A: Chronic instability hurts Bolivia’s economy in the long run, though the scope is difficult to measure. If nothing else, lengthy protests and demonstrations mean lost wages, which impacts lower- and middle-income sectors hardest. The last few years have seen direct foreign investment decline. It’s telling that the only major bidder for the El Mutún iron ore-mining project was India's Jindal Steel. Four years on, disputes between Jindal and Bolivia’s government have stalled the project. So far, Bolivia’s economy has seen above-average growth, but this depends heavily on extractive mineral resources. Without new investments, production will continue to decline. Meanwhile, factories in El Alto continue to shut their doors. The Potosí conflicts showed Morales’ government is unable to effectively deal with social conflicts. Most significantly, the challenges now come from Morales’ own political base. New decentralization reforms made things more difficult. Bolivians are now increasingly concerned with local—rather than national—political and economic issues.
Ironically, the solution may be to embrace fragmented politics. From the start, Morales’ MAS party set out to create a new national hegemonic structure under its vision of national development, borrowing the playbook of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR). But 1950s solutions are not appropriate to 21st-century realities. Rather than seeking to dominate local governments, Morales should empower them to deal with their own issues. There's no reason why every particular issue should reach the president's desk. Only then will Morales have time to focus on the big issues facing Bolivia: transitioning away from an extractive-dependent development.
The other two comments on the issue came from Jaime Aparicio Otero (former Bolivian ambassador to the US) & Iván C. Rebolledo (president of the Bolivian-American Chamber of Commerce).
A:Chronic instability hurts Bolivia's economy in the long run, though the scope is difficult to measure. If nothing else, lengthy protests and demonstrations mean lost wages, which impacts lower- and middle-income sectors hardest. The last few years have seen direct foreign investment decline. It's telling that the only major bidder for the El Mutún iron ore-mining project was India's Jindal Steel. Four years on, disputes between Jindal and Bolivia's government have stalled the project. So far, Bolivia's economy has seen above-average growth, but this depends heavily on extractive mineral resources. Without new investments, production will continue to decline. Meanwhile, factories in El Alto continue to shut their doors. The Potosí conflicts showed Morales' government is unable to effectively deal with social conflicts. Most significantly, the challenges now come from Morales' own political base. New decentralization reforms made things more difficult. Bolivians are now increasingly concerned with local—rather than national—political and economic issues.
Ironically, the solution may be to embrace fragmented politics. From the start, Morales' MAS party set out to create a new national hegemonic structure under its vision of national development, borrowing the playbook of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR). But 1950s solutions are not appropriate to 21st-century realities. Rather than seeking to dominate local governments, Morales should empower them to deal with their own issues. There's no reason why every particular issue should reach the president's desk. Only then will Morales have time to focus on the big issues facing Bolivia: transitioning away from an extractive-dependent development.
The other two comments on the issue came from Jaime Aparicio Otero (former Bolivian ambassador to the US) & Iván C. Rebolledo (president of the Bolivian-American Chamber of Commerce).
]]>“Now it’s obvious that the president has renounced the prophet Mohammed, and he has renounced Islam, and he has accepted Jesus Christ. That’s what he says he has done. I cannot say that he hasn’t. So I just have to believe that the president is what he has said.”
On the surface, the comment seems to make clear that Graham—a significant figure in the Evangelical community—accepts that Obama is, as he has so frequently stated, a Christian (and therefore not a Muslim). In fact, Graham goes even further than Obama has ever gone, by stating that Obama has renounced Islam (something even George W. Bush never did). But then there’s a hint of a passive aggressive tone when Graham suggests that he “has to believe that the president is what he has said.”
But then the comments become more outrageous. Immediately after the above block quote, Graham has is first big “but …”
“the Islamic world sees the president as one of theirs.”
Of course, whether the Islamic world sees Obama as one of its own is irrelevant to an individual’s professed faith (this, I should add, is a basic tenet of Protestantism: that faith is a highly personal relationship known only to God). But that flies in the face of evidence that Obama is increasingly not seen by the Islamic world as “one of theirs.” Obama has continued longstanding US policies (support for Israel, hostility towards Iran) that rankle much of the “Islamic world.”
