castro is instead scheduled to resume writing his political column full time. But I’m hopeful that this will mean a transition to some form of democracy—and w/ it, a more rational US-Cuban relationship.

In an interesting (though not entirely surprising) political turn, Evo has been reigned in by his own supporters (the organizaciones de base). Only days before, Evo had publicly struck out against the Santa Cruz autonomy movement (which is steamrolling forward), claiming that his supporters were willing to use force if necessary, then calling on the military & “social bases” to mobilize.

There’s been some discussion about a recent ABC News report that a Fulbright scholar in Bolivia was asked to “spy” on Venezuelans & Cubans in Bolivia (to be precise: to report if he had seen any, who, and where) during his mandatory security briefing.¹ I’ll refer to the discussion at Gringo Tambo (a group blog of primarily ex-Fulbrighters who study Bolivia).

If you’re in the Dickinson area next Thursday, come see the first speaker in our spring Latin American Studies speaker series.

It’s hard to believe how quickly time passes. Javi is almost a month old now (and fussier by the day). The lack of sleep is starting to slowly wear me down. I still have two major projects (book manuscript, article rewrite) to finish—because in two weeks grading papers will take over my life.

There’s a big brouhaha over Chavez’s recent statement that he chews coca.

For some time now, Peru’s government has been demanding that Bolivia extradite Walter Chávez, a Peruvian citizen wanted for his alleged connection to MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, an urban Maoist terrorist organization). Walter Chávez is a fairly well known journalist w/ leftist sympathies who served as advisor to Evo Morales’s presidential campaigns in 2002 & 2005. The Bolivian government has declined to extradite him to Peru & has offered political asylum. The (relatively minor) issue has been on the back burner for some time now. Walter Chávez, of course, denies the allegations; he stepped down as a presidential advisor in February 2007.

By now most people have commented on the defeat of Chávez’s constitutional reform proposal in yesterday’s referendum vote. The fact that Chávez came out quickly to accept the defeat is a positive signal. It means that Venezuela is not as “authoritarian” as some of its harshest critics would suggest. Hopefully, this will push Chávez to reconsider some of his ambitions (i.e. his desire for indefinite reelections)—especially since he made the constitutional referendum a personal issue (a vote for or against himself).

When did this kind of power-grabbing come back en vogue?

Yes, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez wants to have indefinite reelection for president (but not for governors or mayors) in the new constitution. Seems pretty consistent for that administration. Bolivia’s Evo Morales wants indefinite reelection for presidents (but not for prefects or mayors—why does this sound so familiar?) put in that new constitution as well. So does Ecuador’s Rafael Correa.

This is cross-posted at the LAPIS blog:

The Argentine presidential elections are coming up tomorrow (Sunday, 28 October). It’s highly likely that Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the wife of current president Néstor Kirchner, will win the presidential race. The latest Angus Reid poll puts her at 47%—w/ her nearest rival (Elisa Carrió) pulling in barely 16%.

I’m teaching a multidisciplinary introduction to Latin American studies course next semester. It took me a while to conceptualize the course, but here’s the syllabus. Below are some of the texts I’m assigning (also in my Amazon bookstore). Comments are always welcome.

Ben Whitford (of Backyard Briefing) has a column in yesterday’s Guardian Unlimited: “The trouble with starting over.” In it, Whitford puts current attempts to draft new constitutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador into historical context. Such as the fact that Latin America has collectively gone through more than 200 constitutions since independence. It’s enough to makes one skeptical of the possibility of lasting change w/ such a long history of “disposable democracy.”

I haven’t been able to follow this as closely as I would like. But Ecuador held elections for a constituent assembly on Sunday. So far, it seems that Correa’s “party” won a majority (though official results aren’t yet in). It’ll be interesting to see how the situation unfolds there. He has promised not to follow the Venezuela-Bolivia model (though his rhetoric suggests otherwise).

This will be the fourth “outsider” in the Andes to win an election & soon after rewrite the constitution. This motley crew includes: Alberto Fujimori (an agronomist at a rural university), Hugo Chávez (an army colonel), Evo Morales (leader of the coca farmers’ union), and Rafael Correa (a PhD in economics from Illinois). Though Correa is perhaps less of an “outsider” than the others (he was a former cabinet minister), all (except Evo) were first elected w/o the backing of an institutionalized political party.

