Pronto*

Bolivian international relations under Evo Morales

2008-07-04T02:45:46Z

I was recently asked to write something about Bolivia’s foreign policy for e-IR, a new online international relations journal published by students at Oxford, University of Leicester, and the London School of Economics. The essay (“Bolivia’s New International Stage”) looks at the country’s international relations in the first two years of Evo’s government.

Latest Javi videos

2008-07-02T13:56:58Z

The first is video of Javi in Michigan, including him & Valerie doing a “hop on pop” reenactment. The second is video of Javi back in his crib in Baltimore, playing w/ his new eBay acquisition. The last is video of Javi demonstrating his army crawling skills. Click once to see a video play small. Double-click to see it larger.

Savina Cuéllar elected Chuquisaca prefect

2008-06-30T13:40:49Z

Savina Cuéllar won the race for Chuquisaca prefect by a comfortable margin over the MAS candidate (57.3 to 39.4 percent). Although these are unofficial “quick” counts, they’re not expected to change much. (Official results from the National Electoral Court, w/ only about half of the vote counted, so far gives Cuéllar almost 75 percent of the vote.) ]]> Bolivia’s first elected female prefect, Cuéllar is a native Quechua speaker & former regional secretary for the Bartolina Sisa Campesina Women’s Federation (FMCBS). She was also active in the resistance against the 1980-1981 Garcia Meza dictatorship. She had been, until recently, a supporter of Evo Morales. The victory by the Interinstitutional Committee Alliance (ACI) candidate moves the Chuquisaca regional government into the opposition (leaving pro-MAS prefects in only Oruro & Potosí), and raises the question of Chuquisaca’s stance on regional autonomy.

Chuquisaca prefecture election today

2008-06-29T15:08:03Z

Chuquisaca voters go to the polls today to elect a new prefect to replace interim prefect Ariel Iriarte. The previous prefect, David Sánchez (MAS) resigned over the government’s handling of the social unrest during the final days of the constituent assembly process in Sucre last December, which left three dead. Correo del Sur has brief candidate bios. On the eve of the election, power was cut to television stations in Sucre (w/ the exception of PAT & government Canal 7). The similarity to events in Tarija are worrisome, as are reports that cocalero groups from the Chapare (who call themselves “Satucos”) have arrived in Sucre. Various international observers have also arrived.]]>

Chicago, then Michigan

2008-06-26T23:54:45Z

We’ve been back from our summer expedition for a few days now. It just took a while to get to some of the pictures from our cross-country trip (lesson learned: driving nearly 2,000 miles w/ a five-month-old is harder than we thought). Some quick notes (and pictures): ]]> University of Chicago. It’s a pretty famous school. Indiana Jones taught there, despite being denied tenure by Marshall College. Joking aside, the ceremony was great. And the bagpipes were a nice touch. From there, we went on to Michigan. After a brief pit stop in Kalamazoo for lunch w/ some friends at Food Dance, we continued on towards Gladwin County (where my grandparents have had a cabin for more than 50 years). My parents were in from Bolivia. Javi also got to meet the rest of his cousins (Ayanna & Valerie), as well as my grandparents & aunt Kelly. Plus we also saw Sam & Novalí. Despite the weather, we all had an enjoyable time. On the way back we stopped through Saginaw to see Matt & April (and their kids). Then on the road w/ a brief stop in Ann Arbor to meet one of K8’s friends for lunch at Zingerman’s. After that, it was another 10 hours to Baltimore. At which point we needed some time to decompress. Oh, and did I mention that I was part of the studio audience at The Daily Show on June 9? Well, I was.

Tarija voters opt for autonomy

2008-06-23T13:05:18Z

As expected, voters in Tarija approved an autonomy statute by wide margins. Though final counts aren’t yet in, preliminary counts show that the “Sí” vote reached about 80%. Voters in Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando have already approved autonomy statutes. It also currently looks as if voter turnout was higher than in the three other departments, despite attempts at preventing the vote by pro-MAS activists. ]]> Cochabamba & Chuquisaca will hold their own autonomy referendums (Sucre is the capital of Chuquisaca). These would be the first departments in which MAS won in 2005 & which rejected autonomy in the 2006 nationwide autonomy referendum. Meanwhile, the four “media luna” departments are moving forward to hold elections to regional assemblies, treating their autonomy as a fait accompli.