But what bothered me the most was the following comments by Graham:
“I think the president's problem is that he was born a Muslim, his father was a Muslim. The seed of Islam is passed through the father like the seed of Judaism is passed through the mother. He was born a Muslim, his father gave him an Islamic name.”
Graham should know better. Anyone w/ some basic theological knowledge (such as the kind a minister should have) should know better. This leads me to conclude that either Graham is not well versed in—or doesn’t much care for—his own faith’s theology
Let’s make some basics clear: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are all “Abrahamic” faiths. This means they share some basic core beliefs (such as monotheism), but also some scriptures. The Old Testament is common to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. And the New Testament is common to Christians & Muslims (who believe Jesus & Mohammed were both prophets). A key difference is that only Christianity & Islam are “confessional” faiths. That means that to become a Christian or a Muslim, one must make an explicit pronouncement of faith. Let’s be clear: One is not “born into” Islam any more than one is “born into” Christianity. This is all theology 101, which anyone who has ever taken a comparative religion course would learn. But—and more importantly—anyone who has gone to seminary (caveat: I have friends & relatives who have done so) would learn.
This leads me to conclude that either Graham is being deliberately deceitful about Islam, doesn’t care to learn about it, or is convinced in the truth of beliefs inconsistent w/ centuries of Christian theology. None of this speaks well of Graham’s legitimacy as a Christian minister. (Perhaps he believes he simply inherited his faith from his own father?)
Islam is neither a genetic condition passed on from father to son, nor is it a virus that is transmitted through close proximity. One cannot be born a Muslim, even if one received a “Muslim” name. Or would Graham have me believe that my son is assured eternal salvation as a Christian merely because he was born to a Christian household & bears a “Christian” name?
Graham has made other comments which are troubling. As have other purportedly “Christian” religious leaders (they claim to be Christians, so I can only take them at their word, right?) w/ arguments that Islam is dangerous specifically because its scriptures endorse polygamy, the stoning of adulterers, etc. I would challenge these leaders to pay more careful attention to their own scriptures. All these things—and more! (animal sacrifices, anyone?)—are specifically entailed throughout the Old Testament. And the great patriarchs of the faith had multiple wives. Solomon had hundreds, and he is acknowledged in the Bible as the wisest man ever to have lived. And if you want to talk about women’s rights, take a glance at some of St. Paul’s writings sometime. Oy!
Yet hardly any Christians today (or Jews, for that matter) endorse such practices. Sure, occasionally you get your Branch Davidians & Lord’s Resistance Army (which enforce strict adherence to the Ten Commandments in Uganda) from time to time. But no one suggests this is “true” or “mainstream” Christianity. And certainly no one can reasonably blame all Christians for the beliefs & actions of a few nutjobs.
Surely, Franklin Graham & his ilk know these things. Don’t they?
]]>I continued the regionalist theme in an essay I was invited to write for Americas Quarterly. In the essay (“Bolivia’s Radical Decentralization”) I argue that Evo’s lasting legacy to Bolivia will likely be institutional, not socioeconomic or ideological. The decentralization process that began in 1994 (during Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s first term) has accelerated under Evo’s government, transforming Bolivia from a unitary state to something closer to a federal model.
(In light of both articles, it’s interesting to note that just this week the department of Potosí has mobilized under a regionalist banner—even demanding federalism—despite having been a strong pro-MAS electorate since 2005.)
Finally, my teaching article (“Pop Culture in the Classroom: American Idol, Karl Marx, and Alexis de Tocqueville”) came out in the July issue of PS: Political Science & Politics. The short article is just built around one of my favorite assignments used in intro to comparative politics courses. Basically, students are asked to write what they think Marx or Tocqueville would think about American Idol (substantiating their argument w/ direct citations from The Communist Manifesto & the introduction to Democracy in America).
(I’m also posting this as a way to both procrastinate on my upcoming APSA paper & to feel productive despite said procrastination.)
]]>Like Ari, I take issue w/ this quote from a recent New York Times article on plagiarism:
“The Internet may also be redefining how students — who came of age with music file-sharing, Wikipedia and Web-linking — understand the concept of authorship and the singularity of any text or image.”
My experience suggests that students are quite aware of the concept of “authorship,” broadly defined. When I have given students group assignments, they complain about one thing in particular: They want to get individual credit for their contribution to the project, rather than depend on a collective group grade. This is merely anecdotal evidence, of course. But I get the impression that students regularly expect to be rewarded for the fruits of their labor, and resist the possibility of “free riders” sharing credit.