UK’s The Guardian has a fascinating report on Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez as an example of “television populism” that’s definitely worth a look. Chávez’s regime is very unique & highly unusual, blending “classic” populism (which also relied on performance & spectacle) w/ 21st century “reality” entertainment.

Looks like Fujimori is finally going to be extradited back to Peru to face charges related to the abuse of power during his 1992-2000 semi-authoritarian regime. He had been living in Japan for several years; he was recently aprehended, while in Chile.

I covered Fujimori as one of my four cases (the others were Perón, Várgas, and Chávez) of populist Latin American leaders in my “Heroes & Villains: Populism in Latin America” course last semester. These are the materials we used:

More at my Pronto* Peru bookstore.

It’s perhaps fitting that today—on the anniversary of “9/11”—my Democracy & Democratization class is reading the first chapter of Samuel Huntington’s The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991). It’s fitting because “9/11” is both the anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 2001 and of the US-supported (if not directly “backed”) Chilean military coup of 1973.

While Huntington’s work has been controversial, he’s made some important insights that aren’t easily dismissed—and shouldn’t be overlooked. One of them is this snippet on pages 29-30:

“… the future of democracy in the world is of special importance to Americans. The United States is the premier democratic country in the modern world, and its identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values. Other nations may fundamentally change their political systems and continue their existence as nations. The United States does not have that option.”

Most of the class discussion will focus on the Huntington’s introduction to the idea of “waves” of democratization, which they’re reading alongside Dankward Rustow’s 1970 classic article, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” But I hope we have a chance to parse out this Huntington nugget (which closely follows an argument that increased democratization throughout the world may bring more peace & less violence). Because what Huntington notes in this passage is that US political identity is wrapped up in our belief in liberal, democratic values. The US isn’t only the premier democracy (for all its faults), but the world’s premier case of “civic” (as opposed to organic, ethnic, or cultural) nationalism.

The US wasn’t founded on the belief that “the American people” should govern themselves (in the way that, say, the Serbian nation-state is explicitly Serbian and not for others in Serbian territory—this example could be applied to a host of “ethnic” nation-states), but on the belief that people should. Re-read the first line of the Declaration of Independence; it clearly implies a universal scope. And it suggests that the US has a founding mission to promote the spread of democracy.

Perhaps if we paid more attention to the struggle for freedom & democracy around the world, we wouldn’t be so surprised in international relations. And we may need to constantly remind ourselves that our first priority—or “prime directive”—as a state is to act in ways that promote democratic values around the world. Perhaps the last question made before any policy decision should be this: “Will this policy hinder or advance the cause of freedom in the world?”

I’ve started adding sub-categories to my Amazon bookstore, building country-specific pages under the Latin America category. So far I’ve only added a few books on three countries: Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. If you have other (academic) titles you specifically recommend, please let me know. Even so, the sidebar to the right will give you other, related recommendations.

A day after a regionalist opposition-led strike, Bolivia’s government shot back. It has frequently attacked the opposition for its ties to the US & other international NGOs (such ties do exist, of course), specifically singling out the US for its “political” aid. Of course, isn’t all aid “political”? Or does Venezuela’s millions in military & other aid not serve a “political” purpose? But today’s attacks resembled a witch hunt.

My latest essay for Tiempo Político¹ is up today. It’s titled: “Reelección indefinida y ‘democradura’: ¿un modelo chavista para Bolivia?” I’ve posted similar discussions on indefinite reelection here & here. I’ve provided an English translation below.

Not surprisingly, Venezuela’s legislature unanimously approved changes to the constitution that would (among other things) extend the presidential term from six to seven years & allow for unlimited reelection of presidents. Essentially, Hugo Chávez could be president for as long as he wishes (he’s currently been president for almost ten years).

For all Evo’s problems managing his increasingly fractured MAS coalition (see previous post), he’s making some important headway in foreign diplomacy (along w/ some mistakes).

I barely made the deadline to be included in the CD, but I’ve sent out the paper I’m presenting next month at the Montréal LASA conference. It’s not nearly as “finished” as I’d have liked, but there’ll be plenty of time to revise it later. Here’s the (overly ambitious, not fully realized) abstract:

In a recent post, listed a recent article by Martin Brienen (“Interminable Revolution: Populism and Frustration in 20th Century Bolivia”) . The article was published in the most recent (Spring-Winter 2007) issue of SAIS Review, which has a number of interesting articles on populism around the world (not just Latin America).