Explosion & arrests in Tarija

2008-06-22T23:40:24Z

Back from vacation (and only now w/ cable/internet restored). Still catching up w/ news, email, work, etc. More later. But some startling news from Tarija: An explosion at a Canal 4 installation in Yacuiba, Tarija. The department of Tarija is today wrapping up its own autonomy referendum election. At least one suspect (who has admitted to complicity) w/ ties to the presidential palace was rounded up: Lt. Georgef Peter Nava Zurita is identified as a member of the presidential guard. Another 19 civilians were arrested in connection. While Evo’s government denies any connection to Nava (though La Razón reporters who called for information pretending to be his cousin were given the opposite impression), opposition leaders are claiming this is a sign of Evo’s “state terrorism.” Tomorrow will bring preliminary results of Tarija’s autonomy referendum. This now makes four such votes. Evo’s government has rejected all such referendums as illegal, and pro-MAS supporters have mobilized to prevent voting in each of the four regional referendum elections.

2008-06-19T19:02:51Z

Still traveling. We’ve just arrived in Saginaw for our last visit, before we push off & head back to Baltimore tomorrow. Trying to keep up w/ news during long internet-less days is tough; so all that will have to wait until later. Instead, we’re enjoying seeing nieces we rarely see, reconnecting w/ family & friends, and enjoying our “up North” Michigan adventure.

2008-06-10T21:49:30Z

Pronto* takes a two weeks vacation starting today. We’ll be on the road tonight to Chicago for K8’s graduation, then a swing through Michigan to visit family, then back in Baltimore two weeks later.

Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism

2008-06-06T18:01:28Z

I’ve been meaning to post a note about my objections to the use of the term “race” when discussing Bolivian social politics (I prefer the term “ethnicity”). A brief report in today’s La Razón provides a great starting point: The Qhara Qhara “nation” was “reborn” yesterday. ]]> Qullana (the territory of the southeastern portion of Incan empire). CONAMAQ, founded in 1997, has a parliament of representatives from the various member ayllus (communities) & is led by an Apu Mallku (“Supreme Prince”). The current Apu Mallku is Evo Morales, elected to that position in 2006. Ironically, Evo was (until the late 1990s) little involved w/ such indigenous organizations, focusing instead on the cocalero movement. Like many rural (and urban) Bolivians, Evo has recently made the transition to an “indigenous” identity. So what does this have to do w/ race, ethnicity, and nationalism? Well, for starters, I’ve previously noted my objection to the misuse of the term “race” when discussing social divisions in Bolivia. That is, outside commentators (particularly Americans) are too quick to argue that the “Indian race” is in conflict w/ Bolivian “whites”—as if social cleavages were neatly cut. My problem w/ the term “race” is that it is too easily seen as something static (or, worse, purely biological). The terms “ethnicity” & “nation” are more easily seen as cultural artifacts, as social constructions. Ethnic & national identities are inherited, but they are also learned (and we inherit them by being “socialized” into our identities by our families & communities). This is particularly important to remember when discussing Latin America, a region of the world where mestizaje—the blending of different ethnic groups (or even “races”)—has a long tradition. This doesn’t mean that racism (understood as the prejudice against different “other” groups) doesn’t exist in countries like Bolivia. But it means that we can’t really understand these prejudices by limiting ourselves to the category of “race.” Those who use “race” as a social category often implicitly (if not explicitly!) assume that racial “purity” can exist. Social groups are essentialized, and defined in simple, static categories. Both the romanticizing & demonizing of “Indians” (whether defined as pure & noble or backward & savage) makes the same mistake: It assumes that the “Indian” is static. It’s noteworthy that “racial” statistics in Bolivia vary remarkably. In the recent census, the proportion of “indigenous” Bolivians rose dramatically. It is now standard to note that Bolivia is comprised of a majority of “Indians” (nearly two thirds by the last Bolivian census). But this also depends on how the questions are asked. (Take for example the US census: Not only does it have trouble recognizing people of “mixed” heritage, it fails to identify important “other” groups. In the 2000 census, Middle Eastern Americans are included in the “white” category.) LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project), which has been conducting public opinion research in Bolivia for a decade. The 2006 LAPOP report on Bolivia shows a remarkable trend: the percent of indigenous population in Bolivia has increased dramatically since 1998, even as the percent of whites has declined (see Figure II-3 on page 17). In 1998, more than a fifth of all respondents identified as “white,” but only a little more than a tenth did so in 2006. Similarly, barely a tenth of respondents identified as “indigenous” in 1998, but a fifth did so in 2006. How do we explain that discrepancy? Either there was massive sampling error across all surveys (yet the biannual surveys showed a consistent trend across five different survey waves: 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006). Or people have “switched” their identities. More remarkable is that in the 2006 LAPOP survey, less than a fifth of respondents self-identified as “indigenous” (another tenth still self-identified as “white”). Again, what happened? Part of the answer lies in question wording, of course: unlike the 2000 Bolivian census, the LAPOP surveys include the category “mestizo.” Nearly two thirds of respondents self-identified as “mestizo” in the 2006 survey. Still, the LAPOP survey data shows a remarkable trend: the share of “indigenous” Bolivians has increased over time. What we are seeing in Bolivia today is not merely a conflict between oppressed “Indians” & elite “whites” (though this is clearly part of the story). Rather, we are also seeing a change in the self-identification—a change, if you will, in how Bolivian citizens “imagine” themselves (to borrow Benedict Anderson’s term). After the 1952 National Revolution, Bolivia embarked on a nation-building project. Like other nation-building projects, it sought to bring together an ethnically fragmented society into a homogenous Bolivian nation. In short, it turned “Indians” into campesinos (“peasants”). Using the early 20th century ideology of indigenismo, a Bolivian national mythology was constructed that, though rooted in a distant (but “safe”) indigenous past, projected out to a modern future. That project has, since the 1990s, broken down. Ironically, as Bolivia embraced democratic pluralism (the 1995 Constitution explicitly declared Bolivia a “multiethnic, pluricultural” state), it opened political space for the articulation of new political communities. At the heart of the Bolivian political struggle today is not about who should govern Bolivia, but rather the fundamental question: What is Bolivia? And, of course: What does it mean to be “Bolivian”? The new indigenous political movement that has grown in Bolivia since the 1990s has benefited from pluralist political reforms. But it’s not the only such movement. There is also a social movement for Afro-Bolivian communities. Nor is the indigenous movement monolithic. It took nearly two decades for Aymara communities to overcome their own regional divisions to establish a single organization. In the last decade, that movement has incorporated (though not always smoothly) various Quechua communities as well. But lowland indigenous peoples have their own organizations. And even when these work together, it’s important not to equate this broad social movement w/ a “race.” There is no such thing (really) as an Indian “race” in Bolivia (just think for a moment of how 18th century such a statement sounds!). Rather, there are a number of ethnic communities. Over time, these are perhaps becoming one larger ethnic community. (After all, ethnic communities can be constructed. For example, I just finished reading about the social construction of Tharu ethnic identity in Nepal, which brings together a number of ethnic communities w/ no shared history, kinship networks, or even language. See this revious post.) What is remarkable, is that new regional ethnic communities are being constructed in Bolivia as well. The Nación Camba movement is one such movement. As the radical wing of the eastern lowlands regionalist movement, Nación Camba is analogous to the highland Ayllus Rojos. But the more moderate regionalist movements in Santa Cruz, Beni, Tarija, and even Sucre-Chuquisaca today are no less “ethnic” than the more “indigenous” social movements. These movements have defined themselves as culturally different from the Bolivian national identity. Their leaders point to a history of past abuses (as Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm, and others point out, national or ethnic identities are often spearheaded by local intellectuals or elites who use history for such purposes). We can learn much from public monuments, and a drive through Santa Cruz is an eye opening experience. Returning to my main point: My objection to the simplistic portrayal of the regionalist movement in Santa Cruz as primarily motivated by “race” (“white” elites against “Indians” led by Evo) hides some important truths. If you spend enough time w/ cambas, you’ll soon notice that their anger against collas isn’t limited to those who are indigenous. The term is used to include upper class, criollo (“white”) paceño elites, too. Meanwhile, cambas will point to their own mestizaje—which includes a dialect heavily infused w/ Guaraní words (in this, the Camba ethnic/national identity is similar to the Paraguayan). Santa Cruz regionalists don’t think of themselves as “white”—they think of themselves as cambas. And, even more ironically, a great number of such cambas are second (even first) generation immigrants from the Andes. Most problematically, reducing the conflict to one over race almost always implies that the non-white “other” is oppressed by some white “elite.” So if an “Indian” Bolivian president is opposed by a regional movement, that movement must be led by “white” oligarchs. Such a portrait fails to account for some important facts: “white” paceños equally resist efforts by Santa Cruz regionalists, while non-white residents of Santa Cruz side against the government. Part of the problem w/ the American interpretation of Bolivian politics (or any other international phenomenon) is that American observers find it difficult to understand external phenomenon w/o projecting their own American perspective. In the US, we think of race as a fixed item. (Obama is black, regardless of the fact that he has a white mother & was schooled in Hawaii & Indonesia.) But the concept of “race” isn’t very useful for understanding a society crisscrossed by a number of overlapping, dynamic identities. Nor is the Darwinian idea that “races” are locked in some epic, zero-sum struggle against one another.

Opposition leader freed

2008-06-04T14:58:30Z

news report). The ruling was made by a judge in an El Alto court, after state prosecutors were unable to present any evidence, indictments, or warrants against Sándoval. In effect, the judge ruled the arrest—made by agents of the Intelligence and Government ministries—illegal (see previous post). ]]> It’s noteworthy that Sándoval was freed & escorted by Bolivian national police. The escort was necessary, since a mob of El Alto residents had gathered, demanding Sándoval be sent to the infamous Conchocoro prison. Sándoval was defended by Alberto Cosa Obregón, a noted jurist & 2002 presidential candidate for Ley y Justicia. But the mob gathered outside the proceedings is troubling. First, because it raises questions not only of why Sándoval was illegally kidnapped (as the court has essentially ruled), but why he was brought to El Alto (he was arrested in Sucre). Second, because it makes the detention seem much more like an attempt to intimidate the opposition (which will no doubt backfire).

How to lose the PR war in Bolivia

2008-06-03T14:49:23Z

news report). He’s accused various crimes, including sedition & attempted “magnicide” (stemming from pro-government & opposition forces a few weeks ago in Sucre). If true, they’re serious crimes, of course. Yet the circumstances of his detention seemed questionable: A number of unidentified, masked men forced him into a vehicle. The government only acknowledged his arrest & announced its indictment 12 hours later, after his wife denounced his kidnapping. ]]> There were a number of other irregularities. Based on reports, the men who arrested Sándoval drove cars belonging to the Ministry of Government (not the police). Usually, such cases are first denounced publicly (that is, a government spokesperson announced the intention to arrest an individual, along w/ the reasons). It was also odd that the head of the police’s anti-crime task force was unaware of any warrants against Sándoval. The courts are now determining whether Sándoval’s arrest was carried out legally (it’s currently unclear whether any warrant existed). On a pr side, this is bad news for Evo’s government. The move looks too much like bullying of opposition forces. Particularly since this will be taken by opposition forces as a sign that the government is trying to intimidate opposition candidates. Whether Sándoval was guilty or not will become irrelevant for many government opponents. But even if Sándoval were guilty—and especially if he was guilty of the specific accusations of inciting violence—it was in the government’s best interest to handle the issue delicately. There’s no need to make Sándoval a martyr. Yet this is essentially what the government has chosen to do, by seemingly confirming many of those critics who used “totalitarian” as an adjective for Evo’s government. Modern politics (for better or worse) is mostly about winning the pr war. There’s no need to deliberately play into the opposition’s hands.

Summer update

2008-06-02T14:19:23Z

It’s been a hectic two weeks. Since May 15, we’ve moved to Baltimore, held our son’s christening, attended two weddings (one in DC, one in Carlisle), and hosted a reunion of the Centellas brothers for Andy & Saloumeh’s MBA graduations in Delaware. We also attended two Orioles games, bought new furniture at IKEA, and have started to explore our new Mount Washington (or is it Roland Park?) neighborhood. La Razón articles here). These were more problematic, as anti-referendum protests (w/ some violence) prevented voting in some areas (particularly in Pando). The aim, clearly, was to drive down voter turnout as a way to delegitimize the vote. This will likely be the continued strategy as Tarija moves forward w/ its statute. I’ll try to keep an eye on all this, and post some more thorough reflections in the coming days. In about a week, we’re traveling to Chicago for K8’s official PhD graduation, followed by a swing through Michigan. ]]>

Memorial Day ’08

2008-05-26T14:41:26Z

We’re going to try out the Baltimore Light Rail system today. We’re also going to our first (if we can get tickets) Orioles game at Camden Yards. Should be a nice Memorial Day activity—and it seems that the ballpark is infant friendly. Sorry, Lachie, it looks like Javi’s first baseball experience will be w/ the Orioles, not the Cubs. ]]> pictures of Javi’s christening.

Sucre takes center stage

2008-05-25T23:34:41Z

Bolivia’s politics shifted south this weekend. Evo suspended a planned trip to the Sucre (on the 199th anniversary of Bolivia’s “declaration of independence”¹) after university students & other local groups mobilized in opposition. ]]> 2 MAS prefect was forced to step down, as a regional movement burst to the forefront. Long dormant tensions between Sucre & La Paz resurfaced.³ Recently, Chuquisaca civic leaders wrested assurances from Evo’s government that it would allow residents to elect their new prefect (constitutionally, the president is still empowered to simply name & dismiss prefects). The end result is that Sucre/Chuquisaca has moved decisively into the opposition camp. As in other parts of the country, the movements are polarizing now into urban vs. rural fronts. The conflict in Sucre this weekend was described as a clash between (urban) university students & rural campesinos. But this is complicated by the fact that Bolivia has in recent decades become significantly more “urban” (between one half & two thirds of the population today lives in “urban” communities). This means that many urban residents have “rural” ties. But it also means that “urban Bolivia” is today larger, more diverse, and more politically powerful than is “rural Bolivia.” All this adds further tension as Bolivia looks forward to more autonomy referendums in Beni, Pando, and Tarija, a prefectural election in Chuquisaca, and a recall referendum on all national offices (including the presidency). ---- ¹ The city of Sucre (then called Chuquisaca) was the site of one of the earliest declarations of independence in Latin America, w/ the “grito libertario” of May 25, 1809. From 1809 until 1825, various Bolivian guerrilla forces (either loosely under the command of José de San Martín or completely independently) fought against Spanish royalist forces. In 1825-1826, Simón Bolívar’s forces, under the command of Antonio José de Sucre, marched into Alto Peru (present day Bolivia) & began forging a new state: Bolivia. ² Sucre is the capital of Chuquisaca department. ³ Until the 1899 Federal War, Sucre was Bolivia’s capital (it’s still the “constitutional” capital, La Paz is the “political” capital). But unlike Santa Cruz (and to a lesser extent, Tarija), Sucre/Chuquisaca hadn’t previously had a widespread, popular regionalist movement.