Like Ari, I’ve also noticed that most plagiarists know what they’re doing is wrong. Whenever I’ve caught a student plagiarizing on an assignment, I’ve simply handed back the assignment ungraded, and told the student we needed to talk. W/o exception, he/she always recognizes instantly why I called him/her over. If they have a defense (sometimes they just confess right away), it always involve them thinking they had changed enough words around. In short, they knew that what they were doing was wrong, they just didn’t think they’d get caught.
Prior to the explosion of the internet, students who plagiarized had to at least work at it. They had to find former students who had written similar papers. Or they could always hire someone to write a paper for them. Neither of these were easy to check, so I imagine a great deal of plagiarism cases in the past simply went undiscovered. Since the internet, students don’t even have to find someone they know. They just go online. Typically, they copy Wikipedia articles (I’ve had a few of those). Or they buy a paper online (I had one of those). But both are easily traceable. As anyone who has caught a plagiarist knows, it’s usually students who don’t write very well who suddenly turn in papers w/ few (or no) mistakes and/or vocabulary you’re certain they’re not familiar w/. Often, Google can provide evidence of guilt w/in 30 seconds.
In the case of my worst offender, I even found the whole paper online from three different paper mills. It took me less than 5 mins to find them all w/ Google. And the reason I was suspicious in the first place? The paper wasn’t even on the topic I had assigned. The student hadn’t even bothered to check the assignment prompt!
Could teachers do more to discourage plagiarism? Absolutely. Students have always plagiarized. Part of the problem was that it was difficult to catch them, so the cost/benefit ran in their favor. Especially if too many professors didn’t bother to carefully check papers.
This brings me to my confession: I’m a plagiarist. Once, in high school (in the pre-internet days), I did a little experiment in my honors civics class. I suspected the teacher (who’ll remain anonymous) didn’t really grade our assignments. (I suspected as much because all we did most days in class was play Trivial Pursuit.) So on an assignment to write an essay about a US president, I chose a midpoint in the paper to start plagiarizing. I took an encyclopedia off the shelf, opened to a random page (I remember it was about dinosaurs), and began to copy word for word. Let me be clear: This was a 10-page paper in which 90% was original work by me about a former US president & 10% was text from an encyclopedia entry on dinosaurs. The teacher never remarked on it (in fact, I got an A on the assignment). And that’s one of the chief reasons why plagiarism is such a problem.
If we want to have a frank conversation about plagiarism, we have to stop focusing on the question of new technologies & generational issues. We need to focus on institutional structures that make plagiarism tempting enough to run the risk.
]]>On the one hand, the wiphala is now officially recognized as an official national emblem in the new constitution. (In fact, the new policy/military uniforms combine the tricolor & the wiphala.) In that sense, then, Bolivia has two flags, which should be raised together at formal state events.
On the other hand, the wiphala is am emblem whose problems are rarely acknowledged. Contrary to popular belief, the wiphala is not the flag of “ethnic peoples” in the Andes: It is specifically the flag of the Aymara communities. Moreover, historically there was more than one wiphala: Different ayllus or regions used different patterns to distinguish themselves. Thus, the Bolivian wiphala is not truly a “National” symbol, but rather the symbol of a particular ethnic group (which makes up about 25-30% of the total population)—and it is only one specific design of the wiphala. In that sense, then, the wiphala doesn’t serve well as a unifying national emblem (particularly if it’s not acknowledged by a regionally concentrated minority), especially in a region not typically associated w/ the emblem’s historical legacy.
This means that both Evo & Costas have a point. Costas is right to suggest out that Evo is using the event to stir up conflict by appealing to his Andean base—otherwise the whole issue could’ve been sidestepped by holding the official celebration in either Sucre or La Paz (as by tradition). But Evo is also right to insist that the wiphala is a constitutionally recognized national symbol & refusing to raise it is a form of anti-indigenous (or anti-Andean) prejudice meant to appeal to a regionalist electorate—otherwise Costas could sidestep the whole issue & just raise the thing (what harm would come of it?).
The underlying problem, however, is that despite nearly two years hammering out a new constitution to “refound” the nation, no such thing happened. Instead, the 2009 constitution was grafted onto previous constitutions (despite a large number of controversial changes, the overall spirit & substance of the document is in line w/ the evolution of the 1967 constitution as revised in 1994 & 2004).
When Evo was elected, many made comparisons between him & Mandela. In part by making the analogy that Bolivia was an “apartheid” state like pre-1994 South Africa (which is a poor analogy that shows no understanding of what Apartheid really was & how it differs from social discrimination). But some of Mandela’s greatest successes were symbolic. We’re all familiar w/ the story of the Springboks. But a more remarkable—and lasting—symbolic change has to do w/ South Africa’s post-1994 flag. As a way of “refounding” their country, South Africans didn’t simply introduce a second, “African” flag to go along w/ the old one—they developed a whole new flag. The current South African flag incorporates various elements of the country’s cultural legacies, without privileging any particular one.
Bolivians had a chance to do likewise—at least if they truly wanted to do a “refounding” exercise. And it wouldn’t have been unprecedented. Between 1826 & 1851, the country had four different flags. The country has also had three different shields of arms (the most recent design was introduced in 1888 & was modified in 2004). Instead, the new constitution merely tacked on another item to the list of patriotic symbols—w/o clearly specifying if it was on equal terms to the national flag or not (the list of patriotic symbols also includes the kantuta & patujú flowers, but it’s unlikely anyone will insist that it be present at official events). Too bad. This just means there’ll be more symbolic conflicts as identity politics continues to dominate contemporary Bolivia.
]]>Meanwhile, Ecuador (which also shares a border w/ Colombia) has been cooperating w/ Colombia’s armed forces, working to eliminate FARC guerrillas in their border region. This despite a flareup in 2008 after Colombia forces crossed—unannounced—into Ecuadorian territory to carry out a raid. During that crisis, Venezuela—but not Ecuador—mobilized troops to its border (Chávez gave the order on his Aló Presidente television show).The crisis was averted, and Ecuador & Colombia have developed a close working relationship rooting out FARC bases.
So this crisis is somewhat baffling. For all the fanfare about Venezuela’s recent military purchases, they pale in comparison to Colombia’s, both in quantity ($10 billion to $3 billion) & quality (Colombia has stocked up for years on sophisticated equipment useful for jungle counterinsurgency warfare; Venezuela has been shopping for Soviet-era assault rifles & battle tanks). Any conflict between the two countries would likely be brief (as have all wars in South America since the devastating 1932-1935 Chaco war between Bolivia & Paraguay), but it would also like end badly for Venezuela.
This makes Evo’s comments all the more puzzling. In his comments, he made clear that he found Colombia the aggressor & took a firm stance beside Chávez (an odd move for a “pacifist” country). But this suggests he expects Colombia to attack Bolivia. But why? The southernmost point of Colombia’s frontier lies nearly a thousand miles from Bolivia. And to cross into Bolivia would require Colombian forces to go through Brazilian territory. Brazil is the region’s military-political-economic juggernaut. Surely Colombia wouldn’t risk the ire of Brazil (the only Latin American country to crack the top 10 in global military expenditures) to attack Bolivia. Or does Evo expect a Colombia-Venezuela war to quickly become a regional conflict? That’s the most unlikely of all possible outcomes to this conflict.
For more on the Colombia-Venezuela conflict, see: Bloggings by Boz, Two Weeks Notice, and Just the Facts.
]]>This video is a good launch pad for discussion. Although it was produced for a Dutch network, nearly all of the 10 mins is in English (just ignore the Dutch subtitles).
]]>But it also shows that these declines have been uneven across regions & time. So it allows for a more nuanced discussion—particularly one geared at asking why fertility rates would decrease as a function of improving socioeconomic conditions (or whether a decrease in fertility rates comes before socioeconomic improvements?). Either way, it’s a great way to sneak in some structuralism.
]]>After we return, I’ll tackle wrapping up two conference papers & prepping my fall courses. Expect to see something about those projects here.
And, don’t worry, I planned our travel itinerary around the World Cup matches. I may have to miss one quarterfinal (though I’m recording it to watch later). But we will watch the final match at Small Bar in Chicago (where I watched nearly all post-group matches four years ago).
]]>Second, this tactic relies on very weak evidence. Sure, there’s a long history of US intervention in Bolivia (as in the rest of Latin America). But that says little about the current projects that are targeted: mainly, USAID funding support (often indirect) for environmental conservation NGOs like Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza (FAN), or Foro Boliviano del Medio Ambiente (FOBOMADE). So far the strongest “evidence” that USAID was “infiltrating” these organizations was when Óscar Coca, Minister of the Presidency, showed books published by environmental & indigenous NGOs that were partly financed by USAID. Bolivian books are often published w/ the help of numerous NGOs, which put their logo somewhere on the cover (often there are three or more such logos on a single book). While this demonstrates that USAID had some role in publishing some book, it says little else. Clearly, this kind of evidence is grasping at straws. The government is hoping to use a McCarthy-era tactic to paint a broad stroke by accusing anyone who has ever, under any context, had any contact w/ USAID (or even w/ another NGO that had some previous link to USAID).
Third, and most egregious, is that none of this says anything about the legitimacy of the protesters’ actual claims. And here we have two different kinds of claims by indigenous groups against the government:
So far Evo’s government has not actually addressed these issues by doing more than arguing that the complaints come from indigenous leaders who’ve been paid off by USAID (they’ve scaled back their attacks on UNDP). So now they face a national march by lowland peoples spearheaded by CIDOB (the organization of lowland indigenous peoples). This is the same group that launched the 1990 “March for Dignity” that launched Bolivia’s modern indigenous movement & was the first real challenge to neoliberalism in Bolivia. CIDOB has mobilized both for environmental concerns (they live in the oil/gas rich areas & have consistently objected to further drilling in their lands, but also demanding that their rights—under the new 2009 constitution—be respected so that they can form autonomous communities. The government objects to this primarily because some of these communities would cross department boundaries, and the government has now clearly stated that department boundaries will be sacrosanct. Odd, since one could make the argument that the department boundaries are clearly “colonial” artifacts that ignore the rights of pre-colonial peoples.
Meanwhile, CONAMAQ (the association of Andean ayllus & indigenous communities) has declared itself in opposition to the government primarily over questions of indigenous autonomy. While Evo’s government has gone further in this regard (including passing a law that puts indigenous communitarian justice on equal footing w/ existing code law), it has done so w/ a clear eye to controlling local governments. The April 2010 municipal elections put a heavy strain on this relationship, as MAS nominated candidates over the objection of local communities/leaders & often campaigned against local leaders. (For example, the municipality of Jesús de Machaca was declared an indigenous autonomous community. In January, using a local holiday, they elected their own leaders using “traditional” community procedures; MAS refused to recognize these, insisted they be elected in the “normal” process of elections, then campaigned against the community’s slate of candidates.) Local-level indigenous leaders are finding Evo to be less “pro-indigenous” than his image would suggest—at least when it comes to granting them political autonomy.
The bottom line is that the government is losing its grip on the indigenous movement. Attacking its leaders as agents of USAID (or US imperialism more broadly) and/or acting in line w/ the “extreme right” seems odd. During the 2005 campaign—and for several months later—Evo & MAS clearly raised the banner of indigenous political autonomy. By doing so, it raised expectations that indigenous groups have patiently waited for & now expect fulfilled. Similarly, the People’s Conference on Climate Change raised the banner of a pro-environmental policy agenda. Indigenous peoples & environmental activists took this as a green light to begin pressing their demands to protect Bolivia’s fragile ecosystems (which happen to be in oil-rich areas).
These last weeks may have irrevocably changed perceptions of Evo’s government. The country has a long experience w/ populist figures who use symbolic rhetoric, but never really “mean it” beyond as a way to strengthen their grip on power. A clear example is René Barrientos, the Quechua-speaking general who ruled Bolivia from 1964-1969 (and famous for capturing/executing Che Guevara). He established the “military-campesino” alliance, frequently mobilizing indigenous militias against his opponents. But, in the final analysis, he never really did much to address indigenous demands. I think increasingly more Bolivians are starting to see echoes of that past in the current government.
None of this will likely threaten Evo’s government, of course. I don’t think Bolivians want to repeat the experience of October 2003 anytime soon. But if Evo & MAS want to win the next round of elections, they might do well to think about the long term consequences of policies aimed at securing short term political hegemony.