Greg Weeks posted a brief comment on the recent proposal (finally formally unveiled) by MAS to allow for presidential re-election in Bolivia. This was seen coming for a while (it was discussed in public discourse for several months). But it came late to the formal agenda of the Constituent Assembly, which has basically thrown a monkey wrench in the works—and this as the Assembly seems unable to make its original August deadline for a draft constitution (which was supposed to go to public referendum on 6 August).

With all driving to/from Washington DC yesterday, I didn’t get a chance to look over this week’s edition of Tiempo Político.¹ But there’s an excellent article by Armandy Méndez Morales, “Superar el culturalismo revolucionario populista [Overcoming populist revolutionary culturalism].”

I suppose I should comment on the controversial FIFA ruling that disallows soccer matches at high altitude. The decision means that World Cup (and other important) soccer matches can’t be played in La Paz, Bolivia (the ban applies to other locations as well). It would also apply to other cities at “high” altitude. I understand the indignation, but the issue, sadly, has become another distraction taking away from larger social, political, and economic issues.

I’m traveling to Bolivia in a few days. In some ways, this is nothing new. Though my family moved to Michigan in 1985, we frequently went back to visit relatives & friends, especially in Santa Cruz & La Paz. It’s also nothing new to K8; we met there (we were both Fulbright fellows). But this time, we must consciously plan our visit around potential bloqueos & street protests.

I don’t usually use my blog for “advocacy” links. But I’ve decided to post a “Free RCTV” logo on the main page. There are numerous other causes I could be supporting, but I’ve chosen this one. In part, because I worry about the future of democracy in Latin America. Venezuela’s “partidocracia” (party-ocracy) of the 1970s-1990s was problematic, to be sure; like many, I was hopeful when Chávez was elected in 1998. The 1980s “lost decade” were very difficult on Venezuela’s poor, and it was clear that the existing parties were no longer capable of solving the political, economic, and social crisis. Many were pleased to see Chávez abandon golpismo (coup-making) in favor of electoralism; we hoped he had become a democrat. Since then, he has slowly concentrated powers in his hands—and I mean his personal hands, not his party or movement.

The news from Bolivia is not so good. It’s sad that June is now just recognized as the start of “bloqueo season” in the country (K8 & I will be traveling just then; will we be able to reach La Paz?). But things are getting dicey again.

I should comment on this weekend’s events in Venezuela, after Hugo Chávez closed down an opposition television station (RCTV) by not reinstating its license. There were, of course, significant protests in Venezuela (broken up by government security forces). Greg Weeks has a short, but excellent post on the subject—followed by some interesting comments [Ed. here’s another good thread from Boz].

Today is Mother’s Day in Bolivia. I’ve always liked this holiday; though perhaps that’s partly due to heavy “patriotic” government indoctrination I received in Bolivian elementary schools. In contrast to the US holiday, it (in part) honors one of the country’s “founders” (a founding mother?): Juana Azurduy de Padilla.

I never understood why many jumped to the conclusion that Evo Morales was an “indigenous” political leader in Bolivia. Yes, he’s primarily of indigenous origin. But does that make him an “indigenous” leader? Especially in Bolivia, which has a long tradition of indigenous political movements—the kataristas—who were mostly concentrated in the Andean Altiplano. During the 1980s, the most important of these was MRTKL (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Revolución); in the 1990s, it was MIP (Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti). These weren’t the only such movements. And it’s important to note that Evo was never a member of any of these. He belongs to a different trajectory.

A short column I wrote for Tiempo Político¹ came out today. I won’t have time to translate it, but the column (“Ingeniería electoral: el sistema de voto alternativo [Electoral engineering: the alternative vote system]”) is based on this this earlier post. And w/ that I’m off on the road to Pittsburgh.

The conflict between Bolivia’s president, Evo Morales, and the judicial system continues (previous post). Yesterday, the head of the supreme court resigned. The other court ministers have stated that they’ll resist the executive branch. But a MAS spokesperson threatened to topple the court through social pressure. This is the same kind of threat made January against Cochabamba’s prefect; clashes there left three dead & several injured in January.

As Bolivia’s constituent assembly starts gearing up to write draft constitutions, a confrontation between the executive & judicial branches is brewing. But this isn’t directly connected to any of the legalities of the constituent assembly itself. Instead, this is merely the typical kind of confrontation common to “delegative” democracies.

Today, an investigative report by the Grupo de Diarios América (GDA) was published in a number of newspapers, including several in Bolivia. The report addresses the influence of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez across Latin America (from La Razón). The report is meant to draw together the various kinds of “cooperative assistance” the Venezuelan leader is engaged in, showing his vast influence. Of course, there’s nothing really shocking there. All states try to influence their neighbors through economic (and other) assistance programs. Chávez is currently swimming in petrodollars—and if he wants to make a play for regional hegemon, he certainly has the ability. But there is one troubling underside: Bolivia’s security policy.

Today’s La Razón has a brief story on a newly-unveiled proposal for reform of the Bolivian judiciary. The proposal would combine “ordinary” (Western) and “originary” (indigenous) legal traditions, in a parallel system. I saw a similar proposal in April 2004 at an ILDIS-sponsored conference on decentralization. I’ll have to admit that (like others) I wasn’t convinced of its practicability; but it’s certainly an intriguing possibility—especially if it’s not framed as two systems in parallel (as it was then) but as two systems subsumed under a broader constitutional framework (as it is now).

This is from two weeks ago, but since I’m taking breaks from grading, I thought I’d plug it: John Crabtree (Oxford) frequently writes about the Andes for openDemocracy, an online peer-review journal of world politics; his latest article (“Latin American democracy: time to experiment”) discusses recent developments in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. It’s worth a look. The advantage of online journals, of course, is that they’re more accessible and link to other relevant websites.

I was getting set to send something off to Tiempo Político¹ after the weekend on this very topic. But Mario Requena’s “¿Y si tuviéramos un gobierno parlamentario? [And if we had a parliamentary government?]” is excellent. In it, he argues that Bolivia should consider a parliamentary system, rather than continue as a presidential system.

According to a La Razón report (“La Asamblea propone un Congreso 100% uninominal”), Bolivia’s Constituent Assembly is considering radical changes to the composition of the legislature in the new constitution. The first is to move from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The second is to transform all legislators into “uninominal” representatives elected in single-member districts (SMDs).

There’s been much discussion in Bolivia recently (it’s become part of the “regionalism” discourse in the Constituent Assembly process) about moving the Bolivian capital back to Sucre. Officially, Bolivia has two capital cities: La Paz (where the president and legislature reside) & Sucre (home to the supreme court).

Two new policy reports on Bolivia have recently come out. One is by the US Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The other is by the Democracy Center (DC), a small NGO advocacy group based in San Francisco & Cochabamba (Bolivia). The CFR report, written by Eduardo Gamarra (director of FIU’s Latin American & Caribbean Center), is titled Bolivia on the Brink and describes many of the problems facing Bolivia today. The DC report is titled Interpreting Bolivia’s Political Transformation. I’d like to share some brief thoughts.

One of the greatest challenges facing Bolivia’s Constituent Assembly—and one that wasn’t faced by other such recent assemblies in Peru (1992) or Venezuela (1999), though the upcoming Ecuadorian case might—is the issue of deep regional cleavages & demands for regional autonomy. Despite all the international attention on other issues or potential reforms (macroeconomic reforms, nationalization of strategic industries, indigenous ethnic/cultural issues, etc.), the one that stands at the center stage of Bolivian politics today is the issue of regional autonomy. The four lowland (and petroleum-rich) departments—Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando—are adamantly demanding political autonomy, whether in a form of federalism or federacy or something else. It’s important to note, of course, that these are also the regions where the opposition (led by PODEMOS & the MNR) are strongest (and where Evo’s MAS is weakest).

I know I’ve not posted much about Bolivia (or really, anything) in some time. And though much has happened (e.g. border disputes between provinces in Tarija), I’ve been too focused on catching up w/ my coursework. But I wanted to highlight this recent piece in Tiempo Político¹ by Herber Müller: “La necesidad de construir un verdadero pacto social [The need to build a new social pact].”

I’m particularly pleased that the Dickinson intramural faculty team (Team “A Useful Education”) won its first game—and in the playoffs, where it really counted! Sadly, I missed the excitement, since I was attending an evening presentation by Julio Carrión (U of Delaware), the Latin American Studies guest speaker.

I’m presenting two papers at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting in Chicago next weekend. The second paper is (finally!) finished; here’s the abstract:

I’m presenting two papers at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting in Chicago in two weeks. The first paper is finished; the second still needs some work. Here’s the abstract: