My reason is simple: Bolivia-Chilean relations have actually been improving for most of Evo’s presidency. I think one of his greatest foreign policy accomplishments has been his careful rapprochement w/ Chile. This is remarkable for two countries that have not had full diplomatic relations for a century because of a war fought in the 1870s that deprived Bolivia of a seacoast. In fact, it’s remarkable that under Evo, Bolivian relations have instead soured w/ Peru (Bolivia’s oldest regional ally, and which fought alongside Bolivia in the War of the Pacific). It’s even more remarkable if we note the bitter animosity between Evo and Alán García (ostensibly a social democratic leader of APRA) compared to the seemingly easy relationship between Evo & Sebastian Piñera (Chile’s first conservative president since the Pinochet era).
Only one other president has pursued such a “rational” relationship w/ Chile: Goni (former president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada). Ironically, it was Goni’s willingness to negotiate an oil deal that would include Chile that helped stoke the populist backlash against him in September-October 2003 that led to his resignation. (I remember rumors that Chilean snipers were shooting protesters. They weren’t, of course.) Previous Bolivian heads of state—both on the left & the right, both civilian & military—stoked anti-Chilean sentiment. Even Goni’s successor, Carlos Mesa (a respected historian & intellectual) made Bolivia’s maritime demand a principal part of his administration. So why has Evo pursued friendly relations w/ Chile, first under Bachelet (a social democrat) but also under Piñera (a conservative w/ ties to Pinochet)? Why has Bolivia’s often mercurial president not extended his anti-American, anti-neoliberalism, and anti-conservative rhetoric to his Chilean neighbor?
I don’t pretend to have a complete answer. But I think there are two main reasons: First, Evo (unlike other presidents) doesn’t have to shore up his “street cred” by stoking anti-Chilean sentiment. Where Mesa had to “prove” his nationalism/populism by finding some issue to ride, Evo doesn’t need to. His personal biography insulates him from that need. Second, Evo realizes that Bolivia’s economic development depends significantly on good relations w/ his most economically successful neighbors: Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Chile is one of the strongest economies in the region, and currently is a major trading partner. And, as Goni understood, a gas pipeline through Chile is easier both because of the shorter distance and because it doesn’t have to go through Brazil (itself an energy producer). Further, a pipeline through Chile means most of Bolivia’s gas would go to an open market, rather to one of two buyers (Brazil & Argentina).
It’s no surprise that Evo would go to the rescue. After all, he had also attended Piñera’s inauguration—a remarkable move in itself. Evo is fortunate. He doesn’t have to prove his populism in symbolic ways, so he’s free to pursue rational relations w/ a natural trade partner.
The mining crisis has helped. But it has helped a process of rapprochement ongoing for the past several years. What it did do, symbolically, was important. Mining is a significant part of the Bolivian political & national imaginary. Thinking of Chileans as “fellow miners” (rather than as “territorial usurpers”) will no doubt have significant effect on how Bolivians think of Chileans. And the herculean effort by the Chilean state to care for & rescue the trapped miners sends a powerful message of its own: This is how a state should care for its citizens. But also even for foreign nationals. There was no discussion in Chile about whether the Bolivian miner was a “legal alien” or not, or whether he should be rescued or treated any differently than the Chilean nationals. This must have had an impact. So, too, would seeing a Bolivian citizen celebrate the Chilean state.
But the effect will be more on the two country’s populations. The diplomatic relation between the two countries has already been improving. As it should have, long ago.
]]>I know there’s some debate over whether to consider it as such (Boz has a good rundown of both positions). Clearly, Correa is milking the situation to his best advantage (or at least hoping to). But that shouldn’t matter in terms of what to call the event itself. In fact, Correa would have to be a fool of a politician if he didn’t seek to spin the even to his best advantage. Another controversy concerns the intent and/or extent of the police uprising or mutiny. Greg Weeks, who I respect, uses the ambiguous and/or limited goals of the police protesters/mutineers to argue that it was not a “coup” (see his post).