]]>The next round looks to become interesting, particularly for Latin America. Of the 16 teams left in the tournament, 6 are from Latin America (only Honduras didn’t make it). That includes traditional powerhouses Brazil & Argentina (who look deadly). But also some surprisingly good & entertaining teams that could make a run for it: Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.
Less than half of the European teams that entered remain. And a number will go out early, yet again: England & Germany face each other in their first knock-out game. Ditto Spain & Portugal.
Meanwhile, the US is still alive. And thanks to the shake-ups of the groups stage play, have what looks like a promising chance to reach the quarterfinals. If the US beats Ghana (who beat them at the groups stage 4 years ago), they can move on to the quarterfinals to meet the winner of the Uruguay v. South Korea match. That means the US could make it to a semifinal match w/o having to face a soccer “superpower” on the way. Not an easy task—against any of these teams—but it’s an easier road than many other teams have to face.
]]>Today was Brazil’s debut against North Korea in Group F. Brazil won—and showed a breathtaking display of individual skill & bravura—but it showed its rough edges against a tough & determined Hermit Kingdom side (they managed to frustrate Brazil for most of the match & even scored a goal to go down a respectable 2-1). Earlier, Portugal tied the Ivory Coast, which means the “group of death” could get very interesting, indeed. Portugal and/or Ivory Coast might have a very tough time getting past North Korea.
Spain—¡España!—debuts tomorrow. I’m hoping Fernando Torres, David Villa, Xavi Hernandez, and co. do a better job out the gate than their Brazilian counterparts do.
]]>The head of Bolivia’s national hydrocarbons company (YPFB) complained that indigenous communities were “obstacles” to exploration, drilling, and extraction projects—thus hindering foreign investment (for all the “nationalization” fanfare Bolivia’s oil companies are still 50/50 partnerships w/ foreign investors). So, the new hydrocarbons law will be modified to exclude indigenous community participation in future development projects. Two other indigenous organizations in the Amazon (TIPNIS & CIDOB) objected to government projects to build highways & oil/gas exploration in two national forests: Isiboro Sécure & Madidi.
Earlier this year, during the much-celebrated climate conference hosted by Evo in Cochabamba, such groups were excluded from the events & organized their own “Mesa 18” panel. Table 18 made the government “uncomfortable” & was not part of the official conference program (full disclosure: some of my relatives work for an environmentalist NGO that helped organize that panel).Table 18 criticized the environmental & indigenous rights record of ongoing natural resource extraction in Bolivia. Evo sought to present his government as environmentally friendly & pro-indigenous while also limiting the discussion to the ills of global capitalism run amok (as if non-capitalist countries had pristine ecological or indigenous rights records).
As evidence that USAID foments anti-government activity, government officials point to recent activity by FOBOMADE (an environmentalist group from the Amazonic regions of La Paz). USAID had development programs in the region, which included poverty reduction, health, and environmental protection. Recently, indigenous communities in the region objected to oil exploration plans, claiming that such activity destroyed the natural habitat, on which they were dependent. This was “proof” (according to the government) that USAID was infiltrating indigenous communities & encouraging them to oppose Evo.
But there’s a significant problem w/ these kinds of accusations. It implies indigenous communities and/or environmentalists wouldn’t object to oil exploration in natural parks & similar areas otherwise. In other words, if it wasn’t for American intervention, indigenous communities would welcome oil exploration in their territories & willingly sacrifice their lands & way of life for Bolivia’s revolution.
One wonders why Alán García (president of Peru) hasn’t thought of this. Of course! Why not blame the Bagua conflict on pesky NGOs that foment environmentalism & indigenous rights. Wait, isn’t that exactly what he did?
This kind of confrontation strips Bolivia’s government of a façade: How can the government claim to be defending indigenous rights when it frequently attacks indigenous organizations for daring to suggest that the government’s economic development plans go against their constitutionally recognized rights to their land? Where is Evo’s passionate defense of the Pachamama against oil drilling platforms? Similarly, how can a government claim to be on the vanguard of a global ecological movement when it dismisses environmentalists concerns about the negative consequences of natural resource extractions? Let’s face the reality: How is this an alternative to the kind of neocolonial, capitalist, dependent development of before?
But, back to the original point: The lesson seems clear: If you object to government policies, you will be branded as an agent of foreign interests. Therefore, if you want to accept NGO development aid, you should not object to government policies. How is that not politicizing development aid?
]]>