]]> It is just a semantics argument, but not an unimportant one. Obviously, Weeks & almost everyone else out there agrees that this was a political crisis that should not have happened in a democracy. Correa (like him or not) is an elected head of state. As such, an assault on his person (as well as on the institutions of government: the presidential palace, the legislature) are illegitimate means of expressing discontent w/ policies.Also, the term “coup d’état” does have a specific pedigree, as Weeks point out. But I use the term “coup” or “golpe” in the broader meaning—the kind often used in Bolivia. Unlike Chile (a case Weeks is much more familiar w/), Bolivia (like Ecuador) has a much more established tradition of “golpes.” The Bolivian lexicon uses “golpe” (literally, a “strike” or “physical blow”) to include a broader range of activities. In fact, any armed uprising that strikes at one or more key institutions of power are considered a “golpe.” These can be “golpe military” (a “strike” by the military), a “golpe de palacio” (a “strike” from w/in the presidential palace itself), or a “golpe de partido” (a “strike” by a party, as in the 1949 and 1952 civilian putsches led by the MNR; the first failed, the second was successful & ushered in the Bolivian Revolution). And, of course, there can even be an “auto-golpe” (like when Fujimori launched his famous 1992 “self-coup”),
The situation in Ecuador qualifies as a “golpe.” Whehter the intent was specifically to overthrow Correa & replace him w/ someone else is, in my opinion, irrelevant. (Though of course, if Correa had died in the assault, which was a possibility, then the government would’ve been changed; surely the police who attacked the presidential palace were ware of this?) It’s also irrelevant that the “golpe” failed. There have been a number of failed coups in Ecuador’s history (including several kidnappings of the president by the military in the 1990s). It’s not success or failure that should qualify a “golpe.” It’s also equally impossible to determine the intent of the participants. Instead, I look at merely the scope of the phenomenon.
The police assaulted the presidential palace. They physically attacked the president, and took him to their hospital. By all accounts, they closed the legislature, preventing congressmen from entering their offices. The police then engaged in a firefight w/ loyalist army units seeking to rescue the president. During all this time, who was in charge of the country? I suspect that for a few hours, that issue was unclear. I believe that qualifies as a coup. If Correa had died in the assault, or if the army had chosen to sit it out, then we would have seen a new kind of government—one more likely to favor the police offeres’ demands—in power. I believe that qualifies as a coup. The only tangle is that the day ended w/ a rescued president back in charge. This looks like a failed coup, but a coup nonetheless.
I come to this conclusion after reflecting on the experience of another president: In February 2003, Bolivia’s Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada faced a similar situation. The police, demanding that their salaries be raised, mutinied in the capital. Under the command of a Major David Vargas, the elite GES (the Bolivian SWAT) assaulted the presidential palace (the bullet holes are still there). Like in Ecuador, the military rode to the beleaguered president’s rescue, engaging in a brief firefight w/ the police. Other than the ideological orientation of the presidents, the differences in their situations were minimal. In 2003 many (myself included) considered what happened in Bolivia a “golpe.” against the president. I stand by that assessment.
The real question—and not just a semantics one—is whether Correa will face a different fate than Goni. The February 2003 police mutiny was the first major sign that Goni’s government coalition was in serious trouble. As we know, it didn’t survive the end of the year. Will Correa’s government end the same way? The military offered only tepid support, as did other actors (including, surprisingly, Correa’s own brother). Or will Correa’s government emerge strengthened by the experience? The future is uncertain.
But I think it’s difficult to escape the conclusion that this was a “coup”—at least of some “diminished” subtype.
]]>
A: Chronic instability hurts Bolivia’s economy in the long run, though the scope is difficult to measure. If nothing else, lengthy protests and demonstrations mean lost wages, which impacts lower- and middle-income sectors hardest. The last few years have seen direct foreign investment decline. It’s telling that the only major bidder for the El Mutún iron ore-mining project was India's Jindal Steel. Four years on, disputes between Jindal and Bolivia’s government have stalled the project. So far, Bolivia’s economy has seen above-average growth, but this depends heavily on extractive mineral resources. Without new investments, production will continue to decline. Meanwhile, factories in El Alto continue to shut their doors. The Potosí conflicts showed Morales’ government is unable to effectively deal with social conflicts. Most significantly, the challenges now come from Morales’ own political base. New decentralization reforms made things more difficult. Bolivians are now increasingly concerned with local—rather than national—political and economic issues.
Ironically, the solution may be to embrace fragmented politics. From the start, Morales’ MAS party set out to create a new national hegemonic structure under its vision of national development, borrowing the playbook of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR). But 1950s solutions are not appropriate to 21st-century realities. Rather than seeking to dominate local governments, Morales should empower them to deal with their own issues. There's no reason why every particular issue should reach the president's desk. Only then will Morales have time to focus on the big issues facing Bolivia: transitioning away from an extractive-dependent development.
The other two comments on the issue came from Jaime Aparicio Otero (former Bolivian ambassador to the US) & Iván C. Rebolledo (president of the Bolivian-American Chamber of Commerce).
A:Chronic instability hurts Bolivia's economy in the long run, though the scope is difficult to measure. If nothing else, lengthy protests and demonstrations mean lost wages, which impacts lower- and middle-income sectors hardest. The last few years have seen direct foreign investment decline. It's telling that the only major bidder for the El Mutún iron ore-mining project was India's Jindal Steel. Four years on, disputes between Jindal and Bolivia's government have stalled the project. So far, Bolivia's economy has seen above-average growth, but this depends heavily on extractive mineral resources. Without new investments, production will continue to decline. Meanwhile, factories in El Alto continue to shut their doors. The Potosí conflicts showed Morales' government is unable to effectively deal with social conflicts. Most significantly, the challenges now come from Morales' own political base. New decentralization reforms made things more difficult. Bolivians are now increasingly concerned with local—rather than national—political and economic issues.
Ironically, the solution may be to embrace fragmented politics. From the start, Morales' MAS party set out to create a new national hegemonic structure under its vision of national development, borrowing the playbook of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR). But 1950s solutions are not appropriate to 21st-century realities. Rather than seeking to dominate local governments, Morales should empower them to deal with their own issues. There's no reason why every particular issue should reach the president's desk. Only then will Morales have time to focus on the big issues facing Bolivia: transitioning away from an extractive-dependent development.
The other two comments on the issue came from Jaime Aparicio Otero (former Bolivian ambassador to the US) & Iván C. Rebolledo (president of the Bolivian-American Chamber of Commerce).
]]>“Now it’s obvious that the president has renounced the prophet Mohammed, and he has renounced Islam, and he has accepted Jesus Christ. That’s what he says he has done. I cannot say that he hasn’t. So I just have to believe that the president is what he has said.”
On the surface, the comment seems to make clear that Graham—a significant figure in the Evangelical community—accepts that Obama is, as he has so frequently stated, a Christian (and therefore not a Muslim). In fact, Graham goes even further than Obama has ever gone, by stating that Obama has renounced Islam (something even George W. Bush never did). But then there’s a hint of a passive aggressive tone when Graham suggests that he “has to believe that the president is what he has said.”
But then the comments become more outrageous. Immediately after the above block quote, Graham has is first big “but …”
“the Islamic world sees the president as one of theirs.”
Of course, whether the Islamic world sees Obama as one of its own is irrelevant to an individual’s professed faith (this, I should add, is a basic tenet of Protestantism: that faith is a highly personal relationship known only to God). But that flies in the face of evidence that Obama is increasingly not seen by the Islamic world as “one of theirs.” Obama has continued longstanding US policies (support for Israel, hostility towards Iran) that rankle much of the “Islamic world.”
But what bothered me the most was the following comments by Graham:
“I think the president's problem is that he was born a Muslim, his father was a Muslim. The seed of Islam is passed through the father like the seed of Judaism is passed through the mother. He was born a Muslim, his father gave him an Islamic name.”
Graham should know better. Anyone w/ some basic theological knowledge (such as the kind a minister should have) should know better. This leads me to conclude that either Graham is not well versed in—or doesn’t much care for—his own faith’s theology
Let’s make some basics clear: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are all “Abrahamic” faiths. This means they share some basic core beliefs (such as monotheism), but also some scriptures. The Old Testament is common to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. And the New Testament is common to Christians & Muslims (who believe Jesus & Mohammed were both prophets). A key difference is that only Christianity & Islam are “confessional” faiths. That means that to become a Christian or a Muslim, one must make an explicit pronouncement of faith. Let’s be clear: One is not “born into” Islam any more than one is “born into” Christianity. This is all theology 101, which anyone who has ever taken a comparative religion course would learn. But—and more importantly—anyone who has gone to seminary (caveat: I have friends & relatives who have done so) would learn.
This leads me to conclude that either Graham is being deliberately deceitful about Islam, doesn’t care to learn about it, or is convinced in the truth of beliefs inconsistent w/ centuries of Christian theology. None of this speaks well of Graham’s legitimacy as a Christian minister. (Perhaps he believes he simply inherited his faith from his own father?)
Islam is neither a genetic condition passed on from father to son, nor is it a virus that is transmitted through close proximity. One cannot be born a Muslim, even if one received a “Muslim” name. Or would Graham have me believe that my son is assured eternal salvation as a Christian merely because he was born to a Christian household & bears a “Christian” name?
Graham has made other comments which are troubling. As have other purportedly “Christian” religious leaders (they claim to be Christians, so I can only take them at their word, right?) w/ arguments that Islam is dangerous specifically because its scriptures endorse polygamy, the stoning of adulterers, etc. I would challenge these leaders to pay more careful attention to their own scriptures. All these things—and more! (animal sacrifices, anyone?)—are specifically entailed throughout the Old Testament. And the great patriarchs of the faith had multiple wives. Solomon had hundreds, and he is acknowledged in the Bible as the wisest man ever to have lived. And if you want to talk about women’s rights, take a glance at some of St. Paul’s writings sometime. Oy!
Yet hardly any Christians today (or Jews, for that matter) endorse such practices. Sure, occasionally you get your Branch Davidians & Lord’s Resistance Army (which enforce strict adherence to the Ten Commandments in Uganda) from time to time. But no one suggests this is “true” or “mainstream” Christianity. And certainly no one can reasonably blame all Christians for the beliefs & actions of a few nutjobs.
Surely, Franklin Graham & his ilk know these things. Don’t they?
]]>I continued the regionalist theme in an essay I was invited to write for Americas Quarterly. In the essay (“Bolivia’s Radical Decentralization”) I argue that Evo’s lasting legacy to Bolivia will likely be institutional, not socioeconomic or ideological. The decentralization process that began in 1994 (during Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s first term) has accelerated under Evo’s government, transforming Bolivia from a unitary state to something closer to a federal model.
(In light of both articles, it’s interesting to note that just this week the department of Potosí has mobilized under a regionalist banner—even demanding federalism—despite having been a strong pro-MAS electorate since 2005.)
Finally, my teaching article (“Pop Culture in the Classroom: American Idol, Karl Marx, and Alexis de Tocqueville”) came out in the July issue of PS: Political Science & Politics. The short article is just built around one of my favorite assignments used in intro to comparative politics courses. Basically, students are asked to write what they think Marx or Tocqueville would think about American Idol (substantiating their argument w/ direct citations from The Communist Manifesto & the introduction to Democracy in America).
(I’m also posting this as a way to both procrastinate on my upcoming APSA paper & to feel productive despite said procrastination.)
]]>Like Ari, I take issue w/ this quote from a recent New York Times article on plagiarism:
“The Internet may also be redefining how students — who came of age with music file-sharing, Wikipedia and Web-linking — understand the concept of authorship and the singularity of any text or image.”
My experience suggests that students are quite aware of the concept of “authorship,” broadly defined. When I have given students group assignments, they complain about one thing in particular: They want to get individual credit for their contribution to the project, rather than depend on a collective group grade. This is merely anecdotal evidence, of course. But I get the impression that students regularly expect to be rewarded for the fruits of their labor, and resist the possibility of “free riders” sharing credit.
Like Ari, I’ve also noticed that most plagiarists know what they’re doing is wrong. Whenever I’ve caught a student plagiarizing on an assignment, I’ve simply handed back the assignment ungraded, and told the student we needed to talk. W/o exception, he/she always recognizes instantly why I called him/her over. If they have a defense (sometimes they just confess right away), it always involve them thinking they had changed enough words around. In short, they knew that what they were doing was wrong, they just didn’t think they’d get caught.
Prior to the explosion of the internet, students who plagiarized had to at least work at it. They had to find former students who had written similar papers. Or they could always hire someone to write a paper for them. Neither of these were easy to check, so I imagine a great deal of plagiarism cases in the past simply went undiscovered. Since the internet, students don’t even have to find someone they know. They just go online. Typically, they copy Wikipedia articles (I’ve had a few of those). Or they buy a paper online (I had one of those). But both are easily traceable. As anyone who has caught a plagiarist knows, it’s usually students who don’t write very well who suddenly turn in papers w/ few (or no) mistakes and/or vocabulary you’re certain they’re not familiar w/. Often, Google can provide evidence of guilt w/in 30 seconds.
In the case of my worst offender, I even found the whole paper online from three different paper mills. It took me less than 5 mins to find them all w/ Google. And the reason I was suspicious in the first place? The paper wasn’t even on the topic I had assigned. The student hadn’t even bothered to check the assignment prompt!
Could teachers do more to discourage plagiarism? Absolutely. Students have always plagiarized. Part of the problem was that it was difficult to catch them, so the cost/benefit ran in their favor. Especially if too many professors didn’t bother to carefully check papers.
This brings me to my confession: I’m a plagiarist. Once, in high school (in the pre-internet days), I did a little experiment in my honors civics class. I suspected the teacher (who’ll remain anonymous) didn’t really grade our assignments. (I suspected as much because all we did most days in class was play Trivial Pursuit.) So on an assignment to write an essay about a US president, I chose a midpoint in the paper to start plagiarizing. I took an encyclopedia off the shelf, opened to a random page (I remember it was about dinosaurs), and began to copy word for word. Let me be clear: This was a 10-page paper in which 90% was original work by me about a former US president & 10% was text from an encyclopedia entry on dinosaurs. The teacher never remarked on it (in fact, I got an A on the assignment). And that’s one of the chief reasons why plagiarism is such a problem.
If we want to have a frank conversation about plagiarism, we have to stop focusing on the question of new technologies & generational issues. We need to focus on institutional structures that make plagiarism tempting enough to run the risk.
]]>On the one hand, the wiphala is now officially recognized as an official national emblem in the new constitution. (In fact, the new policy/military uniforms combine the tricolor & the wiphala.) In that sense, then, Bolivia has two flags, which should be raised together at formal state events.
On the other hand, the wiphala is am emblem whose problems are rarely acknowledged. Contrary to popular belief, the wiphala is not the flag of “ethnic peoples” in the Andes: It is specifically the flag of the Aymara communities. Moreover, historically there was more than one wiphala: Different ayllus or regions used different patterns to distinguish themselves. Thus, the Bolivian wiphala is not truly a “National” symbol, but rather the symbol of a particular ethnic group (which makes up about 25-30% of the total population)—and it is only one specific design of the wiphala. In that sense, then, the wiphala doesn’t serve well as a unifying national emblem (particularly if it’s not acknowledged by a regionally concentrated minority), especially in a region not typically associated w/ the emblem’s historical legacy.
This means that both Evo & Costas have a point. Costas is right to suggest out that Evo is using the event to stir up conflict by appealing to his Andean base—otherwise the whole issue could’ve been sidestepped by holding the official celebration in either Sucre or La Paz (as by tradition). But Evo is also right to insist that the wiphala is a constitutionally recognized national symbol & refusing to raise it is a form of anti-indigenous (or anti-Andean) prejudice meant to appeal to a regionalist electorate—otherwise Costas could sidestep the whole issue & just raise the thing (what harm would come of it?).
The underlying problem, however, is that despite nearly two years hammering out a new constitution to “refound” the nation, no such thing happened. Instead, the 2009 constitution was grafted onto previous constitutions (despite a large number of controversial changes, the overall spirit & substance of the document is in line w/ the evolution of the 1967 constitution as revised in 1994 & 2004).
When Evo was elected, many made comparisons between him & Mandela. In part by making the analogy that Bolivia was an “apartheid” state like pre-1994 South Africa (which is a poor analogy that shows no understanding of what Apartheid really was & how it differs from social discrimination). But some of Mandela’s greatest successes were symbolic. We’re all familiar w/ the story of the Springboks. But a more remarkable—and lasting—symbolic change has to do w/ South Africa’s post-1994 flag. As a way of “refounding” their country, South Africans didn’t simply introduce a second, “African” flag to go along w/ the old one—they developed a whole new flag. The current South African flag incorporates various elements of the country’s cultural legacies, without privileging any particular one.
Bolivians had a chance to do likewise—at least if they truly wanted to do a “refounding” exercise. And it wouldn’t have been unprecedented. Between 1826 & 1851, the country had four different flags. The country has also had three different shields of arms (the most recent design was introduced in 1888 & was modified in 2004). Instead, the new constitution merely tacked on another item to the list of patriotic symbols—w/o clearly specifying if it was on equal terms to the national flag or not (the list of patriotic symbols also includes the kantuta & patujú flowers, but it’s unlikely anyone will insist that it be present at official events). Too bad. This just means there’ll be more symbolic conflicts as identity politics continues to dominate contemporary Bolivia.
]]>Meanwhile, Ecuador (which also shares a border w/ Colombia) has been cooperating w/ Colombia’s armed forces, working to eliminate FARC guerrillas in their border region. This despite a flareup in 2008 after Colombia forces crossed—unannounced—into Ecuadorian territory to carry out a raid. During that crisis, Venezuela—but not Ecuador—mobilized troops to its border (Chávez gave the order on his Aló Presidente television show).The crisis was averted, and Ecuador & Colombia have developed a close working relationship rooting out FARC bases.
So this crisis is somewhat baffling. For all the fanfare about Venezuela’s recent military purchases, they pale in comparison to Colombia’s, both in quantity ($10 billion to $3 billion) & quality (Colombia has stocked up for years on sophisticated equipment useful for jungle counterinsurgency warfare; Venezuela has been shopping for Soviet-era assault rifles & battle tanks). Any conflict between the two countries would likely be brief (as have all wars in South America since the devastating 1932-1935 Chaco war between Bolivia & Paraguay), but it would also like end badly for Venezuela.
This makes Evo’s comments all the more puzzling. In his comments, he made clear that he found Colombia the aggressor & took a firm stance beside Chávez (an odd move for a “pacifist” country). But this suggests he expects Colombia to attack Bolivia. But why? The southernmost point of Colombia’s frontier lies nearly a thousand miles from Bolivia. And to cross into Bolivia would require Colombian forces to go through Brazilian territory. Brazil is the region’s military-political-economic juggernaut. Surely Colombia wouldn’t risk the ire of Brazil (the only Latin American country to crack the top 10 in global military expenditures) to attack Bolivia. Or does Evo expect a Colombia-Venezuela war to quickly become a regional conflict? That’s the most unlikely of all possible outcomes to this conflict.
For more on the Colombia-Venezuela conflict, see: Bloggings by Boz, Two Weeks Notice, and Just the Facts.
]]>This video is a good launch pad for discussion. Although it was produced for a Dutch network, nearly all of the 10 mins is in English (just ignore the Dutch subtitles).
]]>But it also shows that these declines have been uneven across regions & time. So it allows for a more nuanced discussion—particularly one geared at asking why fertility rates would decrease as a function of improving socioeconomic conditions (or whether a decrease in fertility rates comes before socioeconomic improvements?). Either way, it’s a great way to sneak in some structuralism.
]]>After we return, I’ll tackle wrapping up two conference papers & prepping my fall courses. Expect to see something about those projects here.
And, don’t worry, I planned our travel itinerary around the World Cup matches. I may have to miss one quarterfinal (though I’m recording it to watch later). But we will watch the final match at Small Bar in Chicago (where I watched nearly all post-group matches four years ago).
]]>Second, this tactic relies on very weak evidence. Sure, there’s a long history of US intervention in Bolivia (as in the rest of Latin America). But that says little about the current projects that are targeted: mainly, USAID funding support (often indirect) for environmental conservation NGOs like Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza (FAN), or Foro Boliviano del Medio Ambiente (FOBOMADE). So far the strongest “evidence” that USAID was “infiltrating” these organizations was when Óscar Coca, Minister of the Presidency, showed books published by environmental & indigenous NGOs that were partly financed by USAID. Bolivian books are often published w/ the help of numerous NGOs, which put their logo somewhere on the cover (often there are three or more such logos on a single book). While this demonstrates that USAID had some role in publishing some book, it says little else. Clearly, this kind of evidence is grasping at straws. The government is hoping to use a McCarthy-era tactic to paint a broad stroke by accusing anyone who has ever, under any context, had any contact w/ USAID (or even w/ another NGO that had some previous link to USAID).
Third, and most egregious, is that none of this says anything about the legitimacy of the protesters’ actual claims. And here we have two different kinds of claims by indigenous groups against the government:
So far Evo’s government has not actually addressed these issues by doing more than arguing that the complaints come from indigenous leaders who’ve been paid off by USAID (they’ve scaled back their attacks on UNDP). So now they face a national march by lowland peoples spearheaded by CIDOB (the organization of lowland indigenous peoples). This is the same group that launched the 1990 “March for Dignity” that launched Bolivia’s modern indigenous movement & was the first real challenge to neoliberalism in Bolivia. CIDOB has mobilized both for environmental concerns (they live in the oil/gas rich areas & have consistently objected to further drilling in their lands, but also demanding that their rights—under the new 2009 constitution—be respected so that they can form autonomous communities. The government objects to this primarily because some of these communities would cross department boundaries, and the government has now clearly stated that department boundaries will be sacrosanct. Odd, since one could make the argument that the department boundaries are clearly “colonial” artifacts that ignore the rights of pre-colonial peoples.
Meanwhile, CONAMAQ (the association of Andean ayllus & indigenous communities) has declared itself in opposition to the government primarily over questions of indigenous autonomy. While Evo’s government has gone further in this regard (including passing a law that puts indigenous communitarian justice on equal footing w/ existing code law), it has done so w/ a clear eye to controlling local governments. The April 2010 municipal elections put a heavy strain on this relationship, as MAS nominated candidates over the objection of local communities/leaders & often campaigned against local leaders. (For example, the municipality of Jesús de Machaca was declared an indigenous autonomous community. In January, using a local holiday, they elected their own leaders using “traditional” community procedures; MAS refused to recognize these, insisted they be elected in the “normal” process of elections, then campaigned against the community’s slate of candidates.) Local-level indigenous leaders are finding Evo to be less “pro-indigenous” than his image would suggest—at least when it comes to granting them political autonomy.
The bottom line is that the government is losing its grip on the indigenous movement. Attacking its leaders as agents of USAID (or US imperialism more broadly) and/or acting in line w/ the “extreme right” seems odd. During the 2005 campaign—and for several months later—Evo & MAS clearly raised the banner of indigenous political autonomy. By doing so, it raised expectations that indigenous groups have patiently waited for & now expect fulfilled. Similarly, the People’s Conference on Climate Change raised the banner of a pro-environmental policy agenda. Indigenous peoples & environmental activists took this as a green light to begin pressing their demands to protect Bolivia’s fragile ecosystems (which happen to be in oil-rich areas).
These last weeks may have irrevocably changed perceptions of Evo’s government. The country has a long experience w/ populist figures who use symbolic rhetoric, but never really “mean it” beyond as a way to strengthen their grip on power. A clear example is René Barrientos, the Quechua-speaking general who ruled Bolivia from 1964-1969 (and famous for capturing/executing Che Guevara). He established the “military-campesino” alliance, frequently mobilizing indigenous militias against his opponents. But, in the final analysis, he never really did much to address indigenous demands. I think increasingly more Bolivians are starting to see echoes of that past in the current government.
None of this will likely threaten Evo’s government, of course. I don’t think Bolivians want to repeat the experience of October 2003 anytime soon. But if Evo & MAS want to win the next round of elections, they might do well to think about the long term consequences of policies aimed at securing short term political hegemony.
]]>The next round looks to become interesting, particularly for Latin America. Of the 16 teams left in the tournament, 6 are from Latin America (only Honduras didn’t make it). That includes traditional powerhouses Brazil & Argentina (who look deadly). But also some surprisingly good & entertaining teams that could make a run for it: Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.
Less than half of the European teams that entered remain. And a number will go out early, yet again: England & Germany face each other in their first knock-out game. Ditto Spain & Portugal.
Meanwhile, the US is still alive. And thanks to the shake-ups of the groups stage play, have what looks like a promising chance to reach the quarterfinals. If the US beats Ghana (who beat them at the groups stage 4 years ago), they can move on to the quarterfinals to meet the winner of the Uruguay v. South Korea match. That means the US could make it to a semifinal match w/o having to face a soccer “superpower” on the way. Not an easy task—against any of these teams—but it’s an easier road than many other teams have to face.
]